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VI. Civil Rights
In This Section:
New Case: R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes Inc. v. Equal Employment Opprotunity
Commission
“SUPREME COURT TO DECIDE WHETHER LANDMARK CIVIL RIGHTS LAW APPLIES TO GAY
AND TRANSGENDER WORKERS”
Adam Liptak
“TRUMP ADMINISTRATION ASKS SUPREME COURT TO PERMIT EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST TRANSGENDER WORKERS”
Tara Law
“EEOC’S TRANS BIAS WIN EXPOSES SHAKINESS OF RFRA DEFENSE”
Vin Gurrieri
“TITLE VII DOESN’T PROTECT TRANS WORKERS, FUNERAL HOME SAY”
Danielle Nichole Smith
“DOJ ARGUES THAT LAW DOESN’T PROTECT TRANSGENDER WORKERS, OPPOSING THE
EEOC”
Lorelei Laird
New Case: Comcast Corp. v. National Association of African-American Owned Media
“SUPREME COURT TO HEAR RACIAL DISCRIMINATION CASE AGAINST COMCAST”
Adam Liptak
“SUPREME COURT WILL DECIDE STANDARD FOR PROVING RACIAL BIAS IN
DISCRIMINATION SUIT AGAINST COMCAST”
Debra Cassens Weiss
“SUPREME COURT TO CONSIDER CURBING RACIAL DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS”
Greg Stohr
“JUSTICE COULD BLUNT RACIAL BIAS CASES WITH COMCAST RULING”
Anne Cullen
“COMCAST, TIME WARNER CABLE HIT WITH $20 BILLION RACIAL BIAS LAWSUIT”
Jonathan Stempel
“BLACK-OWNED NETWORK’S BIAS SUIT AGAINST COMCAST”
Judy Greenwald
“APPEALS COURT REJECTS CHARTER/COMCAST MOTION TO DISMISS BYRON ALLEN’S
MULTIBILLION-DOLLAR CIVIL RIGHTS SUIT- UPDATE”
Dawn C. Chmielewski
“CALIF. JUDGE DISMISSED $20B RACE BIAS SUIT AGAINST COMCAST”
Bonnie Eslinger
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New Case: Babb v. Wilkie
“JUSTICES TO REVIEW HOW FEDERAL WORKERS PROVE JOB BIAS CLAIM”
Hassan A. Kanu
“JUSTICES TO MULL REQUIREMENTS FOR FED. WORKER ADEA CLAIMS”
Danielle Nichole Smith
“SUPREME COURT TO DETERMINE WHETHER “BUT-FOR” CAUSATION REQUIRED IN
FEDERAL-SECTOR ADEA CLAIMS”
Pamela Wolf
New Case: Klein v. Oregon Bureau of Labor and Industries
“SUPREME COURT PASSES, FOR NOW, ON A NEW WEDDING CAKE DISPUTE”
David Savage
“JUSTICES DODGE NEW CASE DEFENDING DENIAL OF SERVICE TO LGBT COUPLE”
Marcia Coyle
“THE SUPREME COURT IS SHOWING AN INSTINCT FOR SELF-PRESERVATION, AT LEAST
UNTIL NEXT YEAR’S ELECTION”
Linda Greenhouse
“U.S. SUPREME COURT ORDERS NEW LOOK AT CLASH OVER GAY-WEDDING CAKE”
Greg Stohr
“APPEALS COURT UPHOLDS FINE AGAINST CHRISTIAN BAKERS WHO REFUSED TO MAKE
SAME-SEX WEDDING CASE”
Gordan R. Friedman
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R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes Inc. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
Ruling Below: Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral
Homes, Inc, 884 F.3d 560 (6th Cir. 2018).
Overview: Aimee Stephens, who worked at R.G. & G.R. Funeral Homes, was fired when she told
the funeral director of her transition from male to female and her intentions to dress as a woman
while at work. After further investigation, the EEOC filed suit claiming that the Funeral home
violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by terminating Stephen’s employment on the
basis of her transgender or transitioning status and her refusal to conform to sex-based stereotypes
and administering a discriminatory-clothing-allowance policy. The Funeral Home argues that it
did not violate Title VII by requiring Stephens to comply with a sex-specific code, equally
burdensome to both males and females. Alternatively, the Funeral Home should not be punished
for their own sincerely held religious beliefs in violation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(RFRA).
Issue: Whether Title VII prohibits discrimination against transgender people based on (1) their
status as transgender or (2) sex stereotyping under Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff-Appellant
v.
R.G. & G.R. HARRIS FUNERAL HOMES, INC., Defendant- Appellee
United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit
Decided on March 7, 2018
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]
MOORE, Circuit Judge:
Aimee Stephens (formerly known as
Anthony Stephens) was born biologically
male. While living and presenting as a man,
she worked as a funeral director at R.G. &
G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc. ("the
Funeral Home"), a closely held for-profit
corporation that operates three funeral homes
in Michigan. Stephens was terminated from
the Funeral Home by its owner and operator,

Thomas Rost, shortly after Stephens
informed Rost that she intended to transition
from male to female and would represent
herself and dress as a woman while at work.
Stephens filed a complaint with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC"), which investigated Stephens's
allegations that she had been terminated as a
result of unlawful sex discrimination. During
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the course of its investigation, the EEOC
learned that the Funeral Home provided its
male public-facing employees with clothing
that complied with the company's dress code
while female public-facing employees
received no such allowance. The EEOC
subsequently brought suit against the Funeral
Home in which the EEOC charged the
Funeral Home with violating Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII") by (1)
terminating Stephens's employment on the
basis of her transgender or transitioning
status and her refusal to conform to sex-based
stereotypes; and (2) administering a
discriminatory-clothing-allowance policy.

clothing-allowance claim to emerge from an
investigation into Stephens's termination.
The district court granted summary judgment
in favor of the Funeral Home on both claims.
For the reasons set forth below, we hold that
(1) the Funeral Home engaged in unlawful
discrimination against Stephens on the basis
of her sex; (2) the Funeral Home has not
established that applying Title VII's
proscriptions against sex discrimination to
the Funeral Home would substantially burden
Rost's religious exercise, and therefore the
Funeral Home is not entitled to a defense
under RFRA; (3) even if Rost's religious
exercise were substantially burdened, the
EEOC has established that enforcing Title
VII is the least restrictive means of furthering
the government's compelling interest in
eradicating workplace discrimination against
Stephens; and (4) the EEOC may bring a
discriminatory-clothing-allowance claim in
this case because such an investigation into
the Funeral Home's clothing-allowance
policy was reasonably expected to grow out
of the original charge of sex discrimination
that Stephens submitted to the EEOC.
Accordingly, we REVERSE the district
court's grant of summary judgment on both
the unlawful-termination and discriminatoryclothing-allowance
claims,
GRANT
summary judgment to the EEOC on its
unlawful-termination claim, and REMAND
the case to the district court for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The parties submitted dueling motions for
summary judgment. The EEOC argued that it
was entitled to judgment as a matter of law
on both of its claims. For its part, the Funeral
Home argued that it did not violate Title VII
by requiring Stephens to comply with a sexspecific dress code that it asserts equally
burdens male and female employees, and, in
the alternative, that Title VII should not be
enforced against the Funeral Home because
requiring the Funeral Home to employ
Stephens while she dresses and represents
herself as a woman would constitute an
unjustified substantial burden upon Rost's
(and thereby the Funeral Home's) sincerely
held religious beliefs, in violation of
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
("RFRA"). As to the EEOC's discriminatoryclothing-allowance claim, the Funeral Home
argued that Sixth Circuit case law precludes
the EEOC from bringing this claim in a
complaint that arose out of Stephens's
original charge of discrimination because the
Funeral Home could not reasonably expect a

I. BACKGROUND
Aimee Stephens, a transgender woman who
was "assigned male at birth," joined the
Funeral Home as an apprentice on October 1,
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2007
and
served
as
a
Funeral
Director/Embalmer at the Funeral Home
from April 2008 until August 2013. During
the course of her employment at the Funeral
Home, Stephens presented as a man and used
her then-legal name, William Anthony
Beasley Stephens.

The Funeral Home requires its public-facing
male employees to wear suits and ties and its
public-facing female employees to wear
skirts and business jackets. The Funeral
Home provides all male employees who
interact with clients, including funeral
directors, with free suits and ties, and the
Funeral Home replaces suits as needed. All
told, the Funeral Home spends approximately
$470 per full-time employee per year and
$235 per part-time employee per year on
clothing for male employees.

The Funeral Home is a closely held for-profit
corporation. Thomas Rost ("Rost"), who has
been a Christian for over sixty-five years,
owns 95.4% of the company and operates its
three funeral home locations. Rost proclaims
"that God has called him to serve grieving
people" and "that his purpose in life is to
minister to the grieving." To that end, the
Funeral Home's website contains a mission
statement that states that the Funeral Home's
"highest priority is to honor God in all that we
do as a company and as individuals" and
includes a verse of scripture on the bottom of
the mission statement webpage. The Funeral
Home itself, however, is not affiliated with a
church; it does not claim to have a religious
purpose in its articles of incorporation; it is
open every day, including Christian holidays;
and it serves clients of all faiths. "Employees
have worn Jewish head coverings when
holding a Jewish funeral service." Although
the Funeral Home places the Bible, "Daily
Bread" devotionals, and "Jesus Cards" in
public places within the funeral homes, the
Funeral Home does not decorate its rooms
with "visible religious figures . . . to avoid
offending people of different religions." Rost
hires employees belonging to any faith or no
faith to work at the Funeral Home, and he
"does not endorse or consider himself to
endorse his employees' beliefs or nonemployment-related activities."

Until October 2014—after the EEOC filed
this suit—the Funeral Home did not provide
its female employees with any sort of
clothing or clothing allowance. Beginning in
October 2014, the Funeral Home began
providing its public-facing female employees
with an annual clothing stipend ranging from
$75 for part-time employees to $150 for fulltime employees. Rost contends that the
Funeral Home would provide suits to all
funeral directors, regardless of their sex, but
it has not employed a female funeral director
since Rost's grandmother ceased working for
the organization around 1950. According to
Rost, the Funeral Home has received only
one application from a woman for a funeral
director position in the thirty-five years that
Rost has operated the Funeral Home, and the
female applicant was deemed not qualified.
On July 31, 2013, Stephens provided Rost
with a letter stating that she has struggled
with "a gender identity disorder" her "entire
life," and informing Rost that she has
"decided to become the person that [her]
mind already is." The letter stated that
Stephens "intend[ed] to have sex
reassignment surgery," and explained that
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"[t]he first step [she] must take is to live and
work full-time as a woman for one year." To
that end, Stephens stated that she would
return from her vacation on August 26, 2013,
"as [her] true self, Amiee [sic] Australia
Stephens, in appropriate business attire."
After presenting the letter to Rost, Stephens
postponed her vacation and continued to
work for the next two weeks. Then, just
before Stephens left for her intended
vacation, Rost fired her. Rost said, "this is not
going to work out," and offered Stephens a
severance agreement if she "agreed not to say
anything or do anything." Stephens
refused. Rost testified that he fired Stephens
because "he was no longer going to represent
himself as a man. He wanted to dress as a
woman."

"management" for her termination was that
"the public would [not] be accepting of [her]
transition." She further noted that throughout
her "entire employment" at the Funeral
Home, there were "no other female Funeral
Director/Embalmers." During the course of
investigating Stephens's allegations, the
EEOC learned from another employee that
the Funeral Home did not provide its publicfacing female employees with suits or a
clothing stipend.
The EEOC issued a letter of determination on
June 5, 2014, in which the EEOC stated that
there was reasonable cause to believe that the
Funeral Home "discharged [Stephens] due to
her sex and gender identity, female, in
violation of Title VII" and "discriminated
against its female employees by providing
male employees with a clothing benefit
which was denied to females, in violation of
Title VII." The EEOC and the Funeral Home
were unable to resolve this dispute through an
informal conciliation process, and the EEOC
filed a complaint against the Funeral Home in
the district court on September 25, 2014.

Rost avers that he "sincerely believe[s] that
the Bible teaches that a person's sex is an
immutable God-given gift," and that he
would be "violating God's commands if [he]
were to permit one of [the Funeral Home's]
funeral directors to deny their sex while
acting as a representative of [the]
organization" or if he were to "permit one of
[the Funeral Home's] male funeral directors
to wear the uniform for female funeral
directors while at work." In particular, Rost
believes that authorizing or paying for a male
funeral director to wear the uniform for
female funeral directors would render him
complicit "in supporting the idea that sex is a
changeable social construct rather than an
immutable God-given gift."

The Funeral Home moved to dismiss the
EEOC's action for failure to state a claim. The
district court denied the Funeral Home's
motion, but it narrowed the basis upon which
the EEOC could pursue its unlawfultermination claim. In particular, the district
court agreed with the Funeral Home that
transgender status is not a protected trait
under Title VII, and therefore held that the
EEOC could
not
sue
for
alleged
discrimination against Stephens based solely
on her transgender and/or transitioning
status. Nevertheless, the district court
determined that the EEOC had adequately

After her employment was terminated,
Stephens filed a sex-discrimination charge
with the EEOC, alleging that "[t]he only
explanation"
she
received
from
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stated a claim for discrimination against
Stephens based on the claim that she was
fired because of her failure to conform to the
Funeral Home's "sex-or gender-based
preferences, expectations, or stereotypes."

expected to grow out of the complaining
party's—in this case, Stephens's—original
charge. The district court entered final
judgment on all counts in the Funeral Home's
favor on August 18, 2016, and the EEOC
filed a timely notice of appeal shortly
thereafter.

The parties then cross-moved for summary
judgment. With regard to the Funeral Home's
decision
to
terminate
Stephens's
employment, the district court determined
that there was "direct evidence to support a
claim of employment discrimination" against
Stephens on the basis of her sex, in violation
of Title VII. However, the court nevertheless
found in the Funeral Home's favor because it
concluded that the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act ("RFRA")precludes the
EEOC from enforcing Title VII against the
Funeral Home, as doing so would
substantially burden Rost and the Funeral
Home's religious exercise and the EEOC had
failed to demonstrate that enforcing Title VII
was the least restrictive way to achieve its
presumably compelling interest "in ensuring
that Stephens is not subject to gender
stereotypes in the workplace in terms of
required clothing at the Funeral home."
Based on its narrow conception of the
EEOC's compelling interest in bringing the
claim, the district court concluded that the
EEOC could have achieved its goals by
proposing that the Funeral Home impose a
gender-neutral dress code. The EEOC's
failure to consider such an accommodation
was, according to the district court, fatal to its
case. . Separately, the district court held that
it lacked jurisdiction to consider the EEOC's
discriminatory-clothing-allowance
claim
because, under longstanding Sixth Circuit
precedent, the EEOC may pursue in a Title
VII lawsuit only claims that are reasonably

Stephens moved to intervene in this appeal on
January 26, 2017, after expressing concern
that changes in policy priorities within the
U.S. government might prevent the EEOC
from fully representing Stephens's interests
in this case. The Funeral Home opposed
Stephens's motion on the grounds that the
motion was untimely and Stephens had failed
to show that the EEOC would not represent
her interests adequately. We determined that
Stephens's request was timely given that she
previously "had no reason to question
whether the EEOC would continue to
adequately represent her interests" and
granted Stephens's motion to intervene on
March 27, 2017. We further determined that
Stephens's intervention would not prejudice
the Funeral Home because Stephens stated in
her briefing that she did not intend to raise
new issues. Six groups of amici curiae also
submitted briefing in this case.
II.DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
"We review a district court's grant of
summary judgment de novo." Summary
judgment is warranted when "there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law." In reviewing a grant of summary
judgment, "we view all facts and any
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inferences in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party." We also review all "legal
conclusions supporting [the district court's]
grant of summary judgment de novo."

transgender and transitioning status is
necessarily discrimination on the basis of sex,
and thus the EEOC should have had the
opportunity to prove that the Funeral Home
violated Title VII by firing Stephens because
she is transgender and transitioning from
male to female.

B. Unlawful Termination Claim
Title VII prohibits employers from
"discriminat[ing] against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin." "[A]
plaintiff can establish a prima facie case [of
unlawful discrimination] by presenting direct
evidence of discriminatory intent." "[A]
facially discriminatory employment policy or
a corporate decision maker's express
statement of a desire to remove employees in
the protected group is direct evidence of
discriminatory intent." Once a plaintiff
establishes that "the prohibited classification
played a motivating part in the [adverse]
employment decision," the employer then
bears the burden of proving that it would have
terminated the plaintiff "even if it had not
been
motivated
by
impermissible
discrimination."

1. Discrimination on the Basis of Sex
Stereotypes
In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, a plurality
of the Supreme Court explained that Title
VII's proscription of discrimination "'because
of . . . sex' . . . mean[s] that gender must be
irrelevant to employment decisions. In
enacting Title VII, the plurality reasoned,
"Congress intended to strike at the entire
spectrum of disparate treatment of men and
women resulting from sex stereotypes.”
The Price Waterhouse plurality, along with
two
concurring
Justices,
therefore
determined that a female employee who
faced an adverse employment decision
because she failed to "walk . . . femininely,
talk . . . femininely, dress . . . femininely,
wear make-up, have her hair styled, [or]
wear jewelry," could properly state a claim
for sex discrimination under Title VII—even
though she was not discriminated against for
being a woman per se, but instead for failing
to be womanly enough.

Here, the district court correctly determined
that Stephens was fired because of her failure
to conform to sex stereotypes, in violation of
Title VII. ("[W]hile this Court does not often
see cases where there is direct evidence to
support
a
claim
of
employment
discrimination, it appears to exist here."). The
district court erred, however, in finding that
Stephens could not alternatively pursue a
claim that she was discriminated against on
the basis of her transgender and transitioning
status. Discrimination on the basis of

Based on Price Waterhouse, we determined
that "discrimination based on a failure to
conform to stereotypical gender norms" was
no less prohibited under Title VII than
discrimination based on "the biological
differences between men and women." And
we found no "reason to exclude Title VII
coverage for non sex-stereotypical behavior
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simply because the person is a transsexual."
Thus, in Smith, we held that a transgender
plaintiff (born male) who suffered adverse
employment consequences after "he began to
express a more feminine appearance and
manner on a regular basis" could file an
employment discrimination suit under Title
VII, because such "discrimination would not
[have] occur[red] but for the victim's
sex.." As we reasoned in Smith, Title VII
proscribes discrimination both against
women who "do not wear dresses or makeup"
and men who do. Under any circumstances,
"[s]ex stereotyping based on a person's
gender
non-conforming
behavior
is
impermissible discrimination."

to conform to a sex-specific dress code—as it
purportedly did here by requiring Stephens to
abide by the dress code designated for the
Funeral Home's male employees—because
such a policy "impose[s] equal burdens on
men and women," and thus does not single
out an employee for disparate treatment
based on that employee's sex. In support of
its position, the Funeral Home relies
principally on Jespersen v. Harrah's
Operating Co., and Barker v. Taft
Broadcasting Co.,. Jespersen held that a sexspecific grooming code that imposed
different
but
equally
burdensome
requirements on male and female employees
would not violate Title VII. Barker, for its
part, held that a sex-specific grooming code
that was enforced equally as to male and
female employees would not violate Title
VII. For three reasons, the Funeral Home's
reliance on these cases is misplaced.

Here, Rost's decision to fire Stephens because
Stephens was "no longer going to represent
himself as a man" and "wanted to dress as a
woman," falls squarely within the ambit of
sex-based
discrimination
that Price
Waterhouse and Smith forbid. For its part,
the Funeral Home has failed to establish a
non-discriminatory basis for Stephens's
termination, and Rost admitted that he did not
fire Stephens for any performance-related
issues. We therefore agree with the district
court that the Funeral Home discriminated
against Stephens on the basis of her sex, in
violation of Title VII.

First, the central issue in Jespersen and
Barker—whether
certain
sex-specific
appearance requirements violate Title VII—
is not before this court. We are not
considering, in this case, whether the Funeral
Home violated Title VII by requiring men to
wear pant suits and women to wear skirt suits.
Our question is instead whether the Funeral
Home could legally terminate Stephens,
notwithstanding that she fully intended to
comply with the company's sex-specific
dress code, simply because she refused to
conform to the Funeral Home's notion of her
sex. When the Funeral Home's actions are
viewed in the proper context, no reasonable
jury could believe that Stephens was not
"target[ed] . . . for disparate treatment" and
that "no sex stereotype factored into [the
Funeral Home's] employment decision."

The Funeral Home nevertheless argues that it
has not violated Title VII because sex
stereotyping is barred only when "the
employer's reliance on stereotypes . . .
result[s] in disparate treatment of employees
because they are either male or female."
According to the Funeral Home, an employer
does not engage in impermissible sex
stereotyping when it requires its employees
541

Second, even if we would permit certain sexspecific dress codes in a case where the issue
was properly raised, we would not rely on
either Jespersen or Barker to
do
so. Barker was
decided
before Price
Waterhouse, and it in no way anticipated the
Court's recognition that Title VII "strike[s] at
the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of
men and women resulting from sex
stereotypes." Rather, according to Barker,
"[w]hen Congress makes it unlawful for an
employer to 'discriminate . . . on the basis of
. . . sex ...', without further explanation of its
meaning, we should not readily infer that it
meant something different than what the
concept of discrimination has traditionally
meant." Of course, this is precisely the
sentiment
that
Price
Waterhouse
"eviscerated" when it recognized that "Title
VII's reference to 'sex' encompasses both the
biological differences between men and
women, and gender discrimination, that is,
discrimination based on a failure to conform
to stereotypical gender norms." Indeed,
Barker's
incompatibility
with
Price
Waterhouse may explain why this court has
not cited Barker since Price Waterhouse was
decided.

that requiring women to wear makeup does,
in fact, constitute improper sex stereotyping.
And more broadly, our decision in Smith
forecloses the Jespersen court's suggestion
that sex stereotyping is permissible so long as
the required conformity does not "impede [an
employee's] ability to perform her job," as the
Smith plaintiff did not and was not required
to allege that being expected to adopt a more
masculine appearance and manner interfered
with his job performance. Jespersen's
incompatibility with Smith may explain why
it has never been endorsed (or even cited) by
this circuit—and why it should not be
followed now.
Finally, the Funeral Home misreads binding
precedent when it suggests that sex
stereotyping violates Title VII only when "the
employer's sex stereotyping resulted in
'disparate
treatment
of
men
and
women.'" This interpretation of Title VII
cannot be squared with our holding in Smith.
There, we did not ask whether transgender
persons transitioning from male to female
were treated differently than transgender
persons transitioning from female to male.
Rather, we considered whether a transgender
person was being discriminated against based
on "his failure to conform to sex stereotypes
concerning how a man should look and
behave." It is apparent from both Price
Waterhouse and Smith that an employer
engages in unlawful discrimination even if it
expects both biologically male and female
employees to conform to certain notions of
how each should behave.

As for Jespersen, that Ninth Circuit case is
irreconcilable with our decision in Smith.
Critical to Jespersen's holding was the notion
that the employer's "grooming standards,"
which required all female bartenders to wear
makeup (and prohibited males from doing
so), did not on their face violate Title VII
because they did "not require [the plaintiff] to
conform to a stereotypical image that would
objectively impede her ability to perform her
job." We reached the exact opposite
conclusion in Smith, as we explained

In short, the Funeral Home's sex-specific
dress code does not preclude liability under
Title VII. Even if the Funeral Home's dress
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code does not itself violate Title VII—an
issue that is not before this court—the
Funeral Home may not rely on its policy to
combat the charge that it engaged in improper
sex stereotyping when it fired Stephens for
wishing to appear or behave in a manner that
contradicts the Funeral Home's perception of
how she should appear or behave based on
her sex. Because the EEOC has presented
unrefuted evidence that unlawful sex
stereotyping was "at least a motivating factor
in the [Funeral Home's] actions,” and because
we reject the Funeral Home's affirmative
defenses, we GRANT summary judgment to
the EEOC on its sex discrimination claim.
2. Discrimination on the Basis
Transgender/Transitioning Status

does not prohibit discrimination based on a
person's transgender or transitioning status
because "sex," for the purposes of Title VII,
"refers to a binary characteristic for which
there are only two classifications, male and
female," and "which classification arises in a
person based on their chromosomally driven
physiology and reproductive function."
According to the Funeral Home, transgender
status refers to "a person's self-assigned
'gender identity'" rather than a person's sex,
and therefore such a status is not protected
under Title VII.
For two reasons, the EEOC and Stephens
have the better argument. First, it is
analytically impossible to fire an employee
based on that employee's status as a
transgender person without being motivated,
at least in part, by the employee's sex. The
Seventh Circuit's method of "isolat[ing] the
significance of the plaintiff's sex to the
employer's decision" to determine whether
Title VII has been triggered illustrates this
point. In Hively, the Seventh Circuit
determined that Title VII prohibits
discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation—a different question than the
issue before this court—by asking whether
the plaintiff, a self-described lesbian, would
have been fired "if she had been a man
married to a woman (or living with a woman,
or dating a woman) and everything else had
stayed the same." If the answer to that
question is no, then the plaintiff has stated a
"paradigmatic sex discrimination" claim.
Here, we ask whether Stephens would have
been fired if Stephens had been a woman who
sought to comply with the women's dress
code. The answer quite obviously is no. This,
in and of itself, confirms that Stephens's sex

of

We also hold that discrimination on the basis
of transgender and transitioning status
violates Title VII. The district court rejected
this theory of liability at the motion-todismiss stage, holding that "transgender or
transsexual status is currently not a protected
class under Title VII." The EEOC and
Stephens argue that the district court's
determination was erroneous because Title
VII protects against sex stereotyping and
"transgender discrimination is based on the
non-conformance of an individual's gender
identity and appearance with sex-based
norms
or
expectations";
therefore,
"discrimination because of an individual's
transgender status is always based on genderstereotypes: the stereotype that individuals
will conform their appearance and
behavior—whether their dress, the name they
use, or other ways they present themselves—
to the sex assigned them at birth." The
Funeral Home, in turn, argues that Title VII
543

impermissibly affected Rost's decision to fire
Stephens.

Court made clear in Price Waterhouse that
Title VII requires "gender [to] be irrelevant to
employment decisions." Gender (or sex) is
not being treated as "irrelevant to
employment decisions" if an employee's
attempt or desire to change his or her sex
leads to an adverse employment decision.

The court's analysis in Schroer v. Billington,
provides another useful way of framing the
inquiry. There, the court noted that an
employer who fires an employee because the
employee converted from Christianity to
Judaism has discriminated against the
employee "because of religion," regardless of
whether the employer feels any animus
against either Christianity or Judaism,
because "[d]iscrimination 'because of
religion' easily encompasses discrimination
because of a change of religion.'" By the
same token, discrimination "because of sex"
inherently includes discrimination against
employees because of a change in their sex.
Here, there is evidence that Rost at least
partially based his employment decision on
Stephens's desire to change her sex: Rost
justified firing Stephens by explaining that
Rost "sincerely believes that 'the Bible
teaches that a person's sex (whether male or
female) is an immutable God-given gift and
that it is wrong for a person to deny his or her
God-given sex,'" and "the Bible teaches that
it is wrong for a biological male to deny his
sex by dressing as a woman." As amici point
out in their briefing, such statements
demonstrate that "Ms. Stephens's sex
necessarily factored into the decision to fire
her."

Second, discrimination against transgender
persons necessarily implicates Title VII's
proscriptions against sex stereotyping. As we
recognized in Smith, a transgender person is
someone who "fails to act and/or identify
with his or her gender"—i.e., someone who
is inherently "gender non-conforming."
Thus, an employer cannot discriminate on the
basis of transgender status without imposing
its stereotypical notions of how sexual organs
and gender identity ought to align. There is
no way to disaggregate discrimination on the
basis
of
transgender
status
from
discrimination on the basis of gender nonconformity, and we see no reason to try.
We did not expressly hold in Smith that
discrimination on the basis of transgender
status is unlawful, though the opinion has
been read to say as much—both by this
circuit and others. In G.G. v. Gloucester
County School Board, for instance, the
Fourth Circuit described Smith as holding
"that discrimination against a transgender
individual based on that person's transgender
status is discrimination because of sex under
federal civil rights statutes." And in Dodds v.
United States Department of Education, we
refused to stay "a preliminary injunction
ordering the school district to treat an elevenyear old transgender girl as a female and
permit her to use the girls' restroom" because,
among other things, the school district failed

The Funeral Home argues that Schroer's
analogy is "structurally flawed" because,
unlike religion, a person's sex cannot be
changed; it is, instead, a biologically
immutable trait. We need not decide that
issue; even if true, the Funeral Home's point
is immaterial. As noted above, the Supreme
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to show that it would likely succeed on the
merits. In so holding, we cited Smith as
evidence that this circuit's "settled law"
prohibits "[s]ex stereotyping based on a
person's gender non-conforming behavior,"
and then pointed to out-of-circuit cases for
the propositions that "[a] person is defined as
transgender precisely because of the
perception that his or her behavior
transgresses gender stereotypes," and "[t]he
weight of authority establishes that
discrimination based on transgender status is
already prohibited by the language of federal
civil rights statutes.” Such references support
what we now directly hold: Title VII
protects transgender persons because of their
transgender or transitioning status, because
transgender or transitioning status constitutes
an inherently gender non-conforming trait.

the district court in Smith for "relying on a
series of pre-Price Waterhouse cases from
other federal appellate courts holding that
transsexuals, as a class, are not entitled to
Title VII protection because 'Congress had a
narrow view of sex in mind' and 'never
considered nor intended that [Title VII] apply
to anything other than the traditional concept
of sex.'" According to Smith, such a limited
view of Title VII's protections had been
"eviscerated by Price Waterhouse." The
Funeral Home's attempt to resurrect the
reasoning of these earlier cases thus runs
directly counter to Smith's holding.
In a related argument, the Funeral Home
notes that both biologically male and
biologically female persons may consider
themselves
transgender,
such
that
transgender status is not unique to one
biological sex. It is true, of course, that an
individual’s biological sex does not dictate
her transgender status; the two traits are not
coterminous. But a trait need not be exclusive
to one sex to nevertheless be a function of
sex. As the Second Circuit explained in
Zarda,

The Funeral Home raises several arguments
against this interpretation of Title VII, none
of which we find persuasive. First, the
Funeral Home contends that the Congress
enacting Title VII understood "sex" to refer
only to a person's "physiology and
reproductive role," and not a person's "selfassigned 'gender identity.'" But the drafters'
failure to anticipate that Title VII would
cover transgender status is of little
interpretive value, because ”statutory
prohibitions often go beyond the principal
evil to cover reasonably comparable evils,
and it is ultimately the provisions of our laws
rather than the principal concerns of our
legislators by which we are governed.” And
in any event, Smith and Price Waterhouse
preclude an interpretation of Title VII that
reads "sex" to mean only individuals'
"chromosomally driven physiology and
reproductive function." Indeed, we criticized

Title VII does not ask whether a
particular sex is discriminated
against; it asks whether a particular
"individual" is discriminated against
"because of such individual's . . . sex."
Taking individuals as the unit of
analysis, the question is not whether
discrimination is borne only by men
or only by women or even by both
men and women; instead, the
question is whether an individual is
discriminated against because of his
or her sex.
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Because an employer cannot discriminate
against an employee for being transgender
without considering that employee's
biological sex, discrimination on the basis of
transgender status necessarily entails
discrimination on the basis of sex—no matter
what sex the employee was born or wishes to
be. By the same token, an employer need not
discriminate based on a trait common to all
men or women to violate Title VII. After all,
a subset of both women and men decline to
wear dresses or makeup, but discrimination
against any woman on this basis would
constitute sex discrimination under Price
Waterhouse.

from being viewed both as discrimination
based on "gender identity" for certain statutes
and, for the purposes of Title VII,
discrimination on the basis of sex.
The Funeral Home places great emphasis on
the fact that our published decision in Smith
superseded an earlier decision that stated
explicitly, as opposed to obliquely, that a
plaintiff who "alleges discrimination based
solely on his identification as a transsexual . .
. has alleged a claim of sex stereotyping
pursuant to Title VII." But such an
amendment does not mean, as the Funeral
Home contends, that the now-binding Smith
opinion "directly rejected" the notion that
Title VII prohibits discrimination on the basis
of transgender status. The elimination of the
language, which was not necessary to the
decision, simply means that Smith did not
expressly recognize Title VII protections for
transgender persons based on identity. But
Smith's reasoning still leads us to the same
conclusion.

Nor can much be gleaned from the fact that
later statutes, such as the Violence Against
Women
Act,
expressly
prohibit
discrimination on the basis of "gender
identity," while Title VII does not, because
"Congress may certainly choose to use both a
belt and suspenders to achieve its objectives.”
We have, in fact, already read Title VII to
provide redundant statutory protections in a
different context. In In re Rodriguez, for
instance, we recognized that claims alleging
discrimination on the basis of ethnicity may
fall within Title VII's prohibition on
discrimination on the basis of national origin,
even though at least one other federal statute
treats "national origin" and "ethnicity" as
separate traits. Moreover, Congress's failure
to modify Title VII to include expressly
gender
identity
"lacks
'persuasive
significance' because 'several equally tenable
inferences' may be drawn from such inaction,
'including the inference that the existing
legislation already incorporated the offered
change.'" In short, nothing precludes
discrimination based on transgender status

We are also unpersuaded that our decision in
Vickers v. Fairfield Medical Center,
precludes the holding we issue today. We
held in Vickers that a plaintiff cannot pursue
a claim for impermissible sex stereotyping on
the ground that his perceived sexual
orientation fails to conform to gender norms
unless he alleges that he was discriminated
against for failing to "conform to traditional
gender stereotypes in any observable way at
work." Vickers thus rejected the notion that
"the act of identification with a particular
group, in itself, is sufficiently gender nonconforming such that an employee who so
identifies would, by this very identification,
engage in conduct that would enable him to
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assert a successful sex stereotyping claim."
The Vickers court reasoned that recognizing
such a claim would impermissibly "bootstrap
protection for sexual orientation into Title
VII." The Funeral Home insists that, under
Vickers, Stephens's sex-stereotyping claim
survives only to the extent that it concerns her
"appearance or mannerisms on the job, but
not as it pertains to her underlying status as a
transgender person.

which we held that a reasonable jury could
conclude that a transgender plaintiff was
discriminated against on the basis of his sex
when, among other factors, his "ambiguous
sexuality and his practice of dressing as a
woman outside of work were well-known
within the [workplace]." From Smith and
Barnes, it is clear that a plaintiff may state a
claim under Title VII for discrimination
based on gender nonconformance that is
expressed outside of work. The Vickers
court's efforts to develop a narrower rule are
therefore not binding in this circuit.

The Funeral Home is wrong. First, Vickers
does not control this case because Vickers
concerned a different legal question. As the
EEOC and amici Equality Ohio note, Vickers
"addressed only whether Title VII forbids
sexual orientation discrimination, not
discrimination against a transgender
individual." While it is indisputable that "[a]
panel of this Court cannot overrule the
decision of another panel" when the "prior
decision [constitutes] controlling authority."
After all, we do not overrule a case by
distinguishing it.

Therefore, for the reasons set forth above, we
hold that the EEOC could pursue a claim
under Title VII on the ground that the Funeral
Home discriminated against Stephens on the
basis of her transgender status and
transitioning identity. The EEOC should
have had the opportunity, either through a
motion for summary judgment or at trial, to
establish that the Funeral Home violated Title
VII's prohibition on discrimination on the
basis of sex by firing Stephens because she
was transgender and transitioning from male
to female.

Second, we are not bound by Vickers to the
extent that it contravenes Smith. As noted
above, Vickers indicated that a sexstereotyping claim is viable under Title VII
only if a plaintiff alleges that he was
discriminated against for failing to "conform
to traditional gender stereotypes in any
observable way at work." The Vickers court's
new "observable-at-work" requirement is at
odds with the holding in Smith, which did not
limit sex-stereotyping claims to traits that are
observable in the workplace. The
"observable-at-work" requirement
also
contravenes our reasoning in Barnes v. City
of Cincinnati—a binding decision that
predated Vickers by more than a year—in

3. Defenses to Title VII Liability
Having determined that the Funeral Home
violated Title VII's prohibition on sex
discrimination, we must now consider
whether any defenses preclude enforcement
of Title VII in this case. As noted above, the
district court held that the EEOC's
enforcement efforts must give way to
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
("RFRA"), which prohibits the government
from enforcing a religiously neutral law
against an individual if that law substantially
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burdens the individual's religious exercise
and is not the least restrictive way to further
a compelling government interest. The
EEOC seeks reversal of this decision; the
Funeral Home urges affirmance. In addition,
certain amici ask us to affirm the district
court's grant of summary judgment on
different grounds—namely that Stephens
falls within the "ministerial exception" to
Title VII and is therefore not protected under
the Act.

employer must be a religious institution and
the employee must have been a ministerial
employee." "The ministerial exception is a
highly circumscribed doctrine. It grew out of
the special considerations raised by the
employment claims of clergy, which
'concern[] internal church discipline, faith,
and organization, all of which are governed
by ecclesiastical rule, custom, and law.'"
Public Advocate of the United States and its
fellow amici argue that the ministerial
exception applies in this case because (1) the
exception applies both to religious and nonreligious entities, and (2) Stephens is a
ministerial employee. Tellingly, however, the
Funeral Home contends that the Funeral
Home "is not a religious organization" and
therefore, "the ministerial exception has no
application" to this case. Although the
Funeral Home has not waived the ministerialexception defense by failing to raise
it, the First
Amendment's ministerial
exception" because "[t]his constitutional
protection is . . . structural"), we agree with
the Funeral Home that the exception is
inapplicable here.

We hold that the Funeral Home does not
qualify for the ministerial exception to Title
VII; the Funeral Home's religious exercise
would not be substantially burdened by
continuing to employ Stephens without
discriminating against her on the basis of sex
stereotypes; the EEOC has established that it
has a compelling interest in ensuring the
Funeral Home complies with Title VII; and
enforcement of Title VII is necessarily the
least restrictive way to achieve that
compelling
interest.
We
therefore
REVERSE the district court's grant of
summary judgment in the Funeral Home's
favor and GRANT summary judgment to the
EEOC on the unlawful-termination claim.

As we made clear in Conlon, the ministerial
exception applies only to "religious
institution[s]." While an institution need not
be "a church, diocese, or synagogue, or an
entity operated by a traditional religious
organization," to qualify for the exception,
the institution must be "marked by clear or
obvious religious characteristics.” In
accordance with these principles, we have
previously determined that the InterVarsity
Christian Fellowship/USA ("IVCF"), "an
evangelical campus mission," constituted a
religious organization for the purposes of the

a. Ministerial Exception
We turn first to the "ministerial exception" to
Title VII, which is rooted in the First
Amendment's religious protections, and
which
"preclude[s]
application
of
[employment discrimination laws such as
Title VII] to claims concerning the
employment relationship between a religious
institution and its ministers." "[I]n order for
the ministerial exception to bar an
employment discrimination claim, the
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ministerial exception. IVCF described itself
on its website as "faith-based religious
organization" whose "purpose 'is to establish
and advance at colleges and universities
witnessing communities of students and
faculty who follow Jesus as Savior and
Lord.'" In addition, IVCF's website notified
potential employees that it has the right to
"hir[e] staff based on their religious beliefs so
that all staff share the same religious
commitment." Finally, IVCF required all
employees "annually [to] reaffirm their
agreement with IVCF's Purpose Statement
and Doctrinal Basis."

for federally recognized holidays, Easter is
not a paid holiday.
Nor is Stephens a "ministerial employee"
under Hosanna-Tabor. Following HosannaTabor, we have identified four factors to
assist courts in assessing whether an
employee is a minister covered by the
exception: (1) whether the employee's title
"conveys a religious—as opposed to
secular—meaning"; (2) whether the title
reflects "a significant degree of religious
training" that sets the employee "apart from
laypersons"; (3) whether the employee serves
"as an ambassador of the faith" and serves a
"leadership role within [the] church, school,
and community"; and (4) whether the
employee performs "important religious
functions . . . for the religious
organization." Stephens's
title—"Funeral
Director"—conveys a purely secular
function. The record does not reflect that
Stephens has any religious training. Though
Stephens has a public-facing role within the
funeral home, she was not an "ambassador of
[any] faith," and she did not perform
"important religious functions," rather, Rost's
description of funeral directors' work
identifies mostly secular tasks—making
initial contact with the deceased's families,
handling the removal of the remains to the
funeral home, introducing other staff to the
families, coaching the families through the
first viewing, greeting the guests, and
coordinating the families' "final farewell.”
The only responsibilities assigned to
Stephens that could be construed as religious
in nature were, "on limited occasions," to
"facilitate" a family's clergy selection,
"facilitate the first meeting of clergy and
family members," and "play a role in building

The Funeral Home, by comparison, has
virtually no "religious characteristics."
Unlike the campus mission in Conlon, the
Funeral Home does not purport or seek to
"establish and advance" Christian values. As
the EEOC notes, the Funeral Home "is not
affiliated with any church; its articles of
incorporation do not avow any religious
purpose; its employees are not required to
hold any particular religious views; and it
employs and serves individuals of all
religions." Though the Funeral Home's
mission statement declares that "its highest
priority is to honor God in all that we do as a
company and as individuals," the Funeral
Home's sole public displays of faith,
according to Rost, amount to placing "Daily
Bread" devotionals and "Jesus Cards" with
scriptural references in public places in the
funeral homes, which clients may pick up if
they wish. The Funeral Home does not
decorate its rooms with "religious figures"
because it does not want to "offend[] people
of different religions." The Funeral Home is
open every day, including on Christian
holidays. And while the employees are paid
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the family's confidence around the role the
clergy will play, clarifying what type of
religious message is desired, and integrating
the clergy into the experience." Such
responsibilities are a far cry from the duties
ascribed to the employee in Conlon, which
"included assisting others to cultivate
'intimacy with God and growth in Christ-like
character through personal and corporate
spiritual disciplines.'" In short, Stephens was
not a ministerial employee and the Funeral
Home is not a religious institution, and
therefore the ministerial exception plays no
role in this case.

individual is the least restrictive means of
furthering a compelling government interest.
The questions now before us are whether (1)
we ought to remand this case and preclude the
Funeral Home from asserting a RFRA-based
defense in the proceedings below because
Stephens, a non-governmental party, joined
this action as an intervenor on appeal; (2) if
not, whether the Funeral Home adequately
demonstrated that it would be substantially
burdened by the application of Title VII in
this case; (3) if so, whether the EEOC
nevertheless demonstrated that application of
a such a burden to the Funeral Home furthers
a compelling governmental interest; and (4)
if so, whether the application of such
a burden constitutes the least restrictive
means of furthering that compelling interest.
We address each inquiry in turn.

b. Religious Freedom Restoration Act
Congress enacted RFRA in 1993 to resurrect
and broaden the Free Exercise Clause
jurisprudence that existed before the
Supreme Court's decision in Employment
Division v. Smith, which overruled the
approach to analyzing Free Exercise Clause
claims set forth by Sherbert v. Verner. To that
end, RFRA precludes the government from
"substantially burden[ing] a person's exercise
of religion even if the burden results from a
rule of general applicability," unless the
government "demonstrates that application of
the burden to the person—(1) is in
furtherance of a compelling governmental
interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means
of furthering that compelling governmental
interest." RFRA thus contemplates a two-step
burden-shifting analysis: First, a claimant
must demonstrate that complying with a
generally applicable law would substantially
burden his religious exercise. Upon such a
showing, the government must then establish
that applying the law to the burdened

i. Applicability of the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act
We have previously made clear that
“Congress intended RFRA to apply only to
suits in which the government is a party."
Thus, if Stephens had initiated a private
lawsuit against the Funeral Home to
vindicate her rights under Title VII, the
Funeral Home would be unable to invoke
RFRA as a defense because the government
would not have been party to the suit. Now
that Stephens has intervened in this suit, she
argues that the case should be remanded to
the district court with instructions barring the
Funeral Home from asserting a RFRA
defense to her individual claims. The EEOC
supports Stephens's argument.

550

The Funeral Home, in turn, argues that the
question of RFRA's applicability to Title VII
suits between private parties "is a new and
complicated issue that has never been a part
of this case and has never been briefed by the
parties." Because Stephens's intervention on
appeal was granted, in part, on her assurances
that she "seeks only to raise arguments
already within the scope of this appeal," the
Funeral Home insists that permitting
Stephens to argue now in favor of remand
"would immensely prejudice the Funeral
Home and undermine the Court's reasons for
allowing Stephens's intervention in the first
place."

to present particular defenses on the merits to
judiciable claims is different than allowing
intervenors to change the procedural course
of litigation by virtue of their intervention.
Moreover, we typically will not consider
issues raised for the first time on appeal
unless they are "presented with sufficient
clarity and completeness and [their]
resolution will materially advance the
process of th[e] . . . litigation." The merits of
a remand have been addressed only in
passing by the parties, and thus have not been
discussed with "sufficient clarity and
completeness" to enable us to entertain
Stephens's claim.

The Funeral Home is correct. Stephens's
reply brief in support of her motion to
intervene insists that "no party to an appeal
may broaden the scope of litigation beyond
the issues raised before the district court."
Though the district court noted in a footnote
that "the Funeral Home could not assert
a RFRA defense if Stephens had filed a Title
VII suit on Stephens's own behalf," this
argument was not briefed by the parties at the
district-court level. Thus, in accordance with
Stephens's own brief, she should not be
permitted to argue for remand before this
court.

ii. Prima Facie Case Under RFRA
To assert a viable defense under RFRA, a
religious claimant must demonstrate that the
government action at issue "would (1)
substantially burden (2) a sincere (3)
religious exercise." In reviewing such a
claim, courts must not evaluate whether
asserted "religious beliefs are mistaken or
insubstantial." Rather, courts must assess
"whether the line drawn reflects 'an honest
conviction.'" In addition, RFRA, as amended
by
the Religious
Land
Use
and
Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000
("RLUIPA"), protects "any exercise of
religion, whether or not compelled by, or
central to, a system of religious belief."

Stephens
nevertheless
insists
that
"intervenors . . . are permitted to present
different arguments related to the principal
parties' claims." But in Grutter, this court
determined that proposed intervenors ought
to be able to present particular "defenses of
affirmative action" that the principal party to
the case (a university) might be disinclined to
raise because of "internal and external
institutional pressures." Allowing intervenors

The EEOC argues that the Funeral Home's
RFRA defense must fail because "RFRA
protects religious exercise, not religious
beliefs," and the Funeral Home has failed to
"identif[y] how continuing to employ
Stephens after, or during, her transition
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would interfere with any religious 'action or
practice.'" The Funeral Home, in turn,
contends that the "very operation of [the
Funeral Home] constitutes protected
religious exercise" because Rost feels
compelled by his faith to "serve grieving
people" through the funeral home, and thus
"[r]equiring [the Funeral Home] to authorize
a male funeral director to wear the uniform
for female funeral directors would directly
interfere with—and thus impose a substantial
burden on—[the Funeral Home's] ability to
carry out Rost's religious exercise of caring
for the grieving."

The Funeral Home's first alleged burden—
that Stephens will present a distraction that
will obstruct Rost's ability to serve grieving
families—is premised on presumed biases.
As the EEOC observes, the Funeral Home's
argument is based on "a view that Stephens is
a 'man' and would be perceived as such even
after her gender transition," as well as on the
"assumption that a transgender funeral
director would so disturb clients as to 'hinder
healing.'" The factual premises underlying
this purported burden are wholly unsupported
in the record. Rost testified that he has never
seen Stephens in anything other than a suit
and tie and does not know how Stephens
would have looked when presenting as a
woman. Rost's assertion that he believes his
clients would be disturbed by Stephens's
appearance during and after her transition to
the point that their healing from their loved
ones' deaths would be hindered, at the very
least raises a material question of fact as to
whether his clients would actually be
distracted, which cannot be resolved in the
Funeral Home's favor at the summaryjudgment stage. Thus, even if we were to find
the Funeral Home's argument legally
cognizable, we would not affirm a finding of
substantial burden based on a contested and
unsupported assertion of fact.

If we take Rost's assertions regarding his
religious beliefs as sincere, which all parties
urge us to do, then we must treat Rost's
running of the funeral home as a religious
exercise—even though Rost does not suggest
that ministering to grieving mourners by
operating a funeral home is a tenet of his
religion, more broadly. The question
then becomes whether the Funeral Home has
identified any way in which continuing to
employ Stephens would substantially burden
Rost's ability to serve mourners. The Funeral
Home purports to identify two burdens.
"First, allowing a funeral director to wear the
uniform for members of the opposite sex
would often create distractions for the
deceased's loved ones and thereby hinder
their healing process (and [the Funeral
Home's] ministry)," and second, "forcing [the
Funeral Home] to violate Rost's faith . . .
would significantly pressure Rost to leave the
funeral industry and end his ministry to
grieving people." Neither alleged burden is
"substantial" within the meaning of RFRA.

But more to the point, we hold as a matter of
law that a religious claimant cannot rely on
customers' presumed biases to establish a
substantial burden under RFRA. Though we
have seemingly not had occasion to address
the issue, other circuits have considered
whether and when to account for customer
biases
in
justifying
discriminatory
employment practices. In particular, courts
asked to determine whether customers' biases
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may render sex a "bona fide occupational
qualification" under Title VII have held that
"it would be totally anomalous . . . to allow
the preferences and prejudices of the
customers to determine whether the sex
discrimination was valid." District courts
within this circuit have endorsed these outof-circuit opinions.

The Funeral Home's second alleged burden
also fails. Under Holt v. Hobbs, a
government action that "puts [a religious
practitioner] to th[e] choice" of "'engag[ing]
in conduct that seriously violates [his]
religious beliefs' [or] . . . fac[ing] serious"
consequences constitutes a substantial
burden for the purposes of RFRA. Here, Rost
contends that he is being put to such a choice,
as he either must "purchase female attire" for
Stephens or authorize her "to dress in female
attire while representing [the Funeral Home]
and serving the bereaved," which purportedly
violates Rost's religious beliefs, or else face
"significant[] pressure . . . to leave the funeral
industry and end his ministry to grieving
people." Neither of these purported choices
can be considered a "substantial burden"
under RFRA.

Of course, cases like Diaz, Fernandez,
and Bradley concern a different situation
than the one at hand. We could agree that
courts should not credit customers'
prejudicial notions of what men and women
can do when considering whether sex
constitutes a "bona fide occupational
qualification" for a given position while
nonetheless recognizing that those same
prejudices have practical effects that would
substantially burden Rost's religious practice
(i.e., the operation of his business) in this
case. But the Ninth Circuit rejected similar
reasoning in Fernandez, and we reject it here.
In Fernandez, the Ninth Circuit held that
customer preferences could not transform a
person's gender into a relevant consideration
for a particular position even if the record
supported the idea that the employer's
business would suffer from promoting a
woman because a large swath of clients
would refuse to work with a female vicepresident. Just as the Fernandez court refused
to treat discriminatory promotion practices as
critical to an employer's business,
notwithstanding any evidence to that effect in
the record, so too we refuse to treat
discriminatory policies as essential to Rost's
business—or, by association, his religious
exercise.

First, though Rost currently provides his male
employees with suits and his female
employees with stipends to pay for clothing,
this benefit is not legally required and Rost
does not suggest that the benefit is religiously
compelled. In this regard, Rost is unlike the
employers in Hobby Lobby, who rejected the
idea that they could simply refuse to provide
health care altogether and pay the associated
penalty (which would allow them to avoid
providing access to contraceptives in
violation of their beliefs) because they felt
religiously compelled to provide their
employees with health insurance. And while
"it is predictable that the companies
[in Hobby Lobby] would face a competitive
disadvantage in retaining and attracting
skilled workers" if they failed to provide
health insurance, the record here does not
indicate that the Funeral Home's clothing
benefit is necessary to attract workers; in
553

fact, until the EEOC commenced the present
action, the Funeral Home did not provide any
sort of clothing benefit to its female
employees. Thus, Rost is not being forced to
choose between providing Stephens with
clothing or else leaving the business; this is a
predicament of Rost's own making.

filling out a form certifying that they have a
religious
objection
to
providing
contraceptive coverage or directly notifying
the Department of Health and Human
Services of the religious objection—
substantially burdens their religious practice.
Eight of the nine circuits to review the issue,
including this court, have determined that the
opt-out process does not constitute a
substantial burden. The courts reached this
conclusion by examining the Affordable Care
Act's provisions and determining that it was
the statute—and not the employer's act of
opting out—that "entitle[d] plan participants
and beneficiaries to contraceptive coverage."
As a result, the employers' engagement with
the opt-out process, though legally
significant in that it leads the government to
provide the organizations' employees with
access to contraceptive coverage through an
alternative route, does not mean the
employers are facilitating the provision of
contraceptives in a way that violates their
religious practice.

Second, simply permitting Stephens to wear
attire that reflects a conception of gender that
is at odds with Rost's religious beliefs is not
a substantial burden under RFRA. We
presume that the "line [Rost] draw[s]"—
namely, that permitting Stephens to represent
herself as a woman would cause him to
"violate God's commands" because it would
make him "directly involved in supporting
the idea that sex is a changeable social
construct rather than an immutable Godgiven gift," constitutes "an honest
conviction." But we hold that, as a matter of
law, tolerating Stephens's understanding of
her sex and gender identity is not tantamount
to supporting it.
Most circuits, including this one, have
recognized that a party can sincerely believe
that he is being coerced into engaging in
conduct that violates his religious convictions
without actually, as a matter of law, being so
engaged. Courts have recently confronted
this issue when non-profit organizations
whose religious beliefs prohibit them "from
paying for, providing, or facilitating the
distribution of contraceptives," or in any way
"be[ing] complicit in the provision of
contraception" argued that the Affordable
Care
Act's opt-out
procedure—which
enables organizations with religious
objections to the contraceptive mandate to
avoid providing such coverage by either

We view the Funeral Home's compliance
with antidiscrimination laws in much the
same light. Rost may sincerely believe that,
by retaining Stephens as an employee, he is
supporting and endorsing Stephens's views
regarding the mutability of sex. But as a
matter of law, bare compliance with Title
VII—without actually assisting or facilitating
Stephens's transition efforts—does not
amount to an endorsement of Stephens's
views. As much is clear from the Supreme
Court's Free Speech jurisprudence, in which
the Court has held that a statute requiring law
schools to provide military and nonmilitary
recruiters an equal opportunity to recruit
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students on campus was not improperly
compelling schools to endorse the military's
policies because "[n]othing about recruiting
suggests that law schools agree with any
speech by recruiters," and "students can
appreciate the difference between speech a
school sponsors and speech the school
permits because legally required to do so,
pursuant to an equal access policy."
Similarly, here, requiring the Funeral Home
to refrain from firing an employee with
different religious views from Rost does not,
as a matter of law, mean that Rost is
endorsing or supporting those views. Indeed,
Rost's own behavior suggests that he sees the
difference between employment and
endorsement, as he employs individuals of
any or no faith, "permits employees to wear
Jewish head coverings for Jewish services,"
and "even testified that he is not endorsing
his employee's religious beliefs by
employing them."

Because the Funeral Home has not
established that Rost's religious exercise
would be substantially burdened by requiring
the Funeral Home to comply with Title VII,
we do not need to consider whether the
EEOC has adequately demonstrated that
enforcing Title VII in this case is the least
restrictive means of furthering a compelling
government interest. However, in the interest
of completeness, we reach this issue and
conclude that the EEOC has satisfied its
burden. We therefore GRANT summary
judgment to the EEOC with regard to the
Funeral Home's RFRA defense on the
alternative grounds that the EEOC's
enforcement action in this case survives strict
scrutiny.
(a) Compelling Government Interest
Under the "to the person" test, the EEOC
must demonstrate that its compelling interest
"is satisfied through application of the
challenged law [to] . . . the particular claimant
whose sincere exercise of religion is being
substantially
burdened." This
requires
"look[ing] beyond broadly formulated
interests justifying the general applicability
of government mandates and scrutiniz[ing]
the asserted harm of granting specific
exemptions
to
particular
religious
claimants."

At bottom, the fact that Rost sincerely
believes that he is being compelled to make
such an endorsement does not make it so.
Accordingly, requiring Rost to comply with
Title VII's proscriptions on discrimination
does not substantially burden his religious
practice. The district court therefore erred in
granting summary judgment to the Funeral
Home on the basis of its RFRA defense, and
we REVERSE the district court's decision on
this ground. As Rost's purported burdens are
insufficient as a matter of law, we GRANT
summary judgment to the EEOC with respect
to the Funeral Home's RFRA defense.

As an initial matter, the Funeral Home does
not seem to dispute that the EEOC "has a
compelling interest in the 'elimination of
workplace discrimination, including sex
discrimination.'" However, the Funeral
Home criticizes the EEOC for "cit[ing] a
general, broadly formulated interest" to
support enforcing Title VII in this

iii. Strict Scrutiny Test
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case. According to the Funeral Home, the
relevant inquiry is whether the EEOC has a
"specific interest in forcing [the Funeral
Home] to allow its male funeral directors to
wear the uniform for female funeral directors
while on the job." The EEOC instead asks
whether its interest in "eradicating
employment discrimination" is furthered by
ensuring that Stephens does not suffer
discrimination (either on the basis of sexstereotyping or her transgender status), lose
her livelihood, or face the emotional pain and
suffering of being effectively told "that as a
transgender woman she is not valued or able
to make workplace contributions.” Stephens
similarly argues that "Title VII serves a
compelling interest in eradicating all the
forms
of
invidious
employment
discrimination proscribed by the statute," and
points to studies demonstrating that
transgender people have experienced
particularly high rates of "bodily harm,
violence, and discrimination because of their
transgender status."

guaranteeing cost-free access to the four
challenged contraceptive methods" was
compelling—not whether the government
had a compelling interest in requiring closely
held organizations to act in a way that
conflicted with their religious practice.
The Supreme Court's analysis in cases like
Wisconsin v. Yoder, and Holt guides our
approach. In those cases, the Court ultimately
determined that the interests generally served
by a given government policy or statute
would not be "compromised" by granting an
exemption to a particular individual or group.
Thus, in Yoder, the Court held that the
interests furthered by the government's
requirement of compulsory education for
children through the age of sixteen (i.e., "to
prepare citizens to participate effectively and
intelligently in our open political system" and
to "prepare[] individuals to be self-reliant and
self-sufficient participants in society") were
not harmed by granting an exemption to the
Amish, who do not need to be prepared "for
life in modern society" and whose own
traditions adequately ensure self-sufficiency.
Similarly, in Holt, the Court recognized that
the Department of Corrections has a
compelling interest in preventing prisoners
from hiding contraband on their persons,
which is generally effectuated by requiring
prisoners to adhere to a strict grooming
policy, but the Court failed to see how the
Department's "compelling interest in
staunching the flow of contraband into and
within its facilities . . . would be seriously
compromised by allowing an inmate to grow
a 1/2-inch beard."

The Funeral Home's construction of the
compelling-interest test is off-base. Rather
than focusing on the EEOC's claim—that the
Funeral Home terminated Stephens because
of her proposed gender nonconforming
behavior—the Funeral Home's test focuses
instead on its defense (discussed above) that
the Funeral Home merely wishes to enforce
an appropriate workplace uniform. But the
Funeral Home has not identified any cases
where the government's compelling interest
was framed as its interest in disturbing a
company's workplace policies. For instance,
in Hobby Lobby, the issue, which the Court
ultimately declined to adjudicate, was
whether the government's "interest in

Here, the same framework leads to the
opposite conclusion. Failing to enforce Title
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VII against the Funeral Home means the
EEOC would be allowing a particular
person—Stephens—to suffer discrimination,
and such an outcome is directly contrary to
the EEOC's compelling interest in combating
discrimination in the workforce. In this
regard, this case is analogous to Eternal
Word, in which the Eleventh Circuit
determined that the government had a
compelling interest in requiring a particular
nonprofit organization with religious
objections to the Affordable Care Act's
contraceptive mandate to follow the
procedures associated with obtaining an
accommodation to the Act because

much force to Stephens as to any other
employee discriminated against based on sex.
It is true, of course, that the specific harms the
EEOC identifies in this case, such as
depriving Stephens of her livelihood and
harming her sense of self-worth, are simply
permutations of the generic harm that is
always
suffered
in
employment
discrimination cases. But O Centro's "to the
person" test does not mean that the
government has a compelling interest in
enforcing the laws only when the failure to
enforce would lead to uniquely harmful
consequences. Rather, the question is
whether "the asserted harm of granting
specific exemptions to particular religious
claimants" is sufficiently great to require
compliance with the law. Here, for the
reasons stated above, the EEOC has
adequately demonstrated that Stephens has
and would suffer substantial harm if we
exempted the Funeral Home from Title VII's
requirements.

applying
the
accommodation
procedure to the plaintiffs in these
cases furthers [the government's]
interests because the accommodation
ensures that the plaintiffs' female plan
participants and beneficiaries—who
may or may not share the same
religious beliefs as their employer—
have access to contraception without
cost
sharing
or
additional
administrative burdens as the ACA
requires.

Finally, we reject the Funeral Home's claim
that it should receive an exemption,
notwithstanding any harm to Stephens or the
EEOC's
interest
in
eradicating
discrimination, because "the constitutional
guarantee of free exercise[,] effectuated here
via RFRA . . . [,] is a higher-order right that
necessarily supersedes a conflicting statutory
right." This point warrants little discussion.
The Supreme Court has already determined
that RFRA does not, in fact, "effectuate . . .
the First Amendment's guarantee of free
exercise," because it sweeps more broadly
than the Constitution demands. And in any
event, the Supreme Court has expressly
recognized that compelling interests can, at

The Eternal Word court reasoned that
"[u]nlike the exception made in Yoder for
Amish children," who would be adequately
prepared for adulthood even without
compulsory education, the "poor health
outcomes related to unintended or
poorly timed pregnancies apply to the
plaintiffs' female plan participants or
beneficiaries and their children just as they do
to the general population." Similarly, here,
the EEOC's compelling interest in
eradicating discrimination applies with as
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times, override religious beliefs—even those
that are squarely protected by the Free
Exercise Clause. We therefore decline to
hoist automatically Rost's religious interests
above other compelling governmental
concerns.
The
undisputed
record
demonstrates that Stephens has been and
would be harmed by the Funeral Home's
discriminatory practices in this case, and the
EEOC has a compelling interest in
eradicating
and
remedying
such
discrimination.

judgment on this ground. According to the
district court, the Funeral Home engaged in
illegal sex stereotyping only with respect to
"the clothing Stephens [c]ould wear at work,"
and therefore a gender-neutral dress code
would resolve the case because Stephens
would not be forced to dress in a way that
conforms to Rost's conception of Stephens's
sex and Rost would not be compelled to
authorize Stephens to dress in a way that
violates Rost's religious beliefs.
Neither party endorses the district court's
proposed alternative, and for good reason.
The district court's suggestion, although
appealing in its tidiness, is tenable only if we
excise from the case evidence of sex
stereotyping in areas other than attire.
Though Rost does repeatedly say that he
terminated Stephens because she "wanted
to dress as a woman" and "would no
longer dress as a man,” the record also
contains uncontroverted evidence that Rost's
reasons for terminating Stephens extended to
other aspects of Stephens's intended
presentation. For instance, Rost stated that he
fired Stephens because Stephens "was no
longer going to represent himself as a man,"
and Rost insisted that Stephens presenting as
a female would disrupt clients' healing
process because female clients would have to
"share a bathroom with a man dressed up as
a woman." The record thus compels the
finding that Rost's concerns extended beyond
Stephens's attire and reached Stephens's
appearance and behavior more generally.

(b) Least Restrictive Means
The final inquiry under RFRA is whether
there exist "other means of achieving [the
government's] desired goal without imposing
a substantial burden on the exercise of
religion by the objecting part[y]." "The leastrestrictive-means standard is exceptionally
demanding," and the EEOC bears the burden
of showing that burdening the Funeral
Home's religious exercise constitutes the
least restrictive means of furthering its
compelling interests. Where an alternative
option exists that furthers the government's
interest "equally well," the government "must
use it.” In conducting the least-restrictivealternative analysis, "courts must take
adequate account of the burdens a requested
accommodation
may
impose
on
nonbeneficiaries." Cost to the government
may also be "an important factor in the leastrestrictive-means analysis."
The district court found that requiring the
Funeral Home to adopt a gender-neutral dress
code would constitute a less restrictive
alternative to enforcing Title VII in this case,
and granted the Funeral Home summary

At the summary-judgment stage, where a
court
may
not
"make
credibility
determinations, weigh the evidence, or draw
[adverse] inferences from the facts," the
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district court was required to account for the
evidence of Rost's non-clothing-based sex
stereotyping in determining whether a
proposed less restrictive alternative furthered
the government's "stated interests equally
[as] well.” Here, as the evidence above
shows, merely altering the Funeral Home's
dress code would not address the
discrimination Stephens faced because of her
broader desire "to represent [her]self as a
[wo]man." Indeed, the Funeral Home's
counsel conceded at oral argument that Rost
would have objected to Stephens's coming
"to work presenting clearly as a woman and
acting as a woman," regardless of whether
Stephens wore a man's suit, because that
"would contradict [Rost's] sincerely held
religious beliefs."

proposed alternative sidelines this interest
entirely.
The EEOC, Stephens, and several amici
argue that searching for an alternative to Title
VII is futile because enforcing Title VII is
itself the least restrictive way to further
EEOC's interest in eradicating discrimination
based on sex stereotypes from the workplace.
We agree.
To start, the Supreme Court has previously
acknowledged that "there may be instances in
which a need for uniformity precludes the
recognition of exceptions to generally
applicable laws under RFRA." The Court
highlighted Braunfeld v. Brown, as an
example of a case where the "need for
uniformity" trumped "claims for religious
exemptions." In Braunfeld, the plurality
"denied a claimed exception to Sunday
closing laws, in part because . . . [t]he whole
point of a 'uniform day of rest for all workers'
would have been defeated by exceptions."
Braunfeld thus serves as a particularly apt
case to consider here, as it too concerned an
attempt by an employer to seek an exemption
that would elevate its religious practices
above a government policy designed to
benefit employees. If the government's
interest in a "uniform day of rest for all
workers" is sufficiently weighty to preclude
exemptions, see O Centro, then surely the
government's
interest
in
uniformly
eradicating discrimination against employees
exerts just as much force.

The Funeral Home's proposed alternative—
to "permit businesses to allow the
enforcement of sex-specific dress codes for
employees
who
are
public-facing
representatives of their employer, so long as
the dress code imposes equal burdens on the
sexes and does not affect employee dress
outside of work," is equally flawed. The
Funeral Home's suggestion would do nothing
to advance the government's compelling
interest in preventing and remedying
discrimination against Stephens based on her
refusal to conform at work to stereotypical
notions of how biologically male persons
should dress, appear, behave, and identify.
Regardless of whether the EEOC has a
compelling interest in combating sex-specific
dress codes—a point that is not at issue in this
case—the EEOC does have a compelling
interest in ensuring that the Funeral Home
does not discriminate against its employees
on the basis of their sex. The Funeral Home's

The Court seemingly recognized Title VII's
ability to override RFRA in Hobby Lobby, as
the majority opinion stated that its decision
should not be read as providing a "shield" to
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those who seek to "cloak[] as religious
practice" their efforts to engage in
"discrimination in hiring, for example on the
basis of race." As the Hobby Lobby Court
explained, "[t]he Government has a
compelling interest in providing an equal
opportunity to participate in the workforce
without regard to race, and prohibitions on
racial discrimination are precisely tailored to
achieve that critical goal." We understand
this to mean that enforcement actions brought
under Title VII, which aims to "provid[e] an
equal opportunity to participate in the
workforce without regard to race" and an
array of other protected traits, will
necessarily defeat RFRA defenses to
discrimination made illegal by Title VII. The
district court reached the opposite
conclusion, reasoning that Hobby Lobby did
not suggest that "a RFRA defense can never
prevail as a defense to Title VII" because "[i]f
that were the case, the majority would
presumably have said so." But the majority
did say that anti-discrimination laws are
"precisely tailored" to achieving the
government's "compelling interest in
providing an equal opportunity to participate
in the workforce" without facing
discrimination.

regulatory scheme that is purported to be the
least restrictive means can, in fact,
demonstrate that other, less-restrictive
alternatives could exist." Indeed, a driving
force in the Hobby Lobby Court's
determination that the government had failed
the least-restrictive-means test was the fact
that the Affordable Care Act, which the
government sought to enforce in that case
against a closely held organization, "already
established an accommodation for nonprofit
organizations with religious objections."
Title VII, by contrast, does not contemplate
any exemptions for discrimination on the
basis of sex. Sex may be taken into account
only if a person's sex "is a bona fide
occupational
qualification
reasonably
necessary to the normal operation of [a]
particular business or enterprise,"—and in
that case, the preference is no longer
discriminatory in a malicious sense. Where
the
government
has
developed
a
comprehensive scheme to effectuate its goal
of eradicating discrimination based on sex,
including sex stereotypes, it makes sense that
the only way to achieve the scheme's
objectives is through its enforcement.
State courts' treatment of RFRA-like
challenges to their own antidiscrimination
laws is also telling. In several instances, state
courts have concluded that their respective
antidiscrimination laws survive strict
scrutiny, such that religious claimants are not
entitled to exemptions to enforcement of the
state prohibitions on discrimination with
regard to housing, employment, medical
care, and education. These holdings support
the notion that antidiscrimination laws allow
for fewer exceptions than other generally
applicable laws.

As Stephens notes, at least two district-level
federal courts have also concluded that Title
VII constitutes the least restrictive means for
eradicating discrimination in the workforce.
We also find meaningful Congress's decision
not to include exemptions within Title VII to
the prohibition on sex-based discrimination.
As both the Supreme Court and other circuits
have recognized, "[t]he very existence of a
government-sanctioned exception to a
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As a final point, we reject the Funeral Home's
suggestion that enforcing Title VII in this
case would undermine, rather than advance,
the EEOC's interest in combating sex
stereotypes. According to the Funeral Home,
the EEOC's requested relief reinforces sex
stereotypes because the agency essentially
asks that Stephens "be able to dress in a
stereotypical feminine manner." This
argument misses the mark. Nothing in Title
VII or this court's jurisprudence requires
employees to reject their employer's
stereotypical notions of masculinity or
femininity; rather, employees simply may not
be discriminated against for a failure to
conform. Title VII protects both the right of
male employees "to c[o]me to work with
makeup or lipstick on [their] face[s]," and the
right of female employees to refuse to "wear
dresses or makeup," without any internal
contradiction.

to the EEOC on the Funeral Home's RFRA
defense on this alternative ground.
C. Clothing-Benefit Discrimination Claim
The district court erred in granting summary
judgment in favor of the Funeral Home on the
EEOC's discriminatory clothing-allowance
claim. We long ago held that the scope of the
complaint the EEOC may file in federal court
in its efforts to enforce Title VII is "limited to
the scope of the EEOC investigation
reasonably expected to grow out of the
charge of discrimination." The EEOC now
urges us to hold that Bailey is incompatible
with subsequent Supreme Court precedent
and therefore no longer binding on this
court. Because we believe that the EEOC
may properly bring a clothing-allowance
claim under Bailey, we need not decide
whether Bailey has been rendered obsolete.
In Bailey, a white female employee charged
that her employer failed to promote her on
account of her sex, generally failed to
promote women because of their sex, failed
to pay equally qualified women as well as
men, and failed to recruit and hire black
women because of their race. While
investigating these claims, the EEOC found
there was no evidence to support the
complainant's charges of sex discrimination,
but there was reasonable cause to believe the
company had racially discriminatory hiring
and promotion practices. In addition, the
EEOC learned that the employer had
seemingly refused to hire one applicant on
the basis of his religion. After failed efforts at
conciliation, the EEOC initiated a lawsuit
against the employer alleging both racial and
religious discrimination. We held that the

In short, the district court erred in finding that
EEOC had failed to adopt the least restrictive
means of furthering its compelling interest in
eradicating discrimination in the workplace.
Thus, even if we agreed with the Funeral
Home that Rost's religious exercise would be
substantially burdened by enforcing Title VII
in this case, we would nevertheless
REVERSE the district court's grant of
summary judgment to the Funeral Home and
hold instead that requiring the Funeral Home
to comply with Title VII constitutes the least
restrictive means of furthering the
government's compelling interest in
eradicating discrimination against Stephens
on the basis of sex. Thus, even assuming
Rost's religious exercise is substantially
burdened by the EEOC's enforcement action
in this case, we GRANT summary judgment
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EEOC lacked authority to bring an
enforcement action regarding alleged
religious discrimination because "[t]he
portion of the EEOC's complaint
incorporating allegations of religious
discrimination exceeded the scope of the
EEOC investigation of [the defendant
employer] reasonably expected to grow out
of [the original] charge of sex and race
discrimination." We determined, however,
that the EEOC was authorized to bring race
discrimination claims against the employer
because the original charge alleged racial
discrimination against black applicants and
employees and the charging party—a white
woman—had standing under Title VII to file
such a charge with the EEOC because she
"may have suffered from the loss of benefits
from the lack of association with racial
minorities at work."

At the same time, however, we concluded
in Bailey that allowing the EEOC to sue for
matters beyond those reasonably expected to
arise from the original charge would
undermine Title VII's enforcement process.
In particular, we understood that an original
charge provided an employer with "notice of
the allegation, an opportunity to participate in
a complete investigation of such allegation,
and an opportunity to participate in
meaningful conciliation discussions should
reasonable cause be found following the
EEOC investigation." We believed that the
full investigatory process would be shortcircuited, and the conciliation process
thereby threatened, if the EEOC did not file a
separate charge and undertake a separate
investigation when facts are learned
suggesting an employer may have engaged in
"discrimination of a type other than that
raised by the individual party's charge and
unrelated to the individual party.

As we explained in Bailey, the EEOC may
sue for matters beyond those raised directly
in the EEOC's administrative charge for two
reasons. First, limiting the EEOC complaint
to the precise grounds listed in the charge of
discrimination would undercut Title VII's
"effective functioning" because laypersons
"who are unfamiliar with the niceties of
pleading and are acting without the assistance
of counsel" submit the original charge.
Second, an initial charge of discrimination
does not trigger a lawsuit; it instead triggers
an EEOC investigation. The matter evolves
into a lawsuit only if the EEOC is unable "to
obtain voluntary compliance with the law. . .
. Thus it is obvious that the civil action is
much more intimately related to the EEOC
investigation than to the words of the charge
which originally triggered the investigation."

The EEOC now insists that Bailey is no
longer good law after the Supreme Court's
decision in General Telephone Company of
the Northwest, Inc. v. EEOC. In General
Telephone, the Supreme Court held that Rule
23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
which governs class actions, does not apply
to enforcement actions initiated by the
EEOC. As part of its reasoning, the Court
found that various requirements of Rule 23—
such as the requirement that "the claims or
defenses of the representative parties [must
be] typical of the claims or defenses of the
class," FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3)—are
incompatible with the EEOC's enforcement
responsibilities under Title VII:
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The typicality requirement is said to
limit the class claims to those fairly
encompassed by the named plaintiff's
claims. If Rule 23were applicable to
EEOC enforcement actions, it would
seem that the Title VII counterpart to
the Rule 23 named plaintiff would be
the charging party, with the EEOC
serving in the charging party's stead
as the representative of the class. Yet
the Courts of Appeals have held that
EEOC enforcement actions are not
limited to the claims presented by the
charging parties. Any violations that
the EEOC ascertains in the course of
a reasonable investigation of the
charging party's complaint are
actionable. The latter approach is far
more consistent with the EEOC's role
in the enforcement of Title VII than is
imposing the strictures of Rule 23,
which would limit the EEOC action
to claims typified by those of the
charging party.

court determined that allegations of religious
discrimination were outside the scope of an
investigation "reasonably related" to the
original charge of sex and race discrimination
because, in part, "[t]he evidence presented at
trial by the EEOC to support its allegations of
religious discrimination did not involve
practices affecting [the original charger]."
Here, by contrast, Stephens would have been
directly affected by the Funeral Home's
allegedly discriminatory clothing-allowance
policy had she not been terminated, as the
Funeral Home's current practice indicates
that she would have received either no
clothing allowance or a less valuable clothing
allowance once she began working at the
Funeral Home as a woman. And, unlike the
EEOC's
investigation
of
religious
discrimination in Bailey, the EEOC's
investigation into the Funeral Home's
discriminatory clothing-allowance policy
concerns precisely the same type of
discrimination—discrimination on the basis
of sex—that Stephens raised in her initial
charge.

The EEOC argues that this passage directly
contradicts the holding in Bailey, in which
we rejected the EEOC's argument that it "can
investigate evidence of any other
discrimination called to its attention during
the course of an investigation."

Second, we have developed a broad
conception of the sorts of claims that can be
"reasonably expected to grow out of the
initial charge of discrimination." As we
explained in Davis v. Sodexho, "where facts
related with respect to the charged claim
would prompt the EEOC to investigate a
different, uncharged claim, the plaintiff is not
precluded from bringing suit on that
claim." And we have also cautioned that
"EEOC charges must be liberally construed
to determine whether . . . there was
information given in the charge that
reasonably should have prompted an EEOC
investigation of [a] separate type of

Though there may be merit to the EEOC's
argument, we need not resolve Bailey's
compatibility with General Telephone at this
time because our holding in Bailey does not
preclude the EEOC from bringing a clothingallowance-discrimination claim in this case.
First, the present case is factually
distinguishable from Bailey. In Bailey, the
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discrimination." Here, Stephens alleged that
she was fired after she shared her intention to
present and dress as a woman because the
Funeral Home "management [told her that it]
did not believe the public would be accepting
of [her] transition" from male to female. It
was reasonable to expect, in light of this
allegation, that the EEOC would investigate
the Funeral Home's employee-appearance
requirements and expectations, would learn
about the Funeral Home's sex-specific dress
code, and would thereby uncover the Funeral
Home's seemingly discriminatory clothingallowance policy. As much is clear from our
decision in Farmer v. ARA Services, Inc, in
which "we held that the plaintiffs could bring
equal pay claims alleging that their union
discriminated in negotiating pay scales for
different job designations, despite the fact
that the plaintiffs' EEOC charge alleged only
that the union failed to represent them in
securing the higher paying job designations."
As we recognized then, underlying the
Farmer plaintiffs' claim was an implicit
allegation that the plaintiffs were as qualified
and responsible as the higher-paid
employees, and this fact "could reasonably be
expected to lead the EEOC to investigate why
different job designations that required the
same qualifications and responsibilities used
disparate pay scales." By the same token,
Stephens's claim that she was fired because
of her planned change in appearance and
presentation contains an implicit allegation
that the Funeral Home requires its male and
female employees to look a particular way,
and this fact could (and did) reasonably
prompt the EEOC to investigate whether
these appearance requirements imposed

unequal burdens—in this case, fiscal
burdens—on its male and female employees.
We therefore REVERSE the district court's
grant of summary judgment to the Funeral
Home on the EEOC's discriminatoryclothing-allowance claim and REMAND
with instructions to consider the merits of the
EEOC's claim.
III. CONCLUSION
Discrimination against employees, either
because of their failure to conform to sex
stereotypes or their transgender and
transitioning status, is illegal under Title VII.
The unrefuted facts show that the Funeral
Home fired Stephens because she refused to
abide by her employer's stereotypical
conception of her sex, and therefore the
EEOC is entitled to summary judgment as to
its
unlawful-termination
claim. RFRA
provides the Funeral Home with no relief
because continuing to employ Stephens
would not, as a matter of law, substantially
burden Rost's religious exercise, and even if
it did, the EEOC has shown that enforcing
Title VII here is the least restrictive means of
furthering its compelling interest in
combating
and
eradicating
sex
discrimination. We therefore REVERSE the
district court's grant of summary judgment in
favor of the Funeral Home and GRANT
summary judgment to the EEOC on its
unlawful-termination claim. We also
REVERSE the district court's grant of
summary judgment on the EEOC's
discriminatory-clothing-allowance claim, as
the district court erred in failing to consider
the EEOC's claim on the merits.
We REMAND this case to the district court
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for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
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“Supreme Court to Decide Whether Landmark Civil Rights Law Applies to Gay
and Transgender Workers”
The New York Times
Adam Liptak
April 22, 2019
The Supreme Court announced on Monday
that it would decide whether the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 guarantees protections from
workplace discrimination to gay and
transgender people in three cases expected to
provide the first indication of how the court’s
new conservative majority will approach
L.G.B.T. rights.

sexual orientation discrimination. But two of
them, in New York and Chicago, recently
issued decisions ruling that discrimination
against gay men and lesbians is a form of sex
discrimination.
The Supreme Court agreed to hear the case
from New York, Altitude Express Inc. v.
Zarda, No. 17-1623, along with one from
Georgia that came to the opposite
conclusion, Bostock v. Clayton County, Ga.,
No. 17-1618.

The Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission has said the 1964 act does
guarantee the protections. But the Trump
administration has taken the opposite
position, saying that the landmark legislation
that outlawed discrimination based on race,
religion, national origin and, notably, sex,
cannot fairly be read to apply to
discrimination based on sexual orientation or
transgender status.

The New York case was brought by a
skydiving instructor, Donald Zarda, who said
he was fired because he was gay. His
dismissal followed a complaint from a female
customer who had voiced concerns about
being tightly strapped to Mr. Zarda during a
tandem dive. Mr. Zarda, hoping to reassure
the customer, told her that he was “100
percent gay.”

The three cases the court accepted are the first
concerning
L.G.B.T.
rights
since
the retirement last summer of Justice
Anthony M. Kennedy, a champion of gay
rights. His replacement by the more
conservative Justice Brett M. Kavanaugh
could shift the court’s approach to cases
concerning gay men, lesbians and
transgender people.

Mr. Zarda sued under Title VII and lost the
initial rounds. He died in a 2014 skydiving
accident, and his estate pursued his case.
Last year, a divided 13-judge panel of the
United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit allowed the lawsuit to
proceed. Writing for the majority, Chief
Judge Robert A. Katzmann concluded

Most federal appeals courts have interpreted
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act to exclude
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that “sexual orientation discrimination is
motivated, at least in part, by sex and is thus
a subset of sex discrimination.”

The justices also agreed to decide the
separate question of whether Title VII bars
discrimination against transgender people.
The case, R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes
v.
Equal
Employment
Opportunity
Commission, No. 18-107, concerns Aimee
Stephens, who was fired from a Michigan
funeral home after she announced in 2013
that she was a transgender woman and would
start working in women’s clothing.

In dissent, Judge Gerard E. Lynch wrote that
the words of Title VII did not support the
majority’s interpretation.
“Speaking solely as a citizen,” he wrote, “I
would be delighted to awake one morning
and learn that Congress had just passed
legislation adding sexual orientation to the
list of grounds of employment discrimination
prohibited under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. I am confident that one day —
and I hope that day comes soon — I will have
that pleasure.”

“What I must tell you is very difficult for me
and is taking all the courage I can muster,”
she wrote to her colleagues. “I have felt
imprisoned in a body that does not match my
mind, and this has caused me great despair
and loneliness.”

“I would be equally pleased to awake to learn
that Congress had secretly passed such
legislation more than a half-century ago —
until I actually woke up and realized that I
must have been still asleep and dreaming,”
Judge Lynch wrote. “Because we all know
that Congress did no such thing.”

Ms. Stephens had worked at the funeral home
for six years. Her colleagues testified that she
was able and compassionate.
Two weeks after receiving the letter, the
home’s owner, Thomas Rost, fired Ms.
Stephens. Asked for the “specific reason that
you terminated Stephens,” Mr. Rost said:
“Well, because he was no longer going to
represent himself as a man. He wanted to
dress as a woman.”

The arguments in the Second Circuit had a
curious feature: Lawyers for the federal
government appeared on both sides. One
lawyer, representing the E.E.O.C., said Title
VII barred discrimination against gay people.
Another,
representing
the
Trump
administration, took the contrary view.

The United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit, in Cincinnati, ruled for Ms.
Stephens. Discrimination against transgender
people, the court said, was barred by Title
VII.

The Georgia case was brought by a child
welfare services coordinator who said he was
fired for being gay. The 11th Circuit, in
Atlanta, ruled against him in a short,
unsigned
opinion that
cited a
1979
decision that had ruled that “discharge for
homosexuality is not prohibited by Title
VII.”

“It is analytically impossible to fire an
employee based on that employee’s status as
a transgender person without being
motivated, at least in part, by the employee’s
sex,” the court said, adding, “Discrimination
‘because of sex’ inherently includes
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discrimination against employees because of
a change in their sex.”

Title VII applies to discrimination against
transgender people. In 1989, the court
said discrimination against workers because
they did not conform to gender stereotypes
was a form of sex discrimination.

John J. Bursch, a lawyer with Alliance
Defending Freedom, which represents the
funeral home, said the appeals court had
impermissibly revised the federal law.

The Sixth Circuit ruled for Ms. Stephens on
that ground, too, saying she had been fired
“for wishing to appear or behave in a manner
that contradicts the funeral home’s
perception of how she should behave or
appear based on her sex.”

“Neither government agencies nor the courts
have authority to rewrite federal law by
replacing ‘sex’ with ‘gender identity’ — a
change with widespread consequences for
everyone,” Mr. Bursch said in a statement.
“The funeral home wants to serve families
mourning the loss of a loved one, but the
E.E.O.C. has elevated its political goals
above the interests of the grieving people that
the funeral home serves.”

All three cases present the question of how
courts should interpret statutes whose
drafters might not have contemplated the
sweep of the language they wrote.
In January, in a minor arbitration case,
Justice Neil M. Gorsuch wrote that courts
should ordinarily interpret statutes as they
were understood at the time of their
enactment. In a concurring opinion, Justice
Ruth Bader Ginsburg said that was not
always so.

James D. Esseks, a lawyer with the American
Civil Liberties Union, which represents Ms.
Stephens and Mr. Zarda’s estate, said the
cases concern elementary principles of
fairness.
“Most of America would be shocked if the
Supreme Court said it was legal to fire Aimee
because she’s transgender or Don because he
is gay,” Mr. Esseks said in a statement. “Such
a ruling would be disastrous, relegating
L.G.B.T.Q. people around the country to a
second-class citizen status.”

“Congress,” she wrote, “may design
legislation to govern changing times and
circumstances.” Quoting from an earlier
decision, she added: “Words in statutes can
enlarge or contract their scope as other
changes, in law or in the world, require their
application to new instances or make old
applications anachronistic.”

There is a second issue in Ms. Stephens’s
case, one that could allow her to win however
the Supreme Court might rule on whether
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“Trump Administration Asks Supreme Court to Permit Employment
Discrimination Against Transgender Workers”

Time
Tara Law
August 17, 2019
The Trump administration’s Department
of Justice is asking the Supreme Court to
set a legal precedent that would enable
employers to fire employees because they
are transgender.

company from 2007 to 2013. According
to court documents, Stephens sent the
company a letter in 2013 that said she
struggled with a “gender identity
disorder” and planned to begin to live as
a woman, including by wearing the
company’s female uniform – a jacket and
skirt – instead of a suit and tie.

The Department of Justice has submitted
a brief to the Court Friday asking the
Justices to rule that Title VII, a federal
law
that
prohibits
employment
discrimination on the basis of sex, race,
color, religion or national origin, does not
protect
transgender
people.
The
department argued that they should throw
out a lower court ruling that found that a
funeral home that fired a transgender
woman had discriminated against her.

The company argued that Stephens was
fired because she refused to wear the
company’s dress code and argued that
“[m]aintaining a professional dress code
that is not distracting to grieving families
is an essential industry requirement that
furthers their healing process.”
In its brief, the Department of Justice has
argued in favor of the funeral home,
arguing that Title VII only protects what
it defines as “biological sex.”

The brief concerns R.G. & G.R. Harris
Funeral Homes Inc. v. Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, one of three
cases that the Supreme Court agreed to
hear earlier this year that concern whether
Title VII can be applied to LGBTQ
workers.

“In 1964 [when Title VII was enacted],
the ordinary public meaning of ‘sex’ was
biological sex. It did not encompass
transgender status,” the DOJ writes,
clarifying, “In the particular context of
Title VII—legislation originally designed
to eliminate employment discrimination
against racial and other minorities—it
was especially clear that the prohibition

In the case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the 6th Circuit found that the owner of the
funeral home, Thomas Rost, had violated
the law when he fired Aimee Stephens, a
transgender woman who worked for the
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on discrimination because of “sex”
referred to unequal treatment of men and
women in the workplace.”

“People don’t realize that the stakes are
extending not just the trans and LGB
communities, but every person who
departs from sex stereotypes: Women
who want to wear pants in the workplace,
men who want more childbearing
responsibilities,” Strangio said.

Chase Strangio, an American Civil
Liberties Union attorney representing
Stephens, told HuffPo that the case could
weaken Title VII protections both for
transgender people and other groups.
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“EEOC’s Trans Bias Win Exposes Shakiness of RFRA Defense”
Law360
Vin Gurrieri
March 8, 2018
The Sixth Circuit’s groundbreaking decision
Wednesday that a funeral home owner’s
religious beliefs didn't shield him from a
U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission suit claiming he illegally fired a
transgender employee serves as a clear
warning to employers that the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act is a questionable
tool to defend against trans discrimination
suits, experts say.

that the advocacy group is “thrilled” with the
Sixth Circuit’s decision since it affirms that
transgender people are protected under Title
VII.
“One of the things that’s also important about
the Sixth Circuit’s case is that it also states
that people can’t be fired under the facade of
religious liberty,” Egyes said. “Title VII is
very clear and the court’s decision was
incredibly clear about people not being able
to use religious liberty as a reason for firing
transgender people.”

In its ruling, the Sixth Circuit held that R.G.
& G.R. Harris Funeral Homes Inc. violated
Title VII by firing funeral director Aimee
Stephens after she informed owner Thomas
Rost that she was transitioning from male to
female and wanted to dress in women’s
clothing at work.

Denise M. Visconti of management-side firm
Littler Mendelson PC said the Sixth Circuit
took a similar position on the RFRA aspect of
the decision, saying it “certainly does draw
some lines” around the ability of employers
to use the statute as a defense.

The panel also determined that Rost wasn't
entitled to a defense under RFRA, a 1993
federal law that blocks the government from
enforcing a religiously neutral law that
“substantially burdens” people’s “religious
exercise” unless that law is the least
restrictive way to further a compelling
government interest, which in this case was
the EEOC’s interest in enforcing antidiscrimination laws.

Under the ruling, Visconti said that simply
employing someone who is transgender
places no burden on someone’s religious
exercise, and that even if such a burden did
exist the elimination of discrimination is a
compelling interest which would override a
RFRA defense.
“I think given that the court covered both
prongs, certainly within the Sixth Circuit, it
places a very substantial limitation on

Lynly Egyes, litigation director at the
Transgender Law Center, said Wednesday
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employers being able to utilize an RFRA
defense or, more importantly, using RFRA as
essentially a sword to justify discrimination,”
Visconti said. “I think this case certainly is a
pretty clear road map suggesting to
employers that this might not be a viable
defense.”

of her sex and gender identity is not
tantamount to supporting it.”
Jackson Lewis PC principal Michelle
Phillips, whose practice focuses heavily on
LGBT issues, said the Rost family in this case
was too intractable toward Stephens and
failed to even consider affording her an
accommodation. Rost’s firing of Stephens,
Phillips said, was “basically blatant
discrimination”
and
“on
its
face
problematic.”

The ruling by the Sixth Circuit overturned a
portion of U.S. District Judge Sean F. Cox’s
2016 ruling that the EEOC’s enforcement
action burdened Rost’s free exercise of
religion and that Title VII’s bar on
discrimination based on sex, which the
EEOC had argued let Stephens act and dress
like a woman, was not the least restrictive
means of protecting her rights. The lower
court suggested that the EEOC could have
achieved its goals by proposing that the
funeral home adopt a gender-neutral dress
code.

“This is an important case because you have
to strike a balance as an employer whether
it’s your own personal religious beliefs or the
religious beliefs of others and you still have
to come to some sort of an accommodation,”
Phillips said. “So, the rigidity of the employer
in this case to me was one of the most
important messages. You cannot have kneejerk reactions and have to engage in the
process of accommodation in good faith.”

But far from being too restrictive of Rost's
rights, Title VII’s requirement that he tolerate
Stephens’
gender
identity
didn’t
“substantially” burden his religious beliefs,
the Sixth Circuit said, rejecting Rost’s
argument that letting Stephens wear women’s
clothing would “create distractions” for the
funeral home’s customers “and thereby
hinder their healing process,” and that
making Rost tolerate her transition would
push him to leave the funeral industry and
“end his ministry to grieving people.”

David Lopez of Outten & Golden LLP — the
EEOC’s general counsel when the case was
filed in 2014 as one of the agency’s first two
lawsuits accusing an employer of sex
discrimination against a transgender
individual — said he was pleased with the
decision and that the Sixth Circuit got it right.
“This is the latest in a series of
groundbreaking decisions recognizing that
Title VII’s prohibitions on discrimination
because of sex covers the LGBT community
— in this case gender identity,” Lopez said.
“The RFRA part obviously was important
because ... it was a new defense that was
asserted in the context of this case that
thankfully the Sixth Circuit rejected.”

Instead, the Sixth Circuit in part said that an
individual asserting the RFRA defense can’t
rely on customers’ presumed biases to
establish a substantial burden under RFRA,
and that “tolerating Stephens’ understanding

572

Phillips noted, however, that RFRA is likely
to come up again in other cases before other
circuits, and that the more recent judicial
appointments by the Trump administration
may serve as “a more receptive audience” for
those religious liberty arguments.

transgender rights in the workplace since the
EEOC will enforce them.
“It reminds employers that they need to be
training employees and supervisors to avoid
discrimination based on sex stereotyping, and
that includes gender identity,” Sultan said.

“There is a movement of certain religiousbased organizations that are going to
continue using this ground, whether it’s
upheld or not, at every opportunity they can
as an insidious way to try and impact the
law,” Phillips said.

As far as whether other circuit courts will
adopt a similar precedent to the Sixth Circuit
that Title VII protects against bias based on
transgender status, Sarah Riskin of Nilan
Johnson Lewis PA said “that is certainly the
trend.”

But as to the broader implications of the case
beyond the RFRA element, Phillips said its
initial filing by the EEOC was “a clear signal
... that protection for transgender and gender
nonconforming individuals are per se sex
discrimination because they relate to
preconceived notions of how men and
women are expected to act in the workplace.”

Riskin pointed out that the Second Circuit
last week ruled that sexual orientation is
protected under Title VII in a case known as
Zarda, making it “two cases from two circuits
that are favorable — on a broad scale — to
LGBT plaintiffs, in only a few weeks' time.”
“It used to be that gender-identity claims
could only be pursued as a sex-stereotyping
claim, if at all,” Riskin said. “That trend has
been shifting, though, and yesterday's
decision is one more step towards a per se
gender-identity discrimination claim in other
circuits."

Phillips pointed out that they filed the suit in
a jurisdiction where there was no protection
under state law for gender identity, noting
that only 19 states plus Washington, D.C.,
grant such protection.
Fred Sultan of Gardere Wynne Sewell LLP
said that while the RFRA portion of the Sixth
Circuit’s ruling likely won’t have much
impact for most employers since the statute
won’t apply to them, the ruling still sends a
strong message that all companies should be
paying close attention to

The case is EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris
Funeral Homes Inc., case number 16-2424, in
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit.
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“Title VII Doesn’t Protect Trans Workers, Funeral Home Says”
Law360
Danielle Nichole Smith
November 6, 2018
The funeral home asking the U.S. Supreme
Court to overturn a Sixth Circuit ruling that
federal law protects transgender workers
from discrimination told the high court on
Tuesday that the U.S. Department of Justice's
recent brief adopting its stance showed that
the case should be reviewed and reversed.

Sixth Circuit wrongly found that the funeral
home’s dress code enforcement was a form
of sex-stereotyping prohibited by the high
court’s 1989 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins
ruling, the agency said, since there weren't
different burdens imposed on male and
female workers.The Department of Justice's
brief reversed the EEOC's earlier stance at the
Sixth Circuit.

R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes Inc. said
in its reply brief that the U.S. Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission,
which is represented by the Justice
Department in the case, acknowledged that
the Sixth Circuit wrongly held that the
funeral home flouted Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act and high court precedent when it
fired Aimee Stephens, who the business said
violated its sex-specific dress code.

Still, even though the U.S. disagreed with the
Sixth Circuit’s ruling, the Supreme Court
shouldn’t consider the funeral home’s case if
it denies the two cert petitions concerning
sexual orientation discrimination in Altitude
Express Inc. v. Zarda and Bostock v. Clayton
County, the agency said. The question in
those cases implicated a “much deeper and
more entrenched circuit conflict” while the
question in the funeral home’s appeal had
been less addressed by the circuits, the
agency contended.

However, the funeral home departed from the
agency by arguing that the justices should
consider the case regardless of whether they
granted two petitions for certiorari on the
related question of whether Title VII
prohibits discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation.

But the funeral home disagreed Tuesday,
saying that the Sixth Circuit fundamentally
changed Title VII by saying that “sex” in
itself was a stereotype and by replacing “sex”
with “gender identity." And there shouldn’t
be a circuit split on an important component
of federal employment law, the funeral home
said.

The Justice Department said in its October
brief that Title VII’s ban on bias “because of
... sex” doesn’t cover gender identity, as the
Sixth Circuit ruled, because Congress didn’t
intend to protect transgender workers when it
passed the 1964 statute. Additionally, the
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“The EEOC now admits that the
interpretations of Title VII and Price
Waterhouse that it persuaded the Sixth
Circuit to adopt below are wrong as a matter
of law, present important and recurring
questions, and conflict with the law of other
circuits,” the funeral home said. “That alone
warrants this court’s review and reversal.”

argued that the funeral home engaged sexstereotypes
since
reproduction-related
physical differences aren’t gender- based
stereotypes, Harris Funeral Homes said,
citing a court opinion.
And the Sixth Circuit had viewed the issues
of transgender discrimination and sexstereotyping under Title VII as “inextricably
intertwined,” the funeral home said.

The funeral home also addressed Stephens’
arguments urging the Supreme Court to deny
its writ petition. Stephens had asserted that
the Supreme Court didn’t need to hear the
funeral home’s appeal over whether
transgender status is protected under Title
VII since the judgment in her favor was
supported enough by the Sixth Circuit’s
findings regarding sex-stereotypes under
Price Waterhouse.

The funeral home also argued that Stephens
downplayed the circuit split regarding the
issue, saying that the split “implicates at least
five circuits and 40 years of jurisprudence”
and required the attention of the Supreme
Court.
Counsel and representatives for the parties
didn’t respond Tuesday to requests for
comment.

Stephens also said that the funeral home
wrongly asked the court to consider in its
petition whether the Price Waterhouse ruling
kept employers from applying sex-specific
policies to its employees on the basis of sex
rather than gender identity. That question
hadn’t been decided by the appeals court and
she had been fired for more than just her
intention not to comply with the funeral
home’s dress code, Stephens said.

R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes is
represented by Kristen K. Waggoner, David
A. Cortman, Gary S. Mccaleb, James A.
Campbell, Jeana Hallock and John J. Bursch
of the Alliance Defending Freedom.
The federal government is represented by
Noel Francisco, Joseph Hunt, John Gore, Eric
Treene, Charles Scarborough and Stephanie
Marcus of the Department of Justice.

The case wasn’t the “right vehicle” for
addressing any of the questions in the funeral
home’s petition, Stephens argued.

Stephens is represented by David Cole, Jay
Kaplan, Daniel Korobkin, Michael Steinberg,
John Knight, Gabriel Arkles, James Esseks
and Louise Melling of the American Civil
Liberties Union.

But Harris Funeral Homes contended on
Tuesday that the Sixth Circuit had focused on
whether the funeral home could make
Stephens dress based on its notion of her sex,
getting at the very question the funeral home
raised in its petition. Stephens also wrongly

The case is R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral
Homes Inc. v. Equal Employment
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Opportunity Commission et al., case number
18-107, before the U.S. Supreme Court.
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“DOJ argues that law doesn’t protect transgender workers, opposing the EEOC”
ABA Journal
Lorelei Laird
October 26, 2018
When Aimee Stephens was fired from a
Michigan funeral home, the federal Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission took
up her case, arguing that her employer could
not legally fire her for transitioning from
living publicly as a man to living as a woman.

doesn’t apply to discrimination based on
sexual orientation.
In that case, Zarda v. Altitude Express, the
2nd Circuit ultimately ruled in favor of the
plaintiff, a skydiving teacher who was fired
after a customer complained that he was gay.
That created a split with the 11th Circuit,
which ruled that Title VIII did not protect a
plaintiff who was fired for revealing his
sexuality, in Bostock v. Clayton County
Board of Commissioners. Both cases are
pending before the Supreme Court. In the
brief on Stephens’s case, Solicitor General
Noel Francisco argues that the Court should
wait to take it up until a ruling
in Zarda, Bostock or both. If it denies review
in the other cases, the government argues that
it should also deny review in this case.

But when R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Home
v. EEOC landed at the U.S. Supreme Court,
the Office of the Solicitor General argued the
opposite—that no federal law forbids
employers from firing employees solely for
being transgender. In a brief filed October 24,
the office argued that the federal prohibition
of sex discrimination does not apply to
discrimination based on gender identity. No
lawyers from the EEOC put their names on
the brief, the National Law Journal noted;
Stephens is represented by the ACLU.
Although it’s unusual for one federal agency
to oppose another, the solicitor general’s
position is consistent with positions taken by
the Justice Department under Attorney
General Jeff Sessions. The DOJ had
previously supported the EEOC’s position,
but
in
2017, Sessions
released
a
memo arguing that Title VII does not protect
workers from discrimination based on gender
identity. That memo came months after DOJ
argued before the New York-based 2nd U.S.
Circuit Court of Appeals that Title VII also

ACLU attorney John Knight, representing
Stephens, asked the court to deny review
now, the National Law Journal says. His brief
notes that the Supreme Court has already
ruled that Title VII prohibits sex
stereotyping, an issue in this case.
Stephens was hired at the funeral home when
living as a man, but told her employer in 2013
that she intended to have sex reassignment
surgery and live as a woman. After a
vacation, she told her employer, she would
return as a woman and dress according to the
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home’s dress code for women. Owner
Thomas Rost fired Stephens. The DOJ’s brief
says Rost is a Christian who sincerely
believes God commands people to adhere to
their biological sexes. The district court
ultimately ruled for the funeral home under
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act; the
6th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals reversed,

finding Title VII applied and RFRA did not
offer an exemption.
Former ABA President Linda Klein issued a
press
release
in
2017 expressing
disappointment in DOJ’s new position, as
expressed in Zarda.
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Comcast Corp. v. National Association of African-American Owned Media
Ruling Below: Nat’l Ass’n of African American-Owned Media v. Comcast Corp., 914 F.3d 1261
(9th Cir. 2018).
Overview: Comcast expressed interest in Entertainment Studios’ programming and later reversed
its position and gave network time to a lesser-known network. Comcast claimed that it lacked
capacity to carry Entertainment Studios before choosing to give network time to the other
programming. Comcast argues that its decision was prompted by ordinary business calculations.
The National Association of African American-Owned Media argued that Comcast’s decision was
race-discrimination.
Issue: Whether the claim of race discrimination under 42 U.S.C Sec 1981 fails in the absence of
but-for-causation.
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF AFRICAN-AMERICAN OWNED MEDIA, PlaintiffsAppellants
v.
COMCAST CORPORATION, Defendant- Appellee
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit
Decided on February 4, 2019
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]
SCHROEDER, SMITH, JR., and NGUYEN,
Circuit Judges:
The panel unanimously votes to deny the
petition for panel rehearing. Judge M. Smith
and Judge Nguyen vote to deny the petition
for rehearing en banc, and Judge Schroeder
so recommends. The full court has been
advised of the petition for rehearing en banc,
and no judge of the court has requested a vote
on it. The petition for panel rehearing and the
petition for rehearing en banc are DENIED.
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NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF AFRICAN-AMERICAN OWNED MEDIA, PlaintiffsAppellants
v.
COMCAST CORPORATION, Defendant- Appellee
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit
Decided on November 19, 2018
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]
SCHROEDER, M. SMITH, and NGUYEN,
Circuit Judges:

1. We conclude that the district court
improperly dismissed Plaintiffs' SAC. As
discussed at length in the contemporaneously
filed opinion in National Association of
African American-Owned Media v. Charter
Communications, Inc., No. 17-55723, to
prevail in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion on their §
1981 claim, Plaintiffs needed only to
plausibly allege that discriminatory intent
was a factor in Comcast's refusal to contract,
and not necessarily the but-for cause of that
decision. Here, Plaintiffs' SAC includes
sufficient allegations from which we can
plausibly infer that Entertainment Studios
experienced disparate treatment due to race
and was thus denied the same right to contract
as a white-owned company, which violates §
1981. These allegations include: Comcast's
expressions of interest followed by repeated
refusals to contract; Comcast's practice of
suggesting various methods of securing
support for carriage only to reverse its
position once Entertainment Studios had
taken those steps; the fact that Comcast
carried every network of the approximately
500 that were also carried by its main
competitors (Verizon FIOS, AT&T U-verse,
and DirecTV), except Entertainment Studios'
channels; and, most importantly, Comcast's
decisions to offer carriage contracts to
"lesser-known, white-owned" networks

Plaintiffs-Appellants National Association of
African
American-Owned
Media
(NAAAOM) and Entertainment Studios
Networks, Inc. (Entertainment Studios, and
together with NAAAOM, Plaintiffs) appeal
the district court's dismissal under Rule
12(b)(6) of their second amended complaint
(SAC). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291, and we reverse and remand.
Entertainment Studios, an African Americanowned operator of television networks,
sought for more than a decade to secure a
carriage contract from Defendant-Appellee
Comcast Corporation (Comcast), the largest
cable television-distribution company in the
United States. These efforts were
unsuccessful, and Plaintiffs filed suit,
claiming that Comcast's refusal to contract
was racially motivated and in violation of 42
U.S.C. § 1981. The district court thrice
dismissed Plaintiffs' complaints, concluding
in its third and final dismissal order that "not
one fact added to the SAC is either
antithetical to a decision not to contract with
[Entertainment Studios] for legitimate
business reasons or, in itself, indicates that
the decision was racially discriminatory."
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(including Inspirational Network, Fit TV,
Outdoor Channel, Current TV, and Baby
First Americas) at the same time it informed
Entertainment Studios that it had no
bandwidth or carriage capacity. Although
Comcast notes that legitimate, race-neutral
reasons for its conduct are contained within
the SAC, when considered in the light most
favorable to Plaintiffs, we cannot conclude
that these alternative explanations are so
compelling as to render Plaintiffs' theory of
racial animus implausible.
We can infer from the allegations in the SAC
that discriminatory intent played at least
some role in Comcast's refusal to contract
with Entertainment Studios, thus denying the
latter the same right to contract as a whiteowned company. Accordingly, Plaintiffs
stated a plausible claim pursuant to § 1981,
and their SAC should not have been
dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6).
2. For the reasons discussed at length in our
opinion in Charter Communications, we also
conclude that the First Amendment does not
bar Plaintiffs' § 1981 claim.
3. Because we reverse the district court's
dismissal of Plaintiffs' SAC, we need not
consider whether the court abused its
discretion when it denied Plaintiffs further
leave to amend.
4. We deny Plaintiffs' motion to take judicial
notice.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
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“Supreme Court to Hear Racial Discrimination Case Against Comcast”
New York Times
Adam Liptak
June 10, 2019
The Supreme Court on Monday agreed to
decide whether Comcast, the nation’s largest
cable company, may be sued for race
discrimination over its decision not to carry
programming from an entertainment
company owned by Byron Allen, an AfricanAmerican entrepreneur.

Comcast, in urging the Supreme Court to
hear its appeal, said its decision not to make
a deal with Mr. Allen’s company was
prompted by ordinary business calculations,
“including
bandwidth
constraints,
a
preference
for
sports
and
news
programming” and insufficient demand for
Entertainment Studios’s offerings.

A federal appeals court in California
ruled that the case could move forward
under a Reconstruction-era federal law that
gives “all persons” the same right to “make
and enforce contracts” as “is enjoyed by
white citizens.”

Comcast’s stated reasons were pretexts,
Entertainment Studios said in its own brief.
“For example,” the brief said, “Comcast
claimed that it did not have sufficient
bandwidth to carry Entertainment Studios’s
channels, but Comcast launched more than
80 white-owned channels at the same time.”

A unanimous three-judge panel of the court,
the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, said that Mr. Allen’s company,
Entertainment Studios Networks, had made
accusations that were serious enough to avoid
dismissal at an early stage of the litigation.

The race-discrimination suit, Comcast’s brief
said, was based on claims of “an outlandish
racist conspiracy.”
“Plaintiffs contend that Comcast did not base
its decision on legitimate business
considerations, but on an outlandish racist
plot against ‘100 percent African-Americanowned media companies’ — a contrived
racial category gerrymandered to include
plaintiffs and virtually no one else — that
involved, among others, the United States
government, the country’s oldest and most
respected
civil
rights
organizations
(including the N.A.A.C.P. and the National

Entertainment Studios said Comcast had
expressed interest in its programming but
never closed a deal, reversed its position on
what Entertainment Studios needed to do to
secure carriage, carried every network that its
main competitors did except Entertainment
Studios and offered space to “lesser known,
white owned” networks even as it said it
lacked capacity to carry Entertainment
Studios.
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Urban League),
prominent
Americans (including Earvin
Johnson, Sean ‘Diddy’ Combs
Sharpton), and ‘white-owned
Comcast’s brief said.

African‘Magic’
and Al
media,’”

necessarily
decision.”

the but-for

cause

of

that

In a statement, Comcast said the case
concerned “a technical point of law” and that
it was proud of its efforts to promote
diversity.

Entertainment Studios said it was not
pursuing those claims. “Like it did in the
Ninth Circuit below, Comcast is still
attacking a conspiracy claim that respondents
dropped over three years ago,” Entertainment
Studios’s brief said. “Respondents are
pursuing a direct claim against Comcast.
Comcast cannot avoid this lawsuit by
ignoring the allegations against it.”

“Comcast has an outstanding record of
supporting
and
fostering
diverse
programming, including programming from
African-American owned channels, two
more of which we launched earlier this year,”
the company’s statement said. “There has
been no finding of discriminatory conduct by
Comcast against this plaintiff because there
has been none. We carry more than 100
networks geared toward diverse audiences.”

The legal question for the justices in the case,
Comcast Corporation v. National Association
of African American-Owned Media, No. 181171, is whether Entertainment Studios must
assert and prove that race was the key reason
for Comcast’s decision or one factor among
many.

Mr. Allen issued a statement disputing some
of the points Comcast made.
“This case is not about African-Americanthemed programming, but is about AfricanAmerican ownership of networks,” he said.
“Unfortunately, the networks Comcast refers
to as ‘African-American-owned’ are not
wholly owned by African-Americans, and
did not get any carriage until I stood up and
spoke out about this discrimination and
economic exclusion.”

The appeals court said the second kind of
evidence would suffice.
“Plaintiffs needed only to plausibly allege
that discriminatory intent was a factor in
Comcast’s refusal to contract,” the
unanimous three-judge panel wrote, “and not
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“Supreme Court Will Decide Standard for Proving Racial Bias in Discrimination
Suit Against Comcast”
ABA Journal
Debra Cassens Weiss
June 10, 2019
The U.S. Supreme Court agreed Monday to
decide whether a black-owned media
company has to show but-for causation in its
Section 1981 discrimination suit against
Comcast for failing to carry its programming.

requiring but-for causation,” the cert petition
says.
Comcast pointed out that Congress permitted
“motivating factor” discrimination claims
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act but
didn’t add a similar provision to Section
1981.

The court agreed to decide the issue in the
case of Entertainment Studios Networks. The
company alleges that Comcast Corp. has
refused to carry any of the network’s
channels for more than seven years, even as
Comcast launched more than 80 lesserknown, white-owned channels. “For years,
Comcast has given Entertainment Studios the
run-around,” the company says its brief
opposing certiorari.

The brief for Entertainment Studios counters
that Congress added the provision to Title VII
to protect discrimination victims, and that
doesn’t mean that Congress intended to
narrow civil rights claims under Section
1981.
Entertainment Studios also says the federal
appellate decisions cited by Comcast didn’t
address burdens at the pleading stage.

Entertainment Studios alleges discrimination
in contract in violation of Section 1981 of the
Civil Rights Act, a Reconstruction-era law.
In a ruling for Entertainment Studios, the 9th
U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals at San
Francisco said the company only has to show
that discrimination was a “motivating factor”
in Comcast’s refusal to contract.

Comcast is represented by Miguel Estrada of
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher. Entertainment
Studios
is
represented
by
Erwin
Chemerinsky, dean at the University of
California at Berkeley School of Law.
Chemerinsky is also a regular ABA Journal
contributor.

Comcast says in its petition for certiorari that
at least five federal appeals courts have
reached contrary decisions. “And for good
reason: Nothing in the text of the statute
purports to displace the common-law rule

USA
Today, Reuters,
the Hollywood
Reporter and Think Progress have coverage
of the Supreme Court’s decision to hear the
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case, Comcast Corp. v. National Association
of African American-Owned Media.
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“Supreme Court to Consider Curbing Racial Discrimination Claims”
Bloomberg
Greg Stohr
June 10, 2019
The U.S. Supreme Court will consider
making it harder to press some types of civil
rights suits, agreeing to hear an appeal from
cable television provider Comcast Corp. in a
clash with a black-owned media company.

Appeals said Entertainment Studios needed
to show only that racial discrimination was a
“motivating factor” in the decisions.
Comcast, which says its decision was made
for legitimate business reasons, says Section
1981 requires Entertainment Studios to show
that it would have received a contract had it
not been for racial bias. That’s a standard the
Supreme Court has applied in other contexts,
including claims of age discrimination and
retaliation.

Comcast is attempting to stop a lawsuit
by Entertainment Studios Networks Inc.,
which says racial discrimination is the reason
it couldn’t get its channels onto the carrier’s
cable systems. A federal appeals court let the
suit go forward.
At issue is a provision known as Section
1981, a Reconstruction-era law that bars
racial discrimination in contracting. Comcast
says the appeals court improperly made it
easier to sue under that statute than under
other civil rights laws.

Comcast said in a statement that it carries
more than 100 networks geared toward
diverse audiences.
“At this stage, the case is about a technical
point of law that was decided in a novel way
by the 9th Circuit,” Comcast said in an
emailed statement. “We hope the Supreme
Court will reverse the 9th Circuit’s unusual
interpretation of the law and bring this case
to an end.”

Entertainment Studios, owned by comedian
and producer Byron Allen, says it tried for
years to get its channels carried by Comcast.
The suit alleges that Comcast officials
refused to reach a deal, even while expanding
offerings of lesser-known, white-owned
channels. Entertainment Studios is pressing a
similar suit against Charter Communications
Inc.

Entertainment Studios urged the court not to
hear the case. In an emailed statement, Allen
said his suit is about black ownership of
television networks, not black-themed
programming.

In letting the suits go forward, the San
Francisco-based 9th U.S. Circuit Court of

“Comcast -- one of the biggest lobbyists in
Washington, D.C. -- will continue to lose this
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case, and the American people who stand
against racial discrimination will win,” Allen
said.
Charter Communications is pressing a similar
Supreme Court appeal, but the high court will
hear only the Comcast case.
The court will hear the case in the nine-month
term that starts in October. The case is
Comcast v. National Association of African
American-Owned Media, 18-11.
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“Justice Could Blunt Racial Bias Cases With Comcast Ruling”
Law360
Anne Cullen
June 21, 2019
The U.S. Supreme Court has agreed to
consider what role racism must play in a
contract decision before a discrimination case
against Comcast can move forward, and
attorneys expect the justices' answer will
make it a little harder to keep race
discrimination cases alive.

Supreme Court has increasingly held up in
discrimination cases over the past decade.
Under the but-for test, Allen’s company
would need to show that Comcast would have
carried the studio’s channels “but for” racial
bias — in other words, that discrimination
tipped the scales towards denial — not just
that discrimination was a motivating factor in
the studio’s failure to secure a Comcast
contract.

On the high court’s docket is a Ninth Circuit
decision that revived a $20 billion racial
discrimination case against Comcast Corp.
over its consistent refusals to work with
African American-owned media company
Entertainment Studios. Owned by former
comedian Byron Allen, Entertainment
Studios contends that Allen’s skin color is the
reason the studio hasn't been able to get
Comcast to carry its channels for years.

Legal scholars told Law360 that the justices'
decision to take the case was probably
motivated by their desire to clean up the
contradictory case law and impose
uniformity over how these claims should be
weighed.

The Ninth Circuit panel concluded that
Allen's
company
has
shown
that
“discriminatory intent played at least some
role in Comcast’s refusal to contract,” and
that was enough to keep the case afloat.
Entertainment Studios need not show racial
bias was the decisive factor, the panel said.

“The issue of which discrimination statutes
have access to a motivating factor standard is
one that has been in a considerable state of
disarray ever since the court’s decision in the
Gross case," said Katie Eyer, a law professor
at Rutgers School of Law who specializes in
anti-discrimination law.

But to many attorneys, the panel's use of a
"motivating factor" test marked a significant
departure from other U.S. courts' growing
reliance on the "but for" standard, which the

In the Supreme Court's 2009 ruling in Gross
v. FBL Financial Services, the justices
adopted the but-for standard for Age
Discrimination in Employment Act suits,
making it harder for workers to prove a claim
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under the ADEA. Before that ruling, Eyer
explained that the mixed-motive standard
was generally assumed to be available in all
discrimination statutes.

“It certainly won’t make it significantly
harder to bring these types of lawsuits,” she
noted, “but it will make it marginally harder.”
Eyer voiced once caveat, however. She said
the justices could make it a great deal more
difficult to claim discrimination in
contracting if they rule that the but-for test is
met only if racism was the sole reason for
being denied a contract.

“Prior to that,” Eyer said, “the courts of
appeals had basically treated all of the
various anti-discrimination statutes similarly,
and had included what’s called the mixedmotive burden-shifting paradigm, where the
plaintiff can just show motivating factor.”

“I think that’s wrong and I think it would be
inconsistent with what the court has said in
some other cases," she said, arguing that this
interpretation is not supportable under the
language of any of the statutes at issue.

And since then, she said, the Supreme Court
has been sussing out what this means for the
other anti-discrimination laws, statute by
statute.
Allen’s studio brought its claim under section
1981 of Title 42 of the United States Code, a
Reconstruction-era statute that bars race
discrimination in contracting by declaring
that everyone “shall have the same right to
make and enforce contracts as is enjoyed by
white citizens.”

And this test would be essentially impossible
for discrimination plaintiffs to meet, she said.
“In real life, there’s almost always a variety
of factors,” Eyer said. “Discrimination may
be what tips the balance, but it’s rarely the
only thing standing alone.”
But barring any imposition of sole causation
into the matter, McCarter & English LLP
partner Hugh Murray similarly felt that there
would be no drastic impact on race
discrimination cases if the but-for test winds
up as the default in section 1981.

And Eyer said it’s likely justices won’t agree
with the standard the Ninth Circuit adopted
for that statute, even though she felt it was a
reasonable interpretation.
“In the Ninth Circuit, I think they reasonably
concluded that having the same right means
the right to be considered for a contract
without your race playing any role in the
decision,” she said. “But I’m not sure if the
[high] court will reach that same result.”

“That will influence a little bit the way that
people have to plead their cases and prove
their cases,” Murray said. “But at the end of
the day, it’s not a huge issue because most
plaintiffs will want to prove they were
harmed by the race discrimination in any
event.”

In the event the justices’ cement the but-for
test as the standard that should be applied to
section 1981, she said discrimination
plaintiffs will have a slightly more difficult
time supporting their claims.

Murray doesn't think there's too much
"disarray" left in the discrimination causation
landscape. He contended that the but-for test
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has been largely settled as the default
standard by both the Supreme Court and
lower level courts, painting the Ninth
Circuit’s ruling as an outlier.

“Employment decisions are inherently
subjective in some measure. So it will be
relatively easy for a plaintiff to allege that
discrimination was a motivating factor,” the
organization told the justices in an amicus
brief in April. The ruling increases the odds
that "entirely legitimate workplace decisions
will result in burdensome litigation and
undeserved reputational harms," the chamber
said.

“The Ninth Circuit likes to have its own way.
They do that a lot,” Murray said, suggesting
the decision may be attributable to the court’s
historically left lean.
The panel’s decision “does allow for more
claims of race discrimination to survive,” he
added, “so, to the extent that it has a liberalconservative axis to it, it’s on the liberal
side.”

Charter Communications Inc. also stands to
benefit from the justices’ decision, as Allen’s
studio brought a related discrimination case
against Charter that balances on the same
issues.

Murray said his “strong supposition” is that
the justices took up the case to clear away the
inconsistent ruling, so they can implement
but-for causation as the default test in section
1981 as well, which he emphasized would
only make it harder at the margins.

Entertainment Studios contends Charter also
refused to carry the studio’s channels because
its owner, Byron Allen, is African American,
and both cases were lodged in California
federal court several years ago by Allen’s
firm alongside the National Association of
African American-Owned Media.

“If folks want to bring a lot of lawsuits
against people who have expressed improper
and unacceptable racial attitudes, having a
motivating factor standard would make those
cases easier,” Murray said.

While a California federal judge shut down
the Comcast case in late 2016 — finding that
legitimate business reasons may have
stymied the business relationship, not racial
animus — a separate judge in the same
California court decided to let the Charter
case move forward just a few weeks later.

“But the law traditionally is not trying to
solve every problem in the world, it’s trying
to correct actual harms,” he added.
The high court’s decision to review the case
marks a win for the country’s preeminent
business advocacy organization, the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce, which had
complained that the mixed-motive standard
could leave companies vulnerable to
frivolous discrimination suits.

The high court's ultimate ruling is expected to
govern in both cases, as the pair of suits were
evaluated and ruled on by the Ninth Circuit
in tandem. After two separate appeals, the
Ninth Circuit found the studio's claims can
proceed against the pair of broadcast
behemoths, finding but-for causation isn't
required in either case.
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While Allen’s company believes its claims
can stand under the higher causation
standard, the studio’s counsel

Jesse A. Cripps, Bradley J. Hamburger and
Samuel Eckman of Gibson Dunn & Crutcher
LLP.

noted that federal courts have long enforced
the broad reach of section 1981.
It's a "viable and very important federal civil
rights statute” and is crucial to fighting racebased contracting

Charter is represented by Paul D. Clement,
Jeffrey S. Powell, Judson D. Brown, Devin S.
Anderson and William K. Lane III of
Kirkland & Ellis LLP.
NAAAOM and Entertainment Studios are
represented by Skip Miller, J. Mira Hashmall
and David W. Schecter of Miller Barondess
LLP and Erwin Chemerinsky of the
University of California, Berkeley School of
Law.

decisions in court, Skip Miller of Miller
Barondess LLP told Law360 on Thursday.
He added that “this is especially important in
the media business, as here, where blackowned businesses have been
almost
completely shut out.”

The cases are Comcast Corp. v. National
Association of African American-Owned
Media et al., case number 18- 1171, and
Charter Communications Inc. v. National
Association of African American-Owned
Media et al., case number 18-1185, in the
U.S. Supreme Court.

Charter, which has its own Supreme Court
review petition pending, said last week it’s
not commenting on the high court’s decision
to take up the Comcast case. And counsel and
representatives for Comcast did not respond
to repeated requests for comment.
Comcast is represented by Miguel A.
Estrada, Thomas G. Hungar, Douglas Fuchs,
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“Comcast, Time Warner Cable Hit with $20 Billion Racial Bias Lawsuit”
Reuters
Jonathan Stempel
February 23, 2015
Comcast Corp and Time Warner Cable Inc
have been sued for $20 billion for allegedly
discriminating against African Americanowned media and employing advocates such
as the NAACP and the Rev. Al Sharpton to
advance their bias.

Sharpton and his National Action Network,
the complaint said, allegedly received “over
$3.8 million in ‘donations’ and as salary” for
his work as an MSNBC host.
The complaint also said Comcast and Time
Warner Cable each have only one fully
African American-owned channel, the Africa
Channel, and that Time Warner Cable has
acquiesced in Comcast’s discrimination in
anticipation of the merger’s completion.

The lawsuit was filed on Friday in Los
Angeles federal court by the National
Association of African-American Owned
Media as U.S. regulators review the proposed
$45 billion merger between the two biggest
U.S. cable operators.

A Comcast spokeswoman called the lawsuit
“frivolous,” saying it followed the
Philadelphia-based company’s good faith
negotiations with the plaintiff over many
years.

The same group filed a $10 billion lawsuit in
December against AT&T Inc and DirecTV,
whose own proposed merger is also under
regulatory review.

“We do not generally comment on pending
litigation, but this complaint represents
nothing more than a string of inflammatory,
inaccurate, and unsupported allegations,” she
said.

According to the complaint, Comcast entered
into “memoranda of understanding” with
Sharpton, the NAACP and other advocacy
groups to provide large cash “donations” in
exchange for their not interfering with its
alleged refusal to contract with AfricanAmerican-owned media.

A Time Warner Cable spokeswoman
declined to discuss the lawsuit, but said the
New York-based company and Comcast
remain separate, “including with respect to
programming decisions.”

The complaint said the agreements were
struck after Comcast was criticized for
similar failures in 2010 when it was buying
part
of
entertainment
company
NBCUniversal, which it now fully owns.

Sharpton also rejected the allegations, saying
they
could
support
defamation
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counterclaims, and that his group has
received less than $1 million from Comcast.

Entertainment Studios Networks Inc, owned
by comedian and producer Byron Allen, is
also suing Comcast and Time Warner Cable.

“The lawsuit is the epitome of an insult to the
black community” and has “not one scintilla
of evidence,” Sharpton said in a phone
interview.

The case is National Association of AfricanAmerican Owned Media et al v. Comcast
Corp et al, U.S. District Court, Central
District of California, No. 15-01239.

The NAACP did not immediately respond to
requests for comment.
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“Black-owned Network’s Bias Suit Against Comcast”
Business Insurance
Judy Greenwald
November 20, 2018
Comcast Corp. may have discriminated
against a black-owned network in refusing to
contract with it to distribute its shows, says a
federal appeals court, in reversing a lower
court ruling and reinstating the network’s
lawsuit.

and was thus denied the same right to contract
as a white-owned company,” said the ruling.
“These allegations include: Comcast’s
expressions of interest followed by repeated
refusals to contract; Comcast’s practice of
suggesting various methods of security
support for carriage only to reverse its
position once Entertainment Studios had
taken these steps; the fact that Comcast
carried every network of the approximately
500 that were also carried by its main
competitors…except Entertainment Studios’
channels; and, most importantly, Comcast’s
decision to offer carriage contracts to ‘lesserknown white-owned’ networks…at the same
time it informed Entertainment Studios that it
had no bandwidth or carriage capacity.

Los Angeles-based Entertainment Studios
Networks Inc., an African American-owned
television network operator, has sought for
more than a decade to secure a contract from
Philadelphia-based Comcast Corp., the
largest cable television distribution company
in the United States, according to Monday’s
ruling by the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals in San Francisco in National
Association of African American-Owned
Media; Entertainment Studios Networks Inc.
v. Comcast Corp.

“Although Comcast notes that legitimate,
race-neutral reasons for its conduct are
contained within the (complaint), when
considered in the light most favorable to
Plaintiffs, we cannot conclude that these
alternative explanations are so compelling as
to render Plaintiffs’ theory of racial animus
implausible,” said the ruling.

Entertainment Studios and the NAAAM filed
suit in U.S. District Court in Pasadena,
California, claiming its refusal to contract
with the network was racially motivated.
The district court dismissed the case, which a
three-judge appeals court panel unanimously
reversed. The plaintiffs’ complaint “includes
sufficient allegations from which we can
plausibly infer that Entertainment Studios
experienced disparate treatment due to race

“We can infer from the allegations in the
(complaint) that discriminatory intent played
at least some role in Comcast’s refusal to
contact with Entertainment Studios, thus
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denying the latter the same right to contract
as a white-owned company,” said the ruling,
in reversing the lower court ruling and
remanding the case.
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“Appeals Court Rejects Charter/Comcast Motion to Dismiss Byron Allen’s
Multibillion-Dollar Civil Rights Suit- Update”

Deadline
Dawn C. Chmielewski
February 4, 2019
The 9th Circuit Court of Appeals today
rejected Comcast and Charter’s motion to
dismiss Byron
Allen’s
multibilliondollar civil rights lawsuit against them. Read
the filing here and details of the case below.

their correspondence/emails and
contracts, to prove our cases in front
of a jury.
Every American, elected official,
civil rights organization, and the
Department of Justice should be
offended that the largest cable
companies in the U.S. pursued a legal
defense that the First Amendment
allowed them to discriminate against
ANY American. Comcast’s and
Charter’s shareholders and Board
members should find this immoral,
unacceptable, and be concerned that
these companies will be held fully
accountable because this has
officially become very serious
business.

Here is a statement Allen released after the
ruling:
“Comcast and Charter are wrong by
pursuing a legal defense that the First
Amendment
allows
them
to
discriminate.
We are very pleased with the ruling
by the Ninth Circuit to uphold their
decisions in our favor for a second
time. If Comcast and Charter want to
pursue the Supreme Court, we are
highly confident that the Supreme
Court will affirm the Ninth Circuit
and support these historic legal
decisions. Unfortunately, Brian
Roberts of Comcast and Tom
Rutledge of Spectrum/Charter have
refused my offers to sit down to
discuss these very serious matters.
Now, we have no choice but to enter
the discovery phase to depose all of
their executives and business
associates, as well as receive all of

We will continue to win these cases
because we are on the right side of
history. As the Bible has taught us,
what is done in the dark will come to
light.”
PREVIOUSLY, November 19: A federal
appeals court cleared the way for Byron
Allen’s Entertainment Studios Networks to
pursue civil rights suits against two of the
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nation’s biggest cable operators, Charter
Communications and Comcast.

Charter and Comcast issued separate
statements, expressing disappointment with
the ruling.

These lawsuits seek sizable damages — $20
billion against Comcast and $10 billion
against Charter — for alleged violations of
the Civil Rights Act.

“We respectfully disagree with the Court’s
decision, and are reviewing the decision and
considering our options,” Comcast said in a
statement.

The African-American executive said he
tried for years to get the cable giants to carry
his networks, which were available to
millions of television viewers through rival
distributors including Verizon, DirecTV,
AT&T, DISH. Allen said he has been
repeatedly rebuffed, and alleges race played
a factor.

Charter issued a more pointed in its response,
calling the allegations of racial animus a
“desperate tactic.”
“This lawsuit is a desperate tactic that this
programmer has used before with other
distributors,” said Charter in a statement to
Deadline. “We are disappointed with today’s
decision and will vigorously defend
ourselves against these claims.”

Charter attempted to have Entertainment
Studios Network’s suit dismissed on First
Amendment grounds, arguing that its choice
of cable channels is a form of expression.

Entertainment Studios Networks — a
constellation of eight channels, including
Pets.TV, Comedy.TV, Recipe.TV, Justice
Central.TV and its recent, high-profile
acquisition, The Weather Channel — filed
suits in federal district court in Los Angeles.

The Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit
today supported the district court’s ruling,
which found that the First Amendment
doesn’t shield Charter from engaging in
discriminatory conduct. The appeals court
reached a similar decision in the suit against
Comcast, sending both cases back to the trial
court.

The
Los
Angeles-based
media
company alleged Charter’s former senior
vice president of programming, Allan Singer,
refused to meet with Entertainment Studios
representatives. Singer rescheduled and
postponed
meetings
and
offered
“disingenuous” explanations for refusing to
carry it programming, according to court
documents.

“These two decisions against Comcast and
Charter are very significant, unprecedented,
and historic,” said Allen in a statement
lauding the decision. “The lack of true
economic inclusion for African Americans
will end with me, and these rulings show that
I am unwavering in my commitment to
achieving this long overdue goal.”

Singer said bandwidth limitations and
operational demands precluded carriage of
ENT’s cable networks, while reaching
carriage agreements with “lesser-known,
white-owned channels” such as the rural
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focused RFD-TV and the horror channel
Chiller.
Court documents cite evidence of racial bias,
including one instance in which Singer
allegedly approached an African-American
protest group outside Charter’s headquarters
and told them “to get off welfare.” Charter
CEO Tom Rutledge referred to Allen as
“Boy” at an industry event, court documents
allege.
“Plaintiffs suggest that these incidents are
illustrative of Charter’s institutional racism,”
the Appeals Court writes, in summarizing the
case’s history. “Noting also that the cable
operator had historically refused to carry
African American-owned channels and, prior
to its merger with Time Warner Cable, had a
board of directors composed only of white
men.”
Entertainment Studios ascribed similar
discriminatory motives on the part of
Comcast, which offered carriage deals to
such networks as Inspirational Network, Fit
TV, Outdoor Channel and Baby First
Americas while informing Allen it had no
bandwidth or storage capacity for his
networks.
The National Association of African
American-Owned Media also is a party to the
suits.
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“Calif. Judge Dismissed $20B Race Bias Suit Against Comcast”
Law360
Bonnie Eslinger
October 5, 2016
A California judge Wednesday dismissed a
$20 billion racial discrimination suit filed
against Comcast by television producer
Byron Allen’s company and the National
Association of African American Owned
Media, saying an amended complaint still
didn’t show how Comcast's decision not to
carry their stations involved bias.

refusal to contract with Entertainment
Studios is racially discriminatory. Comcast
has called the litigation "extortionate."

The three-page ruling by U.S. District Judge
Terry J. Hatter granting Comcast’s motion to
dismiss the second amended complaint from
Allen’s Entertainment Studios Networks and
the association stated that the court had noted
pleading deficiencies in dismissing the prior
version of the suit. Those deficiencies hadn’t
been cured in the second complaint, Judge
Hatter said.

For example, plaintiffs added the statement
that 80 million people have access to ESN
channels across the country.

In his Wednesday ruling, Judge Hatter says
the second amended complaint “merely
provided the court with different opaque
benchmarks.”

“But, similar to the viewer growth statistics
in the FAC, this allegation represents
potential, not actual, demand for ESN
content, and thus it does not necessarily
undercut
the
Comcast’s
alternative
explanation,” the judge wrote. “In short, not
one fact added to the SAC is either
antithetical to a decision not to contract with
ESN for legitimate business reasons or, in
itself, indicates that the decision was racially
discriminatory.”

“[T]he court clearly identified the problem:
the benchmarks provided by plaintiffs —
allegedly representing demand by viewers for
ESN channels — were ambiguous, and did
not exclude the alternative explanation that
Comcast’s refusal to contract with ESN was
based on legitimate business reasons,” the
judge states.

An attorney for the National Association of
African American Owned Media and
Entertainment Studios Networks, Skip Miller
of Miller Barondess LLP, said the plaintiffs
will appeal “and get this decision overturned”
so the case can be reinstated.

ESN and NAAAOM launched the suit in
February 2015, claiming Comcast engaged in
discrimination and then paid off civil rights
groups to look the other way. It’s operative
complaint states that the cable network’s

"We have more than adequately pleaded a
claim for racial discrimination under section
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1981 of the Civil Rights Act, based on
Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit precedent,”
Miller wrote in an email.

“One would expect plaintiffs making such
incendiary accusations — systematic
discrimination by multiple publicly traded
companies, a betrayal of the core mission of
the nation’s oldest and most respected civil
rights organizations, and state-sanctioned
racism in a federal government agency — to
come forward with specific, compelling facts
to back up those allegations,” Comcast states.

In its complaint, Entertainment Studios says
it owns and operates seven different 24-houra-day television networks.
“These networks include Emmy-nominated
and Emmy-award winning shows and talent,
and original programming featuring wellknown celebrities, all of which help to
increase market demand for the networks,”
the suit states.

Comcast argues that ESN has specifically
targeted broadcasters while they have
mergers pending regulatory review, the better
to “maximize media attention for ESN” and
potentially throw roadblocks before the
mergers, pointing out that the suit was filed
against Comcast and Time Warner Cable
during their proposed merger, which has
since been called off. After that, TWC
entered a new proposed merger with Charter
— and ESN filed suit against Charter,
according to Comcast.

Representatives for Comcast were not
immediately reachable on Wednesday. In
July, the global media company blasted the
suit as being nothing more than “extortion by
litigation,” and telling the California federal
judge the suit should be dismissed because it
is is a “scam” backed with nothing more than
conspiracy theories.

"In fact, ESN’s allegation that 80 million
subscribers have access to its channels is
especially useless at showing consumer
demand because tens of millions of those
subscribers were acquired only after
Plaintiffs
began
their
industry-wide
campaign of extortionate litigation,"
Comcast said.

In its memorandum supporting a motion to
dismiss, Comcast argued that after it, as well
as other major broadcasters, declined to carry
ESN's collection of “bandwidth-hogging
high-definition channels,” the network
“shifted its business model to extortion by
litigation,” and has now levied a host of
“incendiary” claims against Comcast and
other broadcasters.

In August 2015, Judge Hatter dismissed the
suit for the first time, holding that the
complaint didn’t establish civil rights groups’
ties to California or provide enough evidence
to demonstrate that Comcast excluded the
100
percent
African-American-owned
network from its television carriage. In
September, ESN and NAAAOM dropped a
Ninth Circuit appeal of Judge Hatter's order

But despite repeatedly alleging that Comcast
is
conspiring
with
the
Federal
Communications Commission and the
NAACP to keep African-American-owned
channels off the air, ESN's second amended
complaint still has not backed up its
allegations with any of the facts, according to
Comcast.
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dismissing the case after the judge allowed
them to amend the complaint.

charges of discrimination” to force them into
carrying ESN channels.

On Wednesday, Entertainment Studios
Network Inc. slammed a bid by Charter
Communications Inc. to duck a $10 billion
suit alleging it blocks black-owned
companies’ access to cable networks, telling
a California federal judge that its racial
discrimination claim has standing.

ESN and NAAAOM are represented by
Louis R. Miller, Amnon Z. Siegel and Lauren
R. Wright of Miller Barondess LLP.
Comcast is represented by Miguel A.
Estrada, Michael R. Huston, Douglas Fuchs,
Jesse A. Cripps and Bradley J. Hamburger of
Gibson Dunn.

Charter,
the
third-largest
television
distributor in the U.S., contended in a motion
to dismiss last month that plaintiffs
Entertainment Studios Network Inc. and the
National Association of African American
Owned Media LLC are on a crusade to accuse
major cable companies of “sensational

The case is National Association of African
American Owned Media et al. v. Comcast
Corp. et al., case number 2:15-cv-01239, in
U.S. District Court for the Central District of
California.
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Babb v. Wilkie
Ruling Below: Babb v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 743 F.App’x 280 (11th Cir. 2018).
Overview: Dr. Babb, a pharmacist at the C.W. Young VA Medical Center, argued that her
managers violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967. She claimed that she was discriminated based on her gender and age,
retaliated against because she had engaged in protected EEOC activity, and subjected her to a
hostile work environment. She appeals from the district court’s summary judgement grant in favor
of the Secretary.
Issue: Whether the federal-sector provision of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967, which provides that personnel actions affecting agency employees aged 40 years or older
shall be made free from any “discrimination based on age,” 29 U.S.C Sec. 633a(a), requires a
plaintiff to prove that age was a but-for cause of the challenged personnel action.
Noris BABB, Plaintiff-Appellant
v.
SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF VETERAN AFFAIRS, Defendant- Appellee
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit
Decided on July 16, 2018
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]
ED CARNES, Chief Judge, NEWSOM and SILER, Circuit Judges
PER CURIAM:
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §
This appeal arises from an employment2000e et seq., and the Age Discrimination in
discrimination action filed by Dr. Noris
Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § § 621
Babb, a pharmacist at the C.W. “Bill” Young
et seq. Babb appeals from the district court’s
VA Medical Center in Bay Pines, Florida,
grant of summary judgment in favor of the
against the Secretary of the Department of
Secretary.
Veterans Affairs. Babb alleges that her
managers discriminated against her based on
Babb raises three issues on appeal. First, she
her gender and age, retaliated against her
contends that the district court erred by
because she had engaged in protected EEOC
applying the McDonnell Douglas standard
activity, and subjected her to a hostile work
rather than the more lenient “motivating
environment—all in violation of Title VII of
factor” test to her gender- and age-
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discrimination and retaliation claims.
Second, she asserts that the district court
overlooked genuine issues of material fact
concerning intent and pretext. And finally,
she argues that the district court erroneously
granted summary judgement on her hostilework-environment claim.
Having considered the parties’ written briefs
and oral arguments, we affirm the district
court’s grant of summary judgement on
Babb’s ADEA claim, her Title VII retaliation
claim, and her hostile-work-environment
claim. We reverse the district court’s grant of
summary judgment on Babb’s genderdiscrimination claim and remand for
consideration under the motivating-factor
standard.

division. In 2006, Babb accepted a position
as a geriatrics pharmacist. Between 2006 and
June 2013, Babb was assigned to an
“interdisciplinary team” of caregivers in the
Medical
Center’s
Geriatric
Clinic.
Accordingly, Babb’s work scope and
responsibilities were governed by a service
agreement between Pharmacy Services and
Geriatric. As a clinical pharmacist working in
the Geriatric Clinic, Babb was supervised
both by Dr. Leonard Williams, Chief of the
Geriatric Clinic, and by Pharmacy Services
administrators—Dr.
Marjorie Howard,
Babb’s direct Pharmacy Services supervisor;
Dr. Keri Justice, Associate Chief of
Pharmacy; and Dr. Robert Stewart, the
Clinical Pharmacy Supervisor.

I

In 2009, while a member of the
interdisciplinary team, Babb obtained an
“advanced scope of practice,” which meant
that she could practice “disease state
management” (or “DSM”)—i.e., she could
see patients and prescribe medication for
conditions within the scope of her expertise
without consulting a physician. In 2010, the
VA announced a nationwide initiative called
“Patient Aligned Care Team” (or “PACT”),
which triggered staffing changes at the
Medical Center. As part of the PACT
initiative, the VA established qualifications
standards pursuant to which pharmacists
spending at least 25% of their time practicing
DSM would be eligible for promotion to GS13. Because she had an advanced scope that
enabled her to practice DSM, Babb sought a
promotion.

The facts here are complex—or at least
unwieldy. For the sake of clarity, we divide
our summary into three parts: (a) a
description of Babb’s employment and
responsibilities in the years leading up to her
(and others’) complaints about alleged
gender and age discrimination; (b) a brief
description of those complaints; and (c) a
slightly more extended description of the
actions that Babb contends constituted
unlawful discrimination and/or retaliation, as
well as the Secretary’s asserted reasons for
those actions.
A
Babb, a clinical pharmacist, joined the
Medical Center in 2004. As a clinical
pharmacist, Babb worked under the auspices
of the Medical Center’s Pharmacy Services

B
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Along the way, Babb and some of her
colleagues concluded that Pharmacy Services
was implementing the new qualifications
standards in a way that evinced gender and
age discrimination. Two other clinical
pharmacists at the Medical Center, Drs.
Donna Trask and Anita Truitt, filed EEO
complaints in September 2011. In April and
May 2012, Babb sent emails supporting
Trask and Truitt to an EEOC investigator,
and later, in March 2014, Babb gave a
deposition in support of Trask and Truitt.
Babb also advocated on her own behalf; in a
February 2013 conversation with Dr. Justice,
Babb says that she identified herself as
“another over 40 female with a grievance”
and complained about management’s
decision (of which more below) not to have
her practice DSM anymore. In May 2013,
Babb filed the EEOC complaint that
ultimately led to this suit.

infectious-disease treatment protocol and so
needed their input.
Pharmacy Services and Geriatric finalized
the new service agreement governing Babb’s
responsibilities in December 2012. While
they considered having Babb remain in the
Geriatric Clinic, keep her advanced scope,
and spend at least 25% of her time practicing
DSM, they ultimately concluded that such a
solution was unworkable. In particular,
although Dr. Williams wanted to keep Babb
in the Geriatric Clinic, he thought that
reserving 25% of her time for DSM posed
two problems: (1) he feared that it would
detract from her role as a clinical pharmacist
and patient caregiver and increase wait times
for geriatric patients; and (2) he did not think
that the DSM model was particularly well
suited to geriatric patients. Accordingly,
Williams determined that the Geriatric Clinic
could not afford to allow Babb to devote
more than three “slots” per day to DSM.
Those three slots would equate to only about
18.75% of Babb’s time, well short of the 25%
required for promotion under the new PACTbased standards. When it became clear that
Geriatric would not agree to an arrangement
that would permit Babb to meet the necessary
25% DSM threshold, Pharmacy Services and
Geriatric agreed that Babb would not have
any scheduled DSM responsibilities but
would instead perform all of her work as part
of an integrated patient-care team.

C
In the fall of 2012, Pharmacy Services and
Geriatric began renegotiating the services
agreement governing Babb’s responsibilities.
Babb asked a Pharmacy Services supervisor
whether she should “do anything” about the
negotiations but was told that they would be
“taken care of at the Service Chief level and
[that she] didn’t need to be concerned about
it.” Babb later found out that two younger
pharmacists—Drs. Lindsey Childs and
William Lavinghousez—did participate in
the
service-agreement
negotiations;
Pharmacy Services explained that both were
infectious-disease specialists and that its
representative
was
unfamiliar
with

Because Babb would no longer practice DSM
under the new service agreement, she would
not need an advanced scope. Accordingly,
shortly after the new service agreement was
finalized, Pharmacy Services management
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began the process of removing Babb’s
advanced-scope designation.

known as “mow-mows” or “squeaky wheels”
who
were
“never
happy,
always
complaining,” and that certain employees
perceived that “they were [being]
discriminated against because they were
older and female.” Wilson testified that he
believed that Babb had “felt that [she was
being] discriminated against over age and
sex.” The AIB questioned a total of 26
employees; Babb was “really upset” about
being one of those questioned.

During this same time period, Babb sought
opportunities in the Medical Center’s
anticoagulation clinic. Initially in the fall of
2012, and then again in January 2013, Babb
requested anticoagulation training so that she
could help out in the anticoagulation clinic.
Pharmacy Services denied both requests on
the grounds that the clinic was responsible for
training medical residents, that the clinic was
understaffed and lacked the capacity to train
additional people, and that the training was
unrelated to Babb’s work as a clinical
pharmacist in the Geriatric Clinic.

When Babb learned that she had not been
selected for either of the anticoagulation
positions for which she had interviewed, she
filed the EEOC complaint that led to this suit
in May 2013. She also requested that she be
moved out of the Geriatric Clinic and into the
“float pool,” where she would cover for
absent staff in a variety of areas. Babb’s
position as a floater did not require an
advanced scope and did not present
promotion opportunities. Pharmacy Services
approved Babb’s request. Soon after Babb
began floating in July 2013, Babb’s
supervisor received two complaints about
Babb that had been filed by one of Babb’s
coworkers. The first asserted that Babb had
been rude to a patient, the second that Babb
had failed to answer her pager. Babb’s
supervisor talked to her about the complaints,
and Pharmacy Services management knew
about them, but they did not result in any
discipline and did not affect Babb’s
performance appraisal. Babb enjoyed her
time in the float pool.

Separately, in April 2013, Babb applied for
two open positions in the anticoagulation
clinic. A three-member panel conducted
interviews for the positions and ultimately
selected two younger female pharmacists.
The interviewers explained that the two
selected candidates had more anticoagulation
experience than Babb (who had none) and
that Babb had used unprofessional language
and criticized other Medical Center
employees during her interview. Babb herself
characterized the interview as “the worst
interview of [her] life.”
That same month, Pharmacy Services
convened an administrative investigation
board (“AIB”) to investigate a vulgar letter
received by Dr. Gary Wilson, Chief of
Pharmacy Services. The letter discussed
concern over promotion practices in
pharmacy between GS-11 and GS-13. During
the AIB’s investigation, Justice testified that
Babb had been part of a group of pharmacists

In early 2014, Babb applied for and was
promoted to a PACT position that involved
work in the hospital’s Module B and Module
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D. The announcement that advertised the job
opening read as follows: “Four 9 hour shifts
Tuesday through Friday 7:00 am – 4:30 pm
with a 4 hour shift Saturday 8:00 am12:00pm. Nights, weekends and holiday[s]
on a fair and equitable rotational schedule.”
In April 2014, Justice submitted paperwork
to facilitate Babb’s promotion; she marked
“excellent” on all applicable forms and
remarked that Babb was “an excellent
practitioner with a broad knowledge of
clinical pharmacy” and “great with patients!”
The VA approved Babb’s promotion to GS13 in August 2014. After starting her new job,
Babb learned that she was entitled to only
four hours of holiday pay for each of the five
Monday federal holidays. (A traditional
schedule with five eight-hour weekday shifts
would provide eight hours of holiday pay for
each Monday holiday. ) Babb was “very
upset” and said that she would not have taken
the job if she had known about the holidaypay issue. The Medical Center offered to
change Babb’s schedule, but she declined;
she testified that due to the additional pay she
gets for working on Saturdays, she makes
more money than employees who work eight
hours a day Monday through Friday.

2000e et seq., and the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § § 621
et seq.
The Secretary filed a motion for summary
judgment, which the district court granted.
The court analyzed the gender- and agediscrimination claims, as well as the
retaliation claim, under the burden-shifting
framework established in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green. With respect to each
of the claims, the court found (1) that Babb
had established a prima facie case, (2) that the
Secretary
had
proffered
legitimate,
nondiscriminatory, non-retaliatory reasons
for the challenged employment actions, and
(3) that no jury could reasonably conclude
that those reasons were pretextual. On Babb’s
hostile-work environment claim, the court
held that the remarks about which Babb
complained were not sufficiently severe and
pervasive to create an objectively abusive
working environment.
III
A
Babb first contends that the district court
erred by applying the McDonnell Douglas
test, rather than the more lenient motivatingfactor test, to her “mixed motive” Title VII
gender-discrimination claim. We agree.

II
Babb sued the Secretary of the Department of
Veterans Affairs in July 2014. In her
complaint, Babb claimed that her managers
discriminated against her based on her gender
and age, retaliated against her because she
had engaged in protected EEOC activity, and
subjected her to a hostile work
environment—all in violation of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §

In Quigg v. Thomas County School District,
we held that a plaintiff alleging a mixedmotive Title VII discrimination claim need
not satisfy McDonnell Douglas’s “overly
burdensome”
standard.
Instead,
we
concluded that a plaintiff need only offer
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“evidence sufficient to convince a jury that:
(1) the defendant took an adverse
employment action against the plaintiff; and
(2) [a protected characteristic] was a
motivating factor for the defendant’s adverse
employment action.” Gender discrimination
constitutes a motivating factor if it “factored
into [the employer’s] decisional process.”

B
Babb next contends that the district court
erred in applying the McDonnell Douglas
framework, rather than the motivating-factor
test, to her ADEA age-discrimination claim.
If we were writing on a clean slate, we might
well agree. It is true, as the Secretary says,
that the Supreme Court held in Gross v. FBL
Financial Services, Inc., that the provision of
the ADEA applicable to private-sector
employees precludes application of a
motivating-factor standard. In so holding, the
Court hewed closely to that provision’s
particular text: “It shall be unlawful for an
employer ... to fail or refuse to hire or to
discharge any individual or otherwise
discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual’s age.” As the
Court’s italics indicate, it focused on the
phrase “because of”— which, the Court held,
requires an age-discrimination plaintiff to
prove “that age was the ‘reason’ that the
employer decided to act,” i.e., “the ‘but-for’
cause of the employer’s adverse decision.”

The Secretary does not dispute that Quigg’s
motivating-factor standard applies to Babb’s
mixed-motive gender-discrimination claim.
Nor does the Secretary dispute that the
district court failed to apply Quigg’s standard
and evaluated Babb’s claim under
McDonnell Douglas instead. The Secretary
asserts, however, that Babb waived her
mixed-motive claim by failing to allege it
specifically in her complaint. We disagree.
As a plurality of the Supreme Court
explained in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, a
plaintiff should not be required to label her
complaint “as either a ‘pretext’ case or a
‘mixed-motives’ case from the beginning in
the District Court” because “[d]iscovery
often will be necessary before the plaintiff
can know whether both legitimate and
illegitimate considerations played a part in
the decision against her.” Here, Babb
sufficiently raised her mixed-motive theory
in the district court by arguing it in response
to the Secretary’s summary judgment
motion.

As Babb has pointed out here, the provision
of the ADEA that governs discrimination
claims brought by federal-sector employees
reads differently. In pertinent part, and with
exceptions not relevant here, it states that
“[a]ll personnel actions affecting employees
or applicants for employment who are at least
40 years of age shall be made free from any
discrimination based on age.” Babb contends
that the federal-sector provision’s particular
framing—which, quite unlike the privatesector provision, requires that employment

Rather than determine for ourselves whether
Babb’s evidence meets Quigg’s motivatingfactor standard, we think it more prudent to
remand Babb’s gender-discrimination claim
to the district court for consideration under
the proper test in the first instance.
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decisions be made “free from any
discrimination” based on age— counsels a
different result here than in Gross, and should
be read to embody a motivating-factor (rather
than but-for) causation standard. Although
Babb’s argument is not insubstantial, it is
foreclosed by our existing precedent.

employment decisions that Babb says were
made against her because of her age: (1)
removal of her advanced scope; (2) nonselection for anticoagulation; (3) denial of
training opportunities; and (4) provision of
only four hours of holiday pay under her new
Module B schedule. We consider each in
turn.

In Trask v. Secretary, Department of
Veterans Affairs, this Court applied the
McDonnell Douglas standard to an ADEA
claim brought by two federal government
employees—indeed, two employees who
worked at the same facility where Babb
worked and made many of the same
allegations that Babb has made here. Under
the prior-panel-precedent rule, Trask is
binding on us. It is true, as Babb says, that the
panel in Trask did not analyze the linguistic
differences between the ADEA’s private- and
federal-sector provisions— differences that
she claims make all the difference. Even so,
we have long—and consistently, and
forcefully—rejected an “overlooked reason”
(or “overlooked argument”) exception to the
prior-precedent rule.

Addressing Babb’s claim that her advanced
scope was removed for discriminatory
reasons, the Secretary proffered testimony
from Dr. Williams, the decision-maker who
removed
Babb’s
advanced-scope
designation, explaining a nondiscriminatory
reason for the decision. Williams testified
that he decided that Babb would no longer
practice DSM—thereby eliminating her need
for an advanced scope—because geriatric
patients presented such complex medical
cases that it would be in patients’ best interest
for care to be provided by interdisciplinary
medical teams rather than by independent
pharmacists practicing DSM. Babb quarrels
with Williams’ choice to remove DSM from
her schedule in the Geriatric Clinic, but her
arguments reduce to criticism of Williams’
business judgment. Under the McDonnell
Douglas framework, to successfully rebut an
employer’s proffered nondiscriminatory
reason for making a business decision, a
plaintiff must “meet that reason head on and
rebut it, and the employee cannot succeed by
simply quarreling with the wisdom of that
reason.” Here, Babb fails to tackle Williams’
proffered nondiscriminatory reason “head
on” to prove that a choice to provide
interdisciplinary care to frail geriatric
patients is not, in fact, what motivated
Williams’ decision.

Accordingly, under Trask, the district court
did not err in applying the McDonnell
Douglas test to Babb’s ADEA agediscrimination claim. And under that
standard, we can find no reversible error in
the district court’s decision. In particular, we
hold that the district court correctly
concluded that Babb failed to demonstrate
that the Medical Center’s proffered reasons
for the adverse employment decisions that
she alleges were pretexual and that the “real”
reason for those decisions was because Babb
was too old. There are four primary adverse
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Addressing Babb’s non-selection for the
anticoagulation position, Babb argues that
age discrimination underlay the Medical
Center’s hiring of two younger pharmacists.
The Secretary offered evidence of the
Medical Center’s nondiscriminatory reasons:
(1) that the selected pharmacists were more
experienced than Babb and (2) that Babb
performed poorly in her interview, offering
inadequate answers to medical questions and
making
disparaging
remarks
about
coworkers. Babb does not meaningfully
contest the Secretary’s assessment that she
interviewed poorly for the anticoagulation
position; in fact, she acknowledged that her
interview was the worst of her life. Babb does
contest the conclusion that she was less
qualified for the positions than the chosen
pharmacists. But while it may be (as Babb
argues) that her experience was different
from the selected pharmacists’, it was not
necessarily better than theirs. The fact is that
the hired pharmacists had anticoagulation
experience that Babb lacked, and a
reasonable employer could rely on that
particular experience in making an
anticoagulation hiring decision, as the
Secretary contends occurred here. Babb has
failed to prove that that the Secretary’s
proffered explanations her non-selection are
pretextual and that age discrimination is the
real reason she was passed over.

because (1) the registration deadline had
passed by the time Babb requested
permission to attend the training, (2) Babb
was responsible for caring for patients in the
Geriatric Clinic at the time of the training,
and (3) Howard believed that Babb already
possessed a good understanding of the
subject matter being taught at the training.
Dr. Stewart testified that at the time Babb’s
request for anticoagulation training was
denied, the anticoagulation department was
busy, understaffed, and already burdened
with the responsibility of training medical
residents. Babb attempts to demonstrate that
these proffered nondiscriminatory reasons
for denials of training are pretextual by
pointing out other individuals at the Medical
Center who were provided with special
training opportunities, but the fact that other
individuals received some special training
does not prove that the real reason that
Babb’s requested training was denied was
discriminatory—i.e., it does not meet the
Secretary’s explanation “head on.”
Finally, addressing Babb’s claim regarding
discrimination in the administration of
holiday pay in her Module B position, the
Secretary has explained that holiday pay is
tied to Babb’s Module B schedule. Babb is
scheduled to work nine-hour shifts Tuesday
through Friday with a four-hour shift every
Saturday; because Babb is never scheduled to
work on a Monday, her Monday holiday pay
is calculated by referencing back to her most
recent work day, a four hour Saturday shift.
Babb admitted that she earned more money
on her Tuesday-Saturday schedule (even with
her holiday pay complaints) than she would
have earned on a traditional Monday-Friday

Addressing Babb’s assertion that she was
unlawfully denied access to training
opportunities, the Secretary offers testimony
from Dr. Howard and Dr. Stewart to explain
nondiscriminatory reasons for those denials.
Dr. Howard testified that she denied Babb’s
request to attend a two-day geriatrics training
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schedule with eight hours of holiday pay for
each Monday holiday. When Babb
complained about her holiday pay, the VA
offered to permanently move her to a
traditional Monday-Friday schedule that
would entitle her to eight hours of holiday
pay for each Monday holiday, but Babb
refused the offer. Babb has failed to rebut the
Secretary’s nondiscriminatory explanation
for Babb’s holiday pay—namely, that it was
calculated in relation to her TuesdaySaturday schedule.

As it had done in Gross, the Court
emphasized the provision’s use of the phrase
“because”—in particular, its prohibition of
any discrimination “because” an employee
has engaged in protected EEO activity.
“Given the lack of any meaningful textual
difference between the text in this statute and
the one in Gross,” the Court held, “the proper
conclusion here, as in Gross, is that Title VII
retaliation claims require proof that the desire
to retaliate was the but-for cause of the
challenged employment action.”

The
Secretary
has
provided
nondiscriminatory reasons for adverse
employment decisions about which Babb has
complained. Babb has failed to adequately
rebut those nondiscriminatory reasons—to
meet them “head on”— and prove that they
are pretextual. Thus, under McDonnell
Douglas, we affirm the district court’s order
of summary judgment on Babb’s age
discrimination claim.

But, Babb asserts—as she does in connection
with her ADEA claim—the language of Title
VII’s federal-sector anti-retaliation provision
is different. Almost exactly like its ADEA
analogue, it states that personnel decisions
(again, with exceptions not relevant here)
“shall be made free from any discrimination
based on … sex ….” Babb insists that the
absence of the “because” language that drove
the result in Nassar, combined with the
presence of the broad phrase “free from any
discrimination,” requires application of a
motivating-factor, rather than but-for,
causation standard.

C
Babb similarly asserts that the district court
erred in applying McDonnell Douglas—
again, rather than the motivating-factor
test—to her retaliation claim. And again, if
we were starting from scratch, we might
agree. But again, we are not, and so we
cannot.

Again, though, our earlier decision in Trask
stands in Babb’s way. There, citing both Title
VII’s private-sector anti-retaliation provision
and Nassar, we held—again, in a case
involving federal-government employees—
that the McDonnell Douglas test and a butfor causation standard applied. And for
reasons already explained, it is no answer to
Trask that the panel there did not engage the
linguistic differences between the privateand federal-sector anti-retaliation provisions.
We are bound just the same.

In University of Texas Southwest Medical
Center v. Nassar, the Supreme Court held
(following the rationale of its earlier decision
in Gross) that Title VII’s private-sector
retaliation provision requires a but-for, rather
than motivating-factor, causation standard.
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Accordingly, we are constrained to hold that
the district court did not err in applying the
McDonnell Douglas framework to Babb’s
retaliation claim. And under that standard, we
cannot say that the district court was wrong
to grant summary judgment to the Secretary.
In particular, we hold that the district court
correctly concluded that Babb failed to
demonstrate that the Medical Center’s
proffered reasons for the adverse
employment decisions that she alleges were
pretextual and that those decisions were
actually motivated by retaliatory animus.

workplace is permeated with discriminatory
intimidation, ridicule, and insult, that is
sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the
conditions of the victim’s employment and
create an abusive working environment.’”
“In evaluating the objective severity of the
harassment, this court looks at the totality of
the circumstances and considers, among
other things: (1) the frequency of the conduct,
(2) the severity of the conduct, (3) whether
the conduct is physically threatening or
humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance,
and (4) whether the conduct unreasonably
interferes with employee’s job performance.”
The district court here correctly concluded
that Babb failed to allege an objectively
hostile environment so filled with
intimidation and ridicule that it was
sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter her
working conditions.

Babb points to the same adverse employment
actions in her retaliation claims as she did in
her age discrimination claims. As explained
above—and for the same reasons—Babb has
failed to demonstrate that the Secretary’s
proffered nondiscriminatory reasons for
making each employment decision were
pretextual. Just as Babb’s age discrimination
claims fail because Babb has failed to show
that the Secretary’s nondiscriminatory reason
for the action was pretextual, Babb’s
retaliation claims similarly fail. We affirm
the district court’s order of summary
judgment in favor of the Secretary on Babb’s
retaliation claims.

In support of her hostile-work-environment
claim, Babb points to many of the same
pieces of evidence that she invokes in
connection with her discrimination and
retaliation claims—e.g., the removal of her
advanced scope, the denial of her request for
anticoagulation training, the fact that she was
not hired for the anticoagulation position for
which she applied. In addition, she points to
three remarks made to her that, she says,
pertained to her age, gender, or protected
activity: (1) one pharmacy administrator once
asked her, “When do you retire?”; (2) another
once referred to “Magic Mike” as a “middleaged woman movie” while speaking to Babb;
and (3) the same called her a “mow mow”
(which Babb interpreted as “a grandma
comment”) during an investigation of a
vulgar email.

D
Finally, Babb claims that the district court
erred in granting summary judgment for the
Secretary on her hostile-work-environment
claim. We disagree; summary judgment was
proper.
“A hostile work environment claim under
Title VII is established upon proof that ‘the
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Babb has not raised a genuine issue of
material fact regarding her hostile workenvironment claim. Her allegations pale in
comparison to the sort of conduct that this
Court has deemed sufficiently “severe and
pervasive” to create an objectively abusive
environment. Given the facts alleged by
Babb, the district court correctly ruled that
her hostile-work-environment claim failed as
a matter of law.
IV
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the
district court’s grant of summary judgment
on Babb’s ADEA age-discrimination claim,
Title VII retaliation claim, and hostile-workenvironment claim. We reverse the district
court’s grant of summary judgment on
Babb’s Title VII gender-discrimination claim
and remand for consideration under the
“motivating-factor” standard.
AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED and
REMANDED in part.
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“Justices to Review How Federal Workers Prove Job Bias Claim”
Bloomberg
Hassan A. Kanu
June 28, 2019
The U.S. Supreme Court accepted June 28 a
petition asking for clarification on what
federal government workers must prove
when they file discrimination claims.

protected
activity—like
filing
a
discrimination complaint—is explicitly
barred by Title VII, but the justices limited
their review to the standard for proving bias
under the ADEA statute.

The main question for the court in the case is
about the standard federal workers must meet
to show there was age discrimination
underlying a termination, demotion, or some
other negative job action. A decision from the
justices would resolve a federal appeals court
split on the issue. The high court’s analysis
may ultimately make it easier or tougher for
federal government workers to prove they
were discriminated against based on age or
even other protected categories, like race or
sex.

Private vs. Federal
Federal laws against discrimination in
employment have different provisions for
workers in the private sector compared to
those in public employment. Broadly
speaking, the private sector provisions ban
employment decisions that are made
“because of” someone’s age or because they
engaged in protected activity. The provisions
that apply to the federal sector generally use
different language that requires that
employment decisions “shall be made free
from” discrimination.

Norris Babb’s case against the Department of
Veterans Affairs alleges discrimination and
retaliation in violation of Title VII of the
1964 Civil Rights Act and the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act. She
alleges she was denied opportunities to
advance at a department facility in Florida
because of her gender and age, and that
management retaliated against her for filing
complaints about the issue.

The Supreme Court has interpreted the
“because of” language as requiring what’s
known as “but-for” causation, which means
the plaintiff must prove that they wouldn’t
have been harmed except for the fact of their
identity or protected act. It has done so in
both Title
VII
retaliation and ADEA
discrimination cases.

Babb’s petition presented a “subsidiary
question” for the court about whether
retaliation against federal workers over

But Congress in 1991 also amended Title VII
so that discrimination claims could be proved
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based on the test that was developed through
interpreting the language in the federal sector
provisions—known as the “motivating
factor” standard. That test requires plaintiffs
to show that bias was a factor in causing the
harm they suffered. The amendments limit
how much money and damages can be
recovered, and retaliation claims brought
under that statute retained the “but-for”
causation standard, which is tougher for
plaintiffs to surmount.

Babb’s case—have held that the age bias
statute requires but-for causation. The Ninth
Circuit’s decision concluded that Supreme
Court precedent doesn’t permit use of the
motivating-factor test during trial in federal
sector cases, but does in the summary
judgment phase—when courts make a
preliminary decision as to whether the
plaintiff actually has a viable claim.
The District of Columbia Circuit, on the other
hand, has rejected that approach and applied
the motivating factor analysis in those cases.

“Congress thus adopted a motivating-factor
standard for causation in Title VII’s privatesector discrimination provision, but it did not
do so in other provisions of Title VII or any
provisions of the ADEA,” the VA said in its
brief.

Administrative “agencies that oversee
discrimination and retaliation claims have
followed the D.C. Circuit” and concluded
“that federal employee’s burden of proof
should be ‘a factor’ or ‘a motivating factor’
in Title VII and ADEA discrimination cases,”
Babb’s attorneys said in her brief.

Babb and the VA both urged the high court to
resolve the standard of causation issue for age
discrimination complaints by federal
workers. The government argued that the
stricter “but-for” standard should apply,
while Babb argued for the more lenient
motivating factor analysis.

The high court’s analysis could resolve those
differences in how courts and agencies
approach the issue.
The case is Babb v. Wilkie, U.S., No. 18-882,
review granted 6/28/19.

Some federal appeals courts—including the
Ninth Circuit and the Eleventh Circuit in
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“Justices to Mull Requirements for Fed. Worker ADEA Claims”
Law360
Danielle Nichole Smith
June 28, 2019
The U.S. Supreme Court on Friday agreed to
weigh in on whether a federal worker has to
show that a challenged action from an
employer wouldn't have occurred if it wasn't
for the employee's age in order to
successfully plead a claim under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act.

However, Babb argued in her high court
petition that the statutory language created a
different standard of causation for federalsector workers bringing retaliation claims
than private-sector workers. Because the
ADEA provision for federal workers said that
all personnel actions would be "free from any
discrimination based on age," those workers
only had to show that age was a factor in the
challenged employer action to make a claim,
Babb said.

In its order, the high court granted Noris
Babb's petition for writ of certiorari in her
suit alleging the U.S. Department of Veterans
Affairs discriminated and retaliated against
her because of her gender and age. The
justices specified that the question in their
review would be limited to whether the
federal- sector provision in the ADEA
requires plaintiffs to "prove age was a but-for
cause of the challenged personnel action."

The Eleventh Circuit's decision created a
greater burden for federal workers seeking to
bring ADEA and Title VII retaliation claims
within its jurisdiction than other federal
employees would have elsewhere, Babb
contended.

The case came before the Supreme Court
after Babb appealed an Eleventh Circuit
panel's partial revival of her suit against the
agency. The panel had ruled in July that while
the lower court should have applied the
lighter "motivating factor" test for Babb's
gender discrimination claims, the court was
correct to analyze her ADEA and Title VII
retaliation claims using the stricter
McDonnell-Douglas burden-shifting test.
The panel noted, however, that its
conclusions might have been different had it
not been bound by an earlier circuit decision
called Trask.

The Department of Veterans Affairs, on the
other hand, told the high court that the
Eleventh Circuit correctly found that the socalled "but-for" standard was the appropriate
standard for federal workers bringing
employment claims under the ADEA and
Title VII. Still, the agency agreed that the
Supreme Court should take up the case to
resolve divisions among the circuit court and
federal agencies on the proper standard of
causation under the relevant provisions.
Roman Martinez, an attorney for Babb, told
Law360 on Friday that they were "happy the
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Supreme Court decided to review the
important issues presented by this case."

Justice, which represents the federal
government in litigation, didn't respond
Friday to requests for comment.

"The law demands that no federal employee
suffer from discrimination on the basis of
age," Martinez said. "We look forward to
vindicating that essential principle in this
case."

Babb is represented by Roman Martinez,
Samir Deger-Sen and Margaret A. Upshaw of
Latham & Watkins LLP, and Joseph Magri
and Sean M. McFadden of Merkle & Magri
PA.

Babb initially sued the Department of
Veterans Affairs in July 2014, alleging,
among other things, that she was stripped her
of an advanced certification, denied a transfer
and training opportunities and shorted on
holiday pay because she is a woman over 40.
A Florida federal judge tossed the case in
August 2016, and Babb appealed to the
Eleventh Circuit the following October.

The Department of Veterans Affairs is
represented by Solicitor General Noel J.
Francisco, Assistant Attorney General Joseph
H. Hunt and Marleigh D. Dover and
Stephanie R. Marcus of the U.S. Department
of Justice.
The case is Babb v. Wilkie, case number 18882, in the U.S. Supreme Court.

Representatives for the Department of
Veterans Affairs and the U.S. Department of
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“Supreme Court to Determine Whether “But-For” Causation Required in FederalSector ADEA Claims”

Employment Law Dailey
Pamela Wolf
July 2, 2019
The petitioner contends that the differing
language in the ADEA’s federal-sector
provision permits a more lenient “motivating
factor” analysis, rather than the ‘but-for”
causation applied in the private sector.

factor” test to her gender and
discrimination and retaliation claims.

age

On July 16, 2018, in an unpublished opinion,
the Eleventh Circuit affirmed summary
judgment of the employee’s ADEA, Title VII
retaliation, and hostile worker environment
claims, but it reversed on her gender
discrimination claim and remanded for
consideration under the motivating-factor
standard.

On June 28, the High Court granted certiorari
in a case that will determine whether federal
agency employees seeking to prevail on
allegations of discrimination in violation of
the ADEA’s federal-sector provision will be
required to prove that “age was a but-for
cause of the challenged personnel action.”

ADEA’s federal-sector provision. As to the
employee’s age discrimination claim, the
appeals court noted that the ADEA’s federal
sector provision states in relevant part that
“[a]ll personnel actions affecting employees
or applicants for employment who are at least
40 years of age shall be made free from any
discrimination based on age.” The employee
asserted that this particular framing, which,
unlike the private-sector provision, requires
that employment decisions be made “free
from any discrimination” based on age,
requires a different result than in the Supreme
Court’s decision in Gross v. FBL Financial
Services, Inc. (2006), and should be read to
encompass a motivating-factor, rather than
the but-for causation standard established
in Gross.

Summary judgment. Below, in Babb v.
Wilkie, a pharmacist at a VA medical center
in Florida alleged that she was subjected to
gender-plus-age discrimination in violation
of Title VII and the ADEA. She also alleged
retaliation due to her protected EEO activity
and a discriminatory and retaliatory hostile
work environment in violation of the same
laws. The district court granted the VA’s
motion for summary judgment on all of her
claims.
The employee appealed, contending, among
other things, that the district court erred by
applying the McDonnell Douglas standard
instead of the more lenient “motivating
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While the Eleventh Circuit characterized the
employee’s argument as “not insubstantial,”
it was nonetheless foreclosed by existing
precedent in Trask v. Secretary, Department
of Veterans Affairs, in which the appeals
court
applied
the McDonnell
Douglas standard to an ADEA claim brought
by two other federal government employees
who had worked at the same facility where
the plaintiff worked; they also made many of
the same allegations. The court was bound by
prior precedent.

Texas Southwestern Medical Center. v.
Nassar (2013)
and Gross interpreting
statutory language applicable to the private
sector bars the use of the “a factor,”
“motivating factor,” or “substantial factor”
standard in Title VII and ADEA retaliation
cases brought by federal-sector employees
under
different
statutory
language.
According to the employee, the High Court’s
reasoning in earlier cases suggests that the
differing statutory language applicable to
federal-sector and private-sector claims
mandates differing approaches.

Although the panel in Trask did not analyze
the linguistic differences between the
ADEA’s private- and federal-sector
provisions, as the employee asserted, the
Eleventh Circuit had also consistently and
forcefully rejected the “overlooked reason”
exception to its prior precedent rule. Thus,
the district court did not err in applying
the McDonnell
Douglas test
to
the
employee’s ADEA age discrimination claim.

Question narrowed. In granting certiorari, the
Supreme Court narrowed the question it will
address to reach only the burden of proof in
federal-sector age discrimination claims:
“Whether the federal-sector provision of the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967, which provides that personnel actions
affecting agency employees aged 40 years or
older shall be made free from any
‘discrimination based on age,’ 29 U. S. C.
§633a(a), requires a plaintiff to prove that age
was a but-for cause of the challenged
personnel action.”

Do Nassar and Gross apply in the federal
sector? In her petition for certiorari, the
employee framed the issue as whether the
Supreme Court’s decisions in University of
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Klein v. Oregon Bureau of Labor and Industries
Ruling Below: Klein v. Or. Bureau of Labor & Indus., 410 P.3d 1051 (Or. Ct. App. 2017)
Overview: A same-sex couple were denied service at an Oregon bakery business due to their
sexual orientation, which violated Oregon’s non-discrimination law. The defendants argue that
there should be an exemption based on their own sincere religious beliefs of same-sex marriage.
This case was remanded to a lower court by the U.S. Supreme Court based on their decision in
2018 Masterpiece Cakeshop.
Issue: (1) Whether Oregon violated the free speech and free exercise clauses of the First
Amendment by compelling the Kleins to design and create a custom wedding cake to celebrate a
same-sex wedding ritual in violation of their sincerely held religious beliefs; (2) whether the
Supreme Court should overrule Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of
Oregon v. Smith; and (3) whether the Supreme Court should reaffirm Smith’s hybrid-rights
doctrine, applying strict scrutiny to free exercise claims that implicate other fundamental rights,
and resolve the circuit split over the doctrine’s precedential status.
Melissa Elaine KLEIN, dba Sweetcakes by Melissa; and Aaron Wayne Klein, dba
Sweetcakes by Melissa, Plaintiffs—Petitioners
v.
OREGON BUREAU OF LABOR AND INDUSTRIES, Defendant—Respondent
Court of Appeals of Oregon
Decided on December 28, 2017
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]
GARRETT, Judge:
Melissa and Aaron Klein, the owners of a
bakery doing business as Sweetcakes by
Melissa (Sweetcakes), seek judicial review of
a final order of the Bureau of Labor and
Industries (BOLI) finding that the Kleins'
refusal to provide a wedding cake to the
complainants,
a
same-sex
couple,
violated ORS 659A.403, which prohibits a
place of public accommodation from denying
"full and equal" service to a person "on

account of * * * sexual orientation." The
order further concluded that the Kleins
violated another of Oregon's public
accommodations laws, ORS 659A.409, by
communicating an intention to unlawfully
discriminate in the future. BOLI's order
awarded damages to the complainants for
their emotional and mental suffering from the
denial of service and enjoined the Kleins
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from
further
violating ORS
659A.403 and ORS 659A.409.

applicability, and the Kleins have made no
showing that the state targeted them for
enforcement because of their religious
beliefs. For substantially the same reasons for
which we reject their federal constitutional
arguments, we reject the Kleins' arguments
under the Oregon Constitution. We also
reject the Kleins' arguments regarding the
alleged bias of BOLI's commissioner and
their challenge to BOLI's damages award.
We agree with the Kleins, however, that the
evidence does not support BOLI's conclusion
that
they
violated ORS
659A.409.
Accordingly, we reverse the order as to that
determination and the related grant of
injunctive relief. BOLI's order is otherwise
affirmed.

In their petition for judicial review, the
Kleins argue that BOLI erroneously
concluded that their refusal to supply a cake
for a same-sex wedding was a denial of
service "on account of" sexual orientation
within the meaning of ORS 659A.403;
alternatively, they argue that the application
of that statute in this circumstance violates
their
constitutional rights
to
free
expressionand to the free exercise of their
religious beliefs. The Kleins also argue that
they were denied due process of law because
BOLI's commissioner did not recuse himself
in this case after making public comments
about it, that the damages award is not
supported by substantial evidence or
substantial reason, and that BOLI
erroneously treated the Kleins' public
statements about this litigation as conveying
an intention to violate public accommodation
laws in the future.

I. BACKGROUND
We will discuss the relevant evidence and
factual findings in greater detail within our
discussion of particular assignments of error,
but the following overview provides context
for that later discussion. The complainants,
Rachel Bowman-Cryer and Laurel BowmanCryer, met in 2004 and had long considered
themselves a couple. In 2012, they decided to
marry.

As explained below, we reject the Kleins'
construction of ORS 659A.403 and conclude
that their denial of service was "on account
of" the complainants' sexual orientation for
purposes of that statute. As for their
constitutional arguments, we conclude that
the final order does not impermissibly burden
the Kleins' right to free expression under
the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution.
We
conclude
that,
under Employment
Division,
Oregon
Department of Human Resources v. Smith,
final order does not impermissibly burden the
Kleins' right to the free exercise of their
religion because it simply requires their
compliance with a neutral law of general

As part of the wedding planning, Rachel and
her mother, Cheryl, attended a Portland
bridal show. Melissa Klein had a booth at that
bridal show, and she advertised wedding
cakes made by her bakery business,
Sweetcakes. Rachel and Cheryl visited the
booth and told Melissa that they would like
to order a cake from her. Racheland Cheryl
were already familiar with Sweetcakes; two
years earlier, Sweetcakes had designed,
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created, and decorated a wedding cake for
Cheryl's wedding, paid for by Rachel.

remained, "holding [her] head in her hands,
just bawling."

After the bridal show, on January 17, 2013,
Rachel and Cheryl visited the Sweetcakes
bakery shop in Gresham for a cake-tasting
appointment, intending to order a wedding
cake. At the time of the appointment, Melissa
was at home providing childcare, so her
husband, Aaron, conducted the tasting.

When Cheryl returned to the car, she told
Rachel that Aaron had called her "an
abomination," which further upset Rachel.
Rachel later said that "[i]t made me feel like
they were saying God made a mistake when
he made me, that I wasn't supposed to be, that
I wasn't supposed to love or be loved or have
a family or live a good life and one day go to
heaven."

During that tasting, Aaron asked for the
names of the bride and groom. Rachel told
him that there were two brides and that their
names were Rachel and Laurel. At that point,
Aaron stated that he was sorry, but that
Sweetcakes did not make wedding cakes for
same-sex ceremonies because of his and
Melissa's religious convictions. Rachel began
crying, and Cheryl took her by the arm and
walked her out of the shop. On the way to
their car, Rachel became "hysterical" and
kept apologizing to her mother, feeling that
she had humiliated her.

When Rachel and Cheryl arrived home,
Cheryl told Laurel what had happened.
Laurel, who had been raised Catholic,
recognized the "abomination" reference from
Leviticus and felt shame and anger. Rachel
was inconsolable, which made Laurel even
angrier. Later that same night, Laurel filled
out an online complaint form with the Oregon
Department of Justice (DOJ), describing the
denial of service at Sweetcakes.
In addition to the DOJ complaint, Laurel
eventually filed a complaint with BOLI, as
did Rachel, alleging that the Kleins had
refused to make them a wedding cake
because of their sexual orientation. BOLI
initiated an investigation.

Cheryl consoled Rachel once they were in
their car, and she assured her that they would
find someone to make the wedding cake.
Cheryl drove a short distance away, but then
turned around and returned to Sweetcakes.
This time, Cheryl reentered the shop by
herself to talk with Aaron. During their
conversation, Cheryl told Aaron that she had
previously shared his thinking about
homosexuality, but that her "truth had
changed" as a result of having "two gay
children." In response, Aaron quoted a Bible
passage from the Book of Leviticus, stating,
"You shall not lie with a male as one lies with
a female; it is an abomination." Cheryl left
and returned to the car, where Rachel had

Meanwhile, the controversy had become the
subject of significant media attention. The
Kleins were interviewed by, among others,
the Christian Broadcast Network (CBN) and
later by a radio talk show host, Tony Perkins.
In the CBN interview, which was broadcast
in September 2013, the Kleins explained that
they did not want to participate in celebrating
a same-sex marriage, wanted to live their
lives in the service of God, and that, although
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they did not want to see their bakery business
go "belly up," they had "faith in the Lord and
he's taken care of us up to this point and I'm
sure he will in the future." The CBN
broadcast also showed a handwritten sign,
taped to the inside of the bakery's front
window, which stated:

accommodations advantages, facilities and
privileges of any place of public
accommodation, without any distinction,
discrimination or restriction on account of *
* * sexual orientation," and further makes it
"an unlawful practice for any person to deny
full and equal accommodations, advantages,
facilities and privileges of any place of public
accommodation in violation of this
section," BOLI further alleged that the
Kleins' subsequent statements had violated
another provision of the state's public
accommodations laws, which makes it
unlawful to communicate an intention to
discriminate in the future on account of
sexual orientation.

"Closed but still in business. You can reach
me
by
email
or
facebook.
www.sweetcakesweb.com or Sweetcakes by
Melissa facebook page. New phone
number will be provided on my website and
facebook. This fight is not over. We will
continue to stand strong. Your religious
freedom is becoming not free anymore. This
is ridiculous that we cannot practice our faith.
The LORD is good and we will continue to
serve HIM with all our heart [heart symbol]."

After the issuance of formal charges, BOLI
designated an ALJ to handle the contested
case proceedings, and the Kleins and BOLI
engaged in extensive motions practice before
the ALJ. Among those motions, the Kleins
sought to disqualify BOLI's commissioner,
Brad Avakian, on the ground that he was
biased against them, as evidenced by his
public statements about the cake controversy.
In a Facebook post shortly after Laurel filed
the DOJ complaint, Avakian had provided a
link to a story on www.kgw.com related to
the refusal of service; in that post, he wrote,
"Everyone has a right to their religious
beliefs, but that doesn't mean they can
disobey laws that are already in place. Having
one set of rules for everybody ensures that
people are treated fairly as they go about their
daily lives." Later, shortly after the first of the
BOLI complaints was filed, an article in The
Oregonian quoted Avakian as saying that
"[e]veryone is entitled to their own beliefs,
but that doesn't mean that folks have the right
to discriminate." According to the Kleins,

In the Perkins interview, which occurred in
February 2014, Aaron explained that he and
Melissa "had a feeling that [requests for
same-sex wedding cakes were] going to
become an issue" and that they had discussed
the issue. During the interview, Aaron stated
that "it was one of those situations where we
said 'well I can see it is going to become an
issue but we have to stand firm. It's our belief
and we have a right to it, you know.'"
BOLI's investigation determined that
substantial
evidence
supported
the
complaints, and the agency eventually issued
formal charges against the Kleins that
described the initial refusal of service as well
as the Kleins' subsequent participation in the
CBN broadcast and Perkins interview.
Specifically, BOLI alleged that the Kleins
had violated ORS 659A.403, which entitles
all persons "to the full and equal

622

those statements and others indicated that
Avakian had prejudged their case before the
hearing. The ALJ disagreed and denied the
motion to disqualify.

each complainant was claiming damages of
"at least $75,000," and it adduced evidence at
the hearing—through testimony of the
complainants
and
others—concerning
emotional harm that the complainants
suffered in the wake of the Kleins' refusal to
make their wedding cake. During closing
arguments, BOLI also asked that the ALJ
award damages for the distress that the
complainants suffered as a result of media
and socialmedia attention after the denial of
service. In response, the Kleins argued that
the complainants were not credible but that,
even if the ALJ were to find them credible,
their emotional distress was attributable to
sources other than the denial of service that
were not lawful bases for a damages award,
such as media attention and family conflicts.
The Kleins also argued that the amount of
damages requested by BOLI far exceeded
anything that the agency had previously
sought for similar violations.

The Kleins and BOLI also filed crossmotions for summary judgment on multiple
issues involving the merits of the case,
including, as relevant on judicial review: (1)
whether the complainants were denied
service "on account of" their sexual
orientation for purposes of Oregon's public
accommodation laws; (2) if so, whether the
application of those laws violates the Kleins'
rights to free expression and religious
worship under the state and federal
constitutions; and (3) whether Aaron Klein's
statements during the CBN and Perkins
interviews, and the note on the Sweetcakes
window, were the kinds of statements of
a future intention to discriminate that are
prohibited by ORS 659A.409. In an interim
order on the cross-motions, the ALJ agreed
with BOLI on the first two questions,
concluding that the Kleins' refusal to provide
a wedding cake violated ORS 659A.403, and
that the statute was constitutional, both
facially and as applied under the
circumstances. However, the ALJ agreed
with the Kleins that Aaron's statements
during the CBN and Perkins interviews had
not been prospective; rather, the ALJ
determined that those statements "are
properly construed as the recounting of past
events that led to the present Charges being
filed," and therefore did not violate ORS
659A.409.

After six days of testimony and argument
regarding the damages issue, the ALJ issued
a proposed final order that encompassed his
earlier summary judgment and procedural
rulings and also addressed the question of
damages. With respect to damages, the ALJ
found that Rachel had testified credibly about
her emotional distress, but that Laurel had not
been present at the cake refusal and had, in
some respects, exaggerated the extent and
severity of her emotional suffering. The ALJ
concluded that there was no basis in law for
awarding damages to the complainants for
their emotional suffering caused by media
and social-media attention. Ultimately, the
ALJ determined that $75,000 was an
appropriate award to compensate Rachel for
her suffering as a result of the denial of

After the ALJ's rulings on the various
motions, only the issue of damages remained
to be decided at a hearing. BOLI alleged that
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service, and that a lesser amount, $60,000,
was appropriate to compensate Laurel.

make the wedding cake. Within that
assignment, they argue that BOLI
misinterpreted the statute to apply to the
refusal; alternatively, they argue that, as
applied under these circumstances, the statute
abridges their rights to freedom of expression
and religious exercise under the federal and
state constitutions. In their second
assignment, the Kleins argue that their due
process rights were violated by the
commissioner's failure to recuse himself. The
Kleins' third assignment asserts that BOLI's
damages award is not supported by
substantial evidence or substantial reason.
And, in their fourth assignment, they argue
that BOLI erred by applying ORS
659A.409because their statements after the
refusal did not communicate an intention to
discriminate in the future. We address each
assignment of error in turn.

Both the Kleins and the agency filed
exceptions to the ALJ's proposed final order.
BOLI, through its commissioner, Avakian,
then issued its final order that, for the most
part, was consistent with the ALJ's reasoning
in his proposed order. Specifically, BOLI's
final order affirmed the ALJ's determinations
that the Kleins violated ORS 659A.403, it
affirmed the ALJ's conclusion that
application of that statute did not violate the
Kleins' constitutional rights, and it affirmed
the damages awards. However, the final
order departed from the ALJ's determination
in one respect: whether the Kleins had
violated ORS 659A.409 by conveying an
intention to discriminate in the future. On that
question, the final order determined that,
based on Aaron's statements during the CBN
and Perkins interviews, and the handwritten
sign taped to the bakery's window, the Kleins
had conveyed an intention to unlawfully
discriminate in the future by refusing service
based on sexual orientation. Thus, BOLI
reversed the ALJ's ruling on that matter and
concluded that the Kleins violated ORS
659A.409; but, BOLI did not award any
damages based on that particular violation
"because there is no evidence in the record
that Complainants experienced any mental,
emotional, or physical suffering because of
it." This petition for judicial review followed.

A. First Assignment: Interpretation and
Application of ORS 659A.403
1. Meaning and scope of ORS 659A.403
In their first assignment of error, the Kleins
argue that BOLI misinterpreted ORS
659A.403—specifically, what it means to
deny equal service "on account of" sexual
orientation. According to the Kleins, they did
not decline service to the complainants "on
account of" their sexual orientation; rather,
"they declined to facilitate the celebration of
a union that conveys messages about
marriage to which they do not [subscribe] and
that contravene their religious beliefs." BOLI
rejected that argument, reasoning that the
Kleins' "refusal to provide a wedding cake for
Complainants because it was for their samesex wedding was synonymous with refusing

II. ANALYSIS
In their petition, the Kleins raise four
assignments of error. In their first
assignment, they argue that BOLI erred by
applying ORS 659A.403 to their refusal to
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to provide a cake because of Complainants'
sexual orientation." We, like BOLI, are not
persuaded that the text, context, or history
of ORS
659A.403 contemplates
the
distinction proposed by the Kleins.

case, "sexual orientation," which is defined to
mean "an individual's actual or perceived
heterosexuality, homosexuality, bisexuality
or gender identity, regardless of whether the
individual's gender identity, appearance,
expression or behavior differs from that
traditionally associated with the individual's
sex at birth."

We review BOLI's interpretation of ORS
659A.403 for legal error, without deference
to the agency's construction of the statute. To
determine the legislature's intended meaning
of ORS 659A.403, we use the analytic
framework set forth in State v. Gaines,
whereby we look to the text of the statute in
its context, along with any helpful legislative
history.

In this case, Sweetcakes provides a service—
making wedding cakes—to heterosexual
couples who intend to wed, but it denies the
service to same-sex couples who likewise
intend to wed. Under any plausible
construction of the plain text of ORS
659A.403, that denial of equal service is "on
account of," or causally connected to, the
sexual orientation of the couple seeking to
purchase the Kleins' wedding-cake service.

The text of ORS 659A.403(1) leaves little
doubt as to its breadth and operation. It
provides, in full:
"(1) Except as provided in subsection (2) of
this
section, all persons
within
the
jurisdiction of this state are entitled to the full
and equal accommodations, advantages,
facilities and privileges of any place of public
accommodation,
without any distinction,
discrimination or restriction on account
of race,
color,
religion,
sex, sexual
orientation, national origin, marital status or
age if the individual is of age, as described in
this section, or older."

The Kleins do not point to any text in the
statute or provide any context or legislative
history suggesting that we should depart from
the ordinary meaning of those words. What
they argue instead is that the statute is silent
as to whether it encompasses "gay conduct"
as opposed to sexual orientation. The Kleins
state that they are willing to serve
homosexual customers, so long as those
customers do not use the Kleins' cakes in
celebration of same-sex weddings. As such,
accordingto the Kleins, they do not
discriminate against same-sex couples "on
account of" their status; rather, they simply
refuse to provide certain services that those
same-sex couples want. The Kleins contend
that BOLI's "broad equation of celebrations
(weddings) of gay conduct (marriage) with
gay status rewrites and expands Oregon's
public accommodations law."

The phrase "on account of" is unambiguous:
In ordinary usage, it is synonymous with "by
reason of" or "because of." And it has long
been understood to carry that meaning in the
context of antidiscrimination statutes.
Thus, by its plain terms, the statute requires
only that the denial of full and equal
accommodations be causally connected to the
protected characteristic or status—in this
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We see no evidence that the drafters of
Oregon's public accommodations laws
intended that type of distinction between
status and conduct. First, there is no reason to
believe that the legislature intended a
"status/conduct" distinction specifically with
regard to the subject of "sexual orientation."
When the legislature in 2007 added "sexual
orientation" to the list of protected
characteristics in ORS 659A.403, Or Laws
2007, ch 100, § 5, it was unquestionably
aware of the unequal treatment that gays and
lesbians faced in securing the same rights and
benefits as heterosexual couples in
committed relationships. During the same
session that the legislature amended ORS
659A.403 to include "sexual orientation," it
adopted the Oregon Family Fairness Act,
which recognized the "numerous obstacles"
that gay and lesbian couplesfaced and was
intended to "extend[ ] benefits, protections
and responsibilities to committed same-sex
partners and their children that are
comparable to those provided to married
individuals and their children by the laws of
this state." To that end, section 9 of that law
provided:

The Kleins have not provided us with any
persuasive explanation for why the
legislature would have intended to grant
equal privileges and immunities to
individuals in same-sex relationships while
simultaneously excepting those committed
relationships from the protections of ORS
659A.403.
Nor does the Kleins' proposed distinction
find support in the context or history of ORS
659A.403 more generally. As originally
enacted in 1953, the statute prohibited "any
distinction, discrimination or restriction on
account of race, religion, color or national
origin." One of the purposes of the statute, the
Supreme Court has observed, was "to prevent
'operators and owners of businesses catering
to the general public to subject Negroes to
oppression and humiliation.'” Yet, under the
distinction proposed by the Kleins, owners
and operators of businesses could continue to
oppress and humiliate black people simply by
recasting their bias in terms of conduct rather
than race. For instance, a restaurant could
refuse to serve an interracial couple, not on
account of the race of either customer, but on
account of the conduct—interracial dating—
to which the proprietor objected. In the
absence of any textual or contextual support,
or legislative history on that point, we decline
to construe ORS 659A.403 in a way that
would so fundamentally undermine its
purpose.

"Any privilege, immunity, right or benefit
granted by statute, administrative or court
rule, policy, common law or any other law to
an individual because the individual is or was
married, or because the individual is or was
an in-law in a specified way to another
individual, is granted on equivalent terms,
substantive and procedural, to an individual
because the individual is or was in a domestic
partnership or because the individual is or
was, based on a domestic partnership, related
in a specified way to another individual."

Tellingly, the Kleins' argument for
distinguishing between "gay conduct" and
sexual orientation is rooted in principles that
they derive from United States Supreme
Court cases rather than anything in the text,
context, or history of ORS 659A.403.
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Specifically, the Kleins draw heavily on the
Supreme Court's reasoning in Bray v.
Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, which
concerned the viability of a federal cause of
action under 42 USC section 1985(3) against
persons obstructing access to abortion
clinics. In that case, the Supreme Court
addressed, among other things, whether the
petitioners' opposition to abortion reflected
an animus against women in general—that is,
whether, because abortion is "an activity
engaged in only by women, to disfavor it is
ipso facto to discriminate invidiously against
women as a class."

to facilitate them." They contend that BOLI
simply "ignores Bray" and that BOLI's
construction of ORS 659A.403 "fails the test
for equating conduct with status" that the
Supreme Court announced in that case.
Bray, which involved a federal statute, does
not inform the question of what the Oregon
legislature intended when it enacted ORS
659A.403. But beyond that, Bray does not
articulate a relevant test for analyzing the
issue presented in this case. Bray addressed
the inferences that could be drawn from
opposition to abortion as a "surrogate" for
sex-based animus, and it was in that context
that the Supreme Court described "irrational
object[s] of disfavor" that "happen to be
engaged in exclusively or predominantly by
a particular class of people," such that intent
to discriminate against that class can be
presumed.

In rejecting that theory of ipso facto
discrimination, the Court observed:
"Some activities may be such an irrational
object of disfavor that, if they are targeted,
and if they also happen to be engaged in
exclusively or predominantly by a particular
class of people, an intent to disfavor that class
can readily be presumed. A tax on wearing
yarmulkes is a tax on Jews. But opposition to
voluntary abortion cannot possibly be
considered such an irrational surrogate for
opposition to (or paternalism towards)
women. Whatever one thinks of abortion, it
cannot be denied that there are common and
respectable reasons for opposing it, other
than hatred of, or condescension toward (or
indeed any view at all concerning), women as
a class—as is evident from the fact that men
and women are on both sides of the issue, just
as men and women are on both sides of
petitioners' unlawful demonstrations."

Here, by contrast, there is no surrogate. The
Kleins refused to make a wedding cake for
the complainants precisely and expressly
because of the relationship between sexual
orientation and the conduct at issue (a
wedding). And, where a close relationship
between status and conduct exists, the
Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected the
type of distinction urged by the Kleins. We
therefore reject the Kleins' proposed
distinction between status and conduct, and
we hold that their refusal to serve the
complainants is the type of discrimination
"on account of * * * sexual orientation" that
falls within the plain meaning of ORS
659A.403.

The Kleins argue that "[t]he same is true here.
Whatever one thinks of same-sex weddings,
there are respectable reasons for not wanting

The reasons for the Kleins' discrimination on
account of sexual orientation—regardless of
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whether they are "common and respectable"
within the meaning of Bray—raise questions
of constitutional law, not statutory
interpretation. The Kleins, in the remainder
of their argument concerning the construction
of ORS 659A.403, urge us to consider those
constitutional questions and to interpret the
statute in a way that avoids running afoul of
the "Speech and Religion Clauses of the
Oregon and United States constitutions."
However, that canon applies only where the
court is faced with competing plausible
constructions of the statute. Here, the Kleins
have not made that threshold showing of
ambiguity. Accordingly, we affirm BOLI's
order with regard to its construction of ORS
659A.403, and we turn to the merits of the
Kleins' constitutional arguments.
2. Constitutional
659A.403

challenges

The Kleins argue that BOLI's final order
violates their First Amendment right to
freedom of speech. BOLI argues that the
order simply enforces ORS 659A.403, a
content-neutral regulation of conduct that
does not implicate the First Amendment at
all. And each side argues that United States
Supreme Court precedent is decisively in its
favor.
The issues before us arise at the intersection
of
two competing principles:
the
government's interest in promoting full
access to the state's economic life for all of its
citizens, which is expressed in public
accommodations
statutes
like
ORS
659A.403, and an individual's First
Amendment right not to be compelled to
express or associate with ideas with which
she disagrees. Although the Supreme Court
has grappled with that intersection before, it
has not yet decided a case in this particular
context, where the public accommodation at
issue is a retail business selling a service, like
cake-making, that is asserted to involve
artistic expression.

to ORS

The Kleins invoke both the United States and
the Oregon constitutions in arguing that the
final order violates their rights to free
expression and the free exercise of their
religion. Oregon courts generally seek to
resolve arguments under the state
constitution before turning to the federal
constitution. In this case, however, the Kleins
draw almost entirely on well-developed
federal constitutional principles, and they do
not meaningfully develop any independent
state constitutional theories. Accordingly, in
the discussion that follows, we address the
Kleins' federal constitutional arguments first
and their state arguments second.

It is that asserted artistic element that
complicates the First Amendment analysis—
and, ultimately, distinguishes this case from
the precedents on which the parties rely.
Generally speaking, the First Amendment
does not prohibit government regulation of
"commerce or conduct" whenever such
regulation indirectly burdens speech. When,
however, the government regulates activity
that involves a "significant expressive
element," some degree of First Amendment
scrutiny is warranted.

a. Free expression
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In the discussion that follows, we conclude
that the Kleins have not demonstrated that
their wedding cakes invariably constitute
fully protected speech, art, or other
expression, and we therefore reject the
Kleins' position that we must subject BOLI's
order to strict scrutiny under the First
Amendment. At most, the Kleins have shown
that their cake-making business includes
some arguably expressive elements as well as
non-expressive elements, so as to trigger
intermediate scrutiny. We assume (without
deciding) that that is true, and then conclude
that BOLI's order nonetheless survives
intermediate scrutiny because any burden on
the Kleins' expressive activities is no greater
than is essential to further Oregon's
substantial interest in promoting the ability of
its citizens to participate equally in the
marketplace without regard to sexual
orientation.

categories of public accommodations: those
that provide lodging to transient guests, those
that sell food for consumption on the
premises, and those that host "exhibition[s]
or entertainment," such as theaters and sports
arenas. When the United States Supreme
Court upheld the public accommodations
provisions of Title II in 1964, it observed that
the constitutionality of state public
accommodations laws at that point had
remained "unquestioned," citing previous
instances in which it had "rejected the claim
that the prohibition of racial discrimination in
public accommodations interferes with
personal liberty."
Over two decades, the Oregon legislature
incrementally expanded the definition of
"place of public accommodation" to include
"trailer park[s]" and "campground[s]," and
then to places "offering to the public food or
drink for consumption on or off the
premises.” Then, in 1973, the legislature
significantly expanded the definition to
include "any place or service offering to the
public
accommodations,
advantages,
facilities or privileges whether in the nature
of goods, services, lodgings, amusements or
otherwise," subject to an exception for "any
institution, bona fide club or place of
accommodation which is in its nature
distinctly private." Other states similarly
enlarged the scope of their publicaccommodations laws over time.

(1) "Public accommodations" and the First
Amendment
Oregon enacted its Public Accommodation
Act in 1953. The original act guaranteed the
provision of "full and equal accommodations,
advantages, facilities and privileges * * *
without any distinction, discrimination or
restriction on account of race, religion, color,
or national origin." It applied to "any hotel,
motel or motor court, any place offering to
the public food or drink for consumption on
the premises, or any place offering to the
public
entertainment,
recreation
or
amusement.” Oregon's statute was thus
similar in scope to Title II of the federal Civil
Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits
discrimination "on the ground of race, color,
religion, or national origin" in three broad

First
Amendment challenges
to
the
application
of
public-accommodations
laws—and other forms of anti-discrimination
laws—have been mostly unsuccessful. The
United States Supreme Court has repeatedly
acknowledged that public accommodations
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statutes in particular are "well within the
State's usual power to enact when a
legislature has reason to believe that a given
group is the target of discrimination." The
Court has further acknowledged that states
enjoy "broad authority to create rights of
public access on behalf of [their] citizens," in
order to ensure "wide participation in
political, economic, and cultural life" and to
prevent the "stigmatizing injury" and "the
denial of equal opportunities" that
accompanies invidious discrimination in
public accommodations. And the Court has
recognized a state's interest in preventing the
"unique evils" that stem from "invidious
discrimination in the distribution of publicly
available goods, services, and other
advantages."

organizers to "alter the expressive content of
their parade" by accommodating a message
(of support for gay rights) that they did not
want to include. The Court further reasoned
that such an application of the statute "had the
effect of declaring the [parade] sponsors'
speech
itself
to
be
the
public
accommodation," which violated "the
fundamental rule of protection under the First
Amendment, that a speaker has the autonomy
to choose the content of his own message."
Following Hurley, the Court decided Boy
Scouts of America v. Dale, (Dale), in which
it held that applying New Jersey's public
accommodations law to require the Boy
Scouts to admit a gay scoutmaster violated
the group's First Amendment right to
freedom of association. The Court observed
that, over time, public accommodations laws
had been expanded to cover more than just
"traditional
places
of
public
accommodation—like inns and trains."
According to the Court, New Jersey's
definition of a "place of public
accommodation" was "extremely broad,"
particularly because the state had "applied its
public accommodations law to a private
entity without even attempting to tie the term
'place' to a physical location." The court
distinguished Dale from prior cases in which
it held that public accommodations laws
posed no First Amendment problem,
observing that, in those prior cases, the law's
enforcement did not "materially interfere
with the ideas that the organization sought to
express."

However, as states adopted more expansive
definitions
of
"places
of
public
accommodation," their anti-discrimination
statutes began to reach entities that
were different in kind from the commercial
establishments that were the original target of
public accommodations laws. As a result, on
two occasions, the Court held that the
application of such laws violated the First
Amendment.
First, in Hurley, the court held that
Massachusetts's public accommodations law
could not be applied to require a St. Patrick's
Day parade organizer to include a gay-rights
group in its parade. Observing that state
public accommodations laws do not, "as a
general matter, violate the First or Fourteenth
Amendments," the Court went on to conclude
that the Massachusetts law had been "applied
in a peculiar way" to a private parade, a result
that "essentially requir[ed]" the parade

Thus, Hurley and Dale demonstrate that the
First Amendment may stand as a barrier to
the
application
of
state
public
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accommodations laws when such laws are
applied to "peculiar" circumstances outside
of the usual commercial context.

at expression at all. It does not even regulate
cake-making; it simply prohibits the refusal
of service based on membership in a
protected class. The United States Supreme
Court has repeatedly held that such contentneutral regulations—although they may have
incidental effects on an individual's
expression—are an altogether different, and
generally permissible, species of government
action than a regulation of speech. In short,
we reject the Kleins' analogy of this case to
Barnette and Wooley.

In this case, the Kleins concede that
Sweetcakes is a "place of public
accommodation" under Oregon law because
it is a retail bakery open to the public. But the
Kleins contend that, as in Hurley and Dale,
application of ORS 659A.403 in this case
violates their First Amendment rights.
(2) First Amendment precedent

Second, the Kleins rely heavily on Hurley
and Dale, which, as discussed above,
invalidated the application of public
accommodations statutes in "peculiar"
circumstances outside of the usual
commercial context. The difficulty with that
analogy is that this case does involve the
usual commercial context; Sweetcakes is not
a private parade or membership organization,
and it is hardly "peculiar," as that term was
used in Hurley, to apply ORS 659A.403 to a
retail bakery like Sweetcakes that is open to
the public and that exists for the purpose of
engaging in commercial transactions. Indeed,
the Kleins accept the premise that
Sweetcakes is a place of public
accommodation under Oregon law, and that,
as such, it must generally open its doors to
customers of all sexual orientations,
regardless of the Kleins' religious views
about homosexuality. Thus, if the Kleins are
to succeed in avoiding compliance with the
statute, it cannot be because their activity
occurs outside the ordinary commercial
context that the government has wide latitude
to regulate, as was the case in Hurley and
Dale. The Kleins must find support
elsewhere.

BOLI and the Kleins offer competing United
States Supreme Court precedent that, they
argue, clearly requires a result in their
respective favors. We begin our analysis by
explaining why we do not regard the
authorities cited by the parties as controlling.
The Kleins argue that the effect of BOLI's
final order is to compel them to express a
message—a celebration of same-sex
marriage—with which they disagree. They
primarily draw on two interrelated lines
of First Amendment cases that, they contend,
preclude
the
application
of ORS
659A.403 here.
First, the Kleins rely on cases holding that the
government may not compel a person to
speak or promote a government message with
which the speaker does not agree.
We do not consider that line of cases to be
helpful here. In "compelled speech" cases
like Barnette and Wooley, the government
prescribed a specific message that the
individual was required to express. ORS
659A.403 does nothing of the sort; it is a
content-neutral regulation that is not directed
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In BOLI's view, on the other hand, the Kleins'
arguments are disposed of by the United
States Supreme Court's decision in FAIR. In
that case, an association of law schools and
law faculty (FAIR) sought to enjoin the
enforcement of the Solomon Amendment, a
federal law that requires higher-education
institutions, as a condition for receiving
federal funds, to provide military recruiters
with the same access to their campuses as
non-military recruiters. Because FAIR
opposed the military's policy at that time
regarding homosexual service-members,
FAIR argued that the equal-access
requirement violated the schools' First
Amendment rights to freedom of speech and
association.

In BOLI's view, this case is like FAIR
because ORS 659A.403 does not directly
compel any speech; even if one considers the
Kleins' cake-making to involve some element
of expression, the law only compels the
Kleins to engage in that expression for samesex couples "if, and to the extent" that the
Kleins do so for the general public.
This case is distinguishable from FAIR,
however, in a significant way. Essential to the
holding in FAIR was that the schools were not
compelled to express a message with which
they disagreed. The schools evidently did not
assert, nor did the Supreme Court
contemplate, that there was a meaningful
ideological or expressive component to the
emails or notices themselves, which merely
conveyed factual information about the
presence of recruiters on campus. The Court
thus distinguished the case from Barnette and
Wooley, cases that addressed the harm that
results from true compelled speech—that is,
depriving a person of autonomy as a speaker
and "inva[ding]" that person's "'individual
freedom of mind.'”

The Court rejected FAIR's compelled-speech
argument, reasoning that the Solomon
Amendment "neither limits what law schools
may say nor requires them to say anything,"
and, therefore, the law was a "far cry" from
the compulsions at issue in Barnette and
Wooley. The Court acknowledged that
compliance with the Solomon Amendment
would indirectly require the schools to
"speak" in a sense because it would require
the schools to send emails and post notices on
behalf of the military if they chose to do so
for other recruiters. Nevertheless, the Court
found it dispositive that the Solomon
Amendment did not "dictate the content of
the speech at all, which is only 'compelled' if,
and to the extent [that,] the school provides
such speech for other recruiters." The Court
distinguished that situation from those where
"the complaining speaker's own message was
affected by the speech it was forced to
accommodate."

Here, unlike in FAIR, the Kleins very much
do object to the substantive content of the
expression that they believe would be
compelled. They argue that their wedding
cakes are works of art that express a
celebratory message about the wedding for
which they are intended, and that the Kleins
cannot be compelled to create that art for a
wedding that they do not believe should be
celebrated. And there is evidentiary support
for the Kleins' view, at least insofar as every
wedding cake that they create partially
reflects their own creative and aesthetic
judgment. Whether that is sufficient to make
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their cakes "art," the creation of which the
government may not compel, is a question to
which we will turn below, but even the
Kleins' subjective belief that BOLI's order
compels them to express a specific message
that they ideologically oppose makes this
case different from FAIR.

artistic expression. The Court has not told us
how to apply a requirement of
nondiscrimination to an artist.
We believe, moreover, that it is plausible that
the United States Supreme Court would hold
the First Amendment to be implicated by
applying a public accommodations law to
require the creation of pure speech or art. If
BOLI's order can be understood to compel
the Kleins to create pure "expression" that
they would not otherwise create, it is possible
that the Court would regard BOLI's order as
a regulation of content, thus subject to strict
scrutiny, the test for regulating fully
protected expression.

That fact is also what makes this case difficult
to compare to other public accommodations
cases that the United States Supreme Court
has decided. It appears that the Supreme
Court has never decided a free-speech
challenge to the application of a public
accommodations law to a retail establishment
selling highly customized, creative goods and
services that arguably are in the nature of art
or other expression.

Although the Court has not clearly articulated
the extent to which the First Amendment
protects visual art and its creation, it has held
that the First Amendment covers various
forms of artistic expression, including music;
"live entertainment," such as musical and
dramatic performances; and video games.
The Court has also made clear that a
particularized, discernible message is not a
prerequisite for First Amendment protection.

To put the problem into sharper focus, we see
no reason in principle why the services of a
singer, composer, or painter could not fit the
definition of a "place of public
accommodation" under ORS 659A.400. One
can imagine, for example, a person whose
business is writing commissioned music or
poetry for weddings, or producing a sculpture
or portrait of the couple kissing at an altar.
One can also imagine such a person who
advertises and is willing to sell those services
to the general public, but who holds strong
religious convictions against same-sex
marriage and would feel her "freedom of
mind" violated if she were compelled to
produce her art for such an occasion. For the
Kleins, this is that case. BOLI disagrees that
a wedding cake is factually like those other
examples, but the legal point that those
examples illustrate is that existing public
accommodations case law is awkwardly
applied to a person whose "business" is

In short, although ORS 659A.403 is a
content-neutral regulation that is not directed
at expression, the Kleins' arguments cannot
be dismissed on that ground alone. Rather,
we must decide whether the Kleins' cakemaking activity is sufficiently expressive,
communicative, or artistic so as to implicate
the First Amendment, and, if it is, whether
BOLI's final order compelling the creation of
such expression in a particular circumstance
survives First Amendment scrutiny.
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(3) Whether these cakes implicate the First
Amendment

to the Kleins, they intend—and their "clients
expect"—that "each cake will be uniquely
crafted to be a statement of each customer's
personality, physical tastes, theme and
desires, as well as their palate." According to
Melissa, she "almost never make[s] a cake
without creating a unique element of style
and customization."
Furthermore,
the
complainants expressly stated that they
wanted a cake "like" the one that the Kleins
had created for Rachel's mother's wedding,
which was a custom-designed cake. On this
record, we therefore assume that any cake
that the Kleins made for Rachel and Laurel
would have followed the Kleins' customary
practice.

If, as BOLI argues, the Kleins' wedding cakes
are just "food" with no meaningful artistic or
communicative component, then, as the
foregoing discussion illustrates, BOLI's final
order does not implicate the First
Amendment; the Kleins' objection to having
to "speak" as a result of ORS 659A.403 is no
more powerful than it would be coming from
the seller of a ham sandwich. On the other
hand, if and to the extent that the Kleins'
wedding cakes constitute artistic or
communicative expression, then the First
Amendment is implicated by BOLI's final
order. In short, we must decide whether the
act that the Kleins refused to perform—to
design and create a wedding cake—is
"sufficiently imbued with elements of
communication" so as to "fall within the
scope" of the First Amendment.

Consequently, the question is whether that
customary practice, and its end product, are
in the nature of "art." As noted above, if the
ultimate effect of BOLI's order is to compel
the Kleins to create something akin to pure
speech, then BOLI's order may be subject to
strict scrutiny. If, on the other hand, the
Kleins' cake-making retail business involves,
at most, both expressive and non-expressive
components, and if Oregon's interest in
enforcing ORS 659A.403 is unrelated to the
content of the expressive components of a
wedding cake, then BOLI's order need only
survive intermediate scrutiny to comport with
the First Amendment.

On this point, BOLI makes a threshold
argument that we must address, which is that,
because the Kleins refused service to Rachel
and Laurel before even finding out what kind
of cake the couple wanted, there is no basis
for assessing the "artistic" component of
whatever cake might have resulted. For all we
know, BOLI reasons, Rachel and Laurel
might have wanted a standardized cake that
would not have involved any meaningful
expressive activity on the part of the Kleins.
However, we believe the fair interpretation of
this record is that the Kleins do not offer such
"standardized" or "off the shelf" wedding
cakes; they testified that their practice for
creating wedding cakes includes a
collaborative and customized design process
that is individual to the customer. According

The record reflects that the Kleins' wedding
cakes follow a collaborative design process
through which Melissa uses her customers'
preferences to develop a custom design,
including choices as to "color," "style," and
"other decorative detail." Melissa shows
customers previous designs "as inspiration,"
and she then draws "various designs on sheets
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of paper" as part of a dialogue with the
customer. From that dialogue, Melissa
"conceives" and customizes "a variety of
decorating suggestions" as she ultimately
finalizes the design. Thus, the process does
not simply involve the Kleins executing
precise instructions from their customers;
instead, it is clear that Melissa uses her own
design skills and aesthetic judgments.

custom-designed for a ceremonial occasion,
are still cakes made to be eaten. Although the
Kleins themselves may place more
importance on the communicative aspect of
one of their cakes, there is no information in
this record that would permit an inference
that the same is true in all cases for
the Kleins' customers and the people who
attend the weddings for which the cakes are
created. Moreover, to the extent that the
cakes are expressive, they do not reflect only
the Kleins' expression. Rather, they are
products of a collaborative process in which
Melissa's artistic execution is subservient to a
customer's wishes and preferences. For those
reasons, we do not agree that the Kleins'
cakes can be understood to fundamentally
and inherently embody the Kleins'
expression, for purposes of the First
Amendment.

Therefore, on this record, the Kleins'
argument that their products entail artistic
expression is entitled to be taken seriously.
That being said, we are not persuaded that the
Kleins' wedding cakes are entitled to the
same level of constitutional protection as
pure speech or traditional forms of artistic
expression. In order to establish that their
wedding cakes are fundamentally pieces of
art, it is not enough that the
Kleins believe them to be pieces of
art. For First Amendment purposes, the
expressive character of a thing must turn not
only on how it is subjectively perceived by its
maker, but also on how it will be perceived
and experienced by others. Here, although we
accept that the Kleins imbue each wedding
cake with their own aesthetic choices, they
have made no showing that other people will
necessarily experience any wedding cake that
the Kleins create predominantly as
"expression" rather than as food.

We also reject the Kleins' argument that,
under the facts of this case, BOLI's order
compels them to "host or accommodate
another speaker's message" in a manner that
the Supreme Court has deemed to be a
violation of the First Amendment. In the only
such case that involved the enforcement of a
content-neutral public accommodations
law, Hurley, the problem was that the
speaker's autonomy was affected by the
forced intermingling of messages, with
consequences for how others would perceive
the content of the expression. Here, because
the Kleins refused to provide their weddingcake service to Rachel and Laurel altogether,
this is not a situation where the Kleins were
asked to articulate, host, or accommodate a
specific message that they found offensive. It
would be a different case if BOLI's order had
awarded damages against the Kleins for

Although the Kleins' wedding cakes involve
aesthetic judgments and have decorative
elements, the Kleins have not demonstrated
that their cakes are inherently "art," like
sculptures, paintings, musical compositions,
and other works that are both intended to
be and are experienced predominantly as
expression. Rather, their cakes, even when
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refusing to decorate a cake with a specific
message requested by a customer.

ingredients and following a customer's
precise specifications. Instead, based on the
Kleins' customary practice, the ultimate
effect of BOLI's order is to compel them to
engage in a collaborative process with a
customer and to create a custom product that
they would not otherwise make. The Kleins'
argument that that process involves
individualized aesthetic judgments that are
themselves within the realm of First
Amendment protected expression is not
implausible on its face.

The Kleins' additional concern, as we
understand it, is that a wedding cake
communicates a "celebratory message" about
the wedding for which it is intended, and the
Kleins do not wish to "host" the message that
same-sex weddings should be celebrated.
But, unlike in Hurley, the Kleins have not
raised a nonspeculative possibility that
anyone attending the wedding will impute
that message to the Kleins. We think it more
likely that wedding attendees understand that
various commercial vendors involved with
the event are there for commercial rather than
ideological purposes. Moreover, to the extent
that the Kleins subjectively feel that they are
being "associated" with the idea that same
sex marriage is worthy of celebration, the
Kleins are free to engage in their own speech
that disclaims such support.

Ultimately, however, we need not resolve
whether that argument is correct. That is
because, even assuming (without deciding)
that the Kleins' cake-making business
involves aspects that may be deemed
"expressive" for purposes of the First
Amendment, BOLI's order is subject, at most,
to intermediate scrutiny, and it survives such
scrutiny, as explained below.

In short, we disagree that the Kleins' wedding
cakes are invariably in the nature of fully
protected speech or artistic expression, and
we further disagree that BOLI's order forces
the Kleins to host, accommodate, or associate
with anyone else's particular message. Thus,
because we conclude that BOLI's order does
not have the effect of compelling fully
protected expression, it does not trigger strict
scrutiny under the First Amendment.

(4) BOLI's final order
Amendment scrutiny

survives First

Neither ORS 659A.403 nor BOLI's order is
directed toward the expressive content of the
Kleins' business. When a content-neutral
regulation indirectly imposes a burden on
protected expression, it will be sustained if
"'it furthers an important or substantial
governmental interest; if the governmental
interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression; and if the incidental restriction on
alleged First Amendment freedoms is no
greater than is essential to the furtherance of
that interest.'"

As noted above, however, BOLI's order is
still arguably subject to intermediate First
Amendment scrutiny if the Kleins' cakemaking activity involves both expressive and
non-expressive
elements. Here,
we
acknowledge that the Kleins' cake-making
process is not a simple matter of combining

We address each factor in turn.
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We first address the state's interest in
enforcing its public-accommodations law. As
noted above, the United States Supreme
Court has consistently acknowledged
that states have a compelling interest both in
ensuring equal access to publicly available
goods and services and in preventing the
dignitary
harm
that
results
from
discriminatory denials of service. That
interest is no less compelling with respect to
the provision of services for same-sex
weddings; indeed, that interest is particularly
acute when the state seeks to prevent the
dignitary harms that result from the unequal
treatment of same-sex couples who choose to
exercise their fundamental right to marry.
Thus, we readily conclude that BOLI's order
furthers "an important or substantial
governmental interest."

that they regard as expressive. "'[A]n
incidental burden on speech is no greater than
is essential, and therefore is permissible'" if
"'the neutral regulation promotes a
substantial government interest that would be
achieved less effectively absent the
regulation.'" Given that the state's interest is
to avoid the "evil of unequal treatment, which
is the injury to an individual's sense of selfworth and personal integrity," there is no
doubt that that interest would be undermined
if businesses that market their goods and
services to the "public" are given a special
privilege to exclude certain groups from the
meaning of that word. Thus, we conclude that
the final order in this case survives First
Amendment scrutiny.

Furthermore, Oregon's interest is in no way
related to the suppression of free expression.
Rather, Oregon has an interest in preventing
the harms that result from invidious
discrimination that is "wholly apart from the
point of view such conduct may transmit."
BOLI's order reflects a concern with ensuring
equal access to products like wedding cakes
when a seller chooses to sell them to the
general public, not a concern with
influencing the expressive choices involved
in designing or decorating a cake.

The Kleins assert that BOLI's final order also
violates their rights under Article I, section 8,
of the Oregon Constitution, which provides
that "[n]o law shall be passed restraining the
free expression of opinion, or restricting the
right to speak, write, or print freely on any
subject whatever[.]" The Kleins' argument is
limited to the observation that Article I,
section 8, has been held to establish broader
protection for speech than the First
Amendment, a premise from which they
conclude that, "since BOLI's Final Order
violates the federal Constitution's Speech
Clause, it also violates the Oregon
Constitution's broader counterpart a fortiori."
We have rejected the First Amendment
predicate for that derivative argument, and
the Kleins do not offer any separate analysis
under the state constitution. Accordingly, we
reject their argument under Article I, section
8, without further discussion.

(5) Oregon Constitution, Article I, section 8

Finally, we conclude that any burden
imposed on the Kleins' expression is no
greater than essential to further the
state's interest. Again, it is significant that
BOLI's order does not compel the Kleins to
express an articulable message with which
they disagree; rather, their objection is to
being compelled to engage in any conduct
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b. Free exercise of religion

proscribes).'" Put another way, neutral and
generally applicable laws do not offend
the Free Exercise Clause simply because "the
law has the incidental effect of burdening a
particular religious practice."

We turn to the Kleins' contention that BOLI's
order violates their constitutional right to the
free exercise of their religion. The Kleins
advance two arguments under the United
States Constitution: (1) BOLI's final order is
not merely the application of a "neutral and
generally applicable" law because it
impermissibly "targets" religion, and (2) the
order implicates the Kleins' "hybrid rights,"
subjecting it to heightened scrutiny that it
cannot survive. The Kleins also invoke the
Oregon Constitution's free-exercise clauses
in Article I, sections 2 and 3, contending that:
(1) as under the federal constitution, the final
order impermissibly targets religion, and (2)
even if the final order does not impermissibly
target religion, they should be granted an
exemption to ORS 659A.403 on religious
grounds. For the reasons explained below, we
reject the Kleins' arguments.

To determine whether a law is "neutral,"
courts first ask whether "the object of [the]
law is to infringe upon or restrict practices
because of their religious motivation." To
determine a law's object, we begin with the
text, as "the minimum requirement of
neutrality is that a law not discriminate on its
face.". "A law lacks facial neutrality if it
refers to a religious practice without a secular
meaning discernible from the language or
context." "Apart from the text, the effect of a
law in its real operation is strong evidence of
its object." Additionally, whether a law is
"generally applicable" depends on whether
the government selectively seeks to advance
its interests "only against conduct with a
religious motivation."

The First
Amendment proscribes
laws
"prohibiting the free exercise of" religion.
The question presented by this case is
whether BOLI's final order enforcing ORS
659A.403 against the Kleins runs afoul of
that constitutional guarantee; if it does, the
order is invalid unless it can survive strict
scrutiny.

Nothing in the text of ORS 659A.403 or
BOLI's final order is facially discriminatory
towards the exercise of religious beliefs.
Rather, the statute prohibits any "place of
public accommodation" from discriminating
"on account of" protected characteristics,
including "sexual orientation." Similarly,
BOLI's order is, on its face, a neutral
application of ORS 659A.403 that gives no
indication that the result would have been
different if the Kleins' refusal of service was
based upon secular rather than religious
convictions.

The answer begins with Employment
Division, Oregon Department of Human
Resources v. Smith, in which the United
States Supreme Court held that "the right of
free exercise does not relieve an individual of
the obligation to comply with a 'valid and
neutral law of general applicability on the
ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes)
conduct that his religion prescribes (or

A law that is written in neutral terms may still
violate
the Free
Exercise
Clause,
however. In Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye,
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Inc., the Court concluded that the city
ordinances in question—which prohibited
certain animal slaughtering for "ritual[s]" and
"sacrifice"—were not neutral because some
important terms, as the ordinances defined
them, targeted the Santeria religion's practice
of ritualistic animal sacrifice while
exempting other secular and religious
practices like hunting and kosher slaughter.
The laws were also not "generally applicable"
because
they
were
substantially
underinclusive
in
advancing
the
government's stated interests of protecting
the public health and preventingcruelty to
animals. Rather, the laws were "drafted with
care to forbid few killings but those
occasioned by religious sacrifice."

likewise fail to support their assertion that
BOLI's final order constitutes a "novel
expansion" of the statute, rather than a
straightforward application of a facially
neutral statute to the facts of this case. For
those reasons, the Kleins' "targeting"
argument is meritless.
The Kleins' second argument under the
federal Free Exercise Clause is that the final
order burdens their "hybrid rights." That is,
the final order burdens both Free Exercise
rights and other constitutional rights, a
combination that purportedly triggers an
exception to Smith and subjects even neutral
laws of general applicability to strict scrutiny.
The Kleins' argument relies on the following
passage from Smith:

Here, the Kleins advance a similar argument
that BOLI's order violates the Free Exercise
Clause because it applies ORS 659A.403 in a
way that impermissibly "targets" religion for
disfavored treatment. They contend that the
final order was a "novel expansion" of ORS
659A.403 that "was, at best, discretionary
and done for the specific purpose of forcing
business owners with moral reservations
about same-sex marriage to either violate
their consciences or go out of business."
(Emphasis removed.) BOLI responds that no
evidence exists to support the Kleins'
assertions, which are "pure speculation and
utterly without merit."

"The only decisions in which we have held
that the First Amendment bars application of
a neutral, generally applicable law to
religiously motivated action have involved
not the Free Exercise Clause alone, but
the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with
other constitutional protections, such as
freedom of speech * * *. * * *
"The present case does not present such a
hybrid situation, but a free exercise claim
unconnected with any communicative
activity * * *."
We have previously expressed skepticism
about whether a "hybrid-rights "doctrine"
exists, and, to the extent it does, how it could
be properly applied. In Church at 295 S. 18th
Street, St. Helens, we referred to
the Smith passage as "dictum," observing that
it merely "noted—without reference to any
particular standard—that, in the past, the

On review of the record, we agree with BOLI.
The Kleins have directed us to no evidence
whatsoever that ORS 659A.403 was enacted
for the purpose of singling out religiously
motivated action, or that BOLI has
selectively targeted religion in its
enforcement of the statute. The Kleins
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Court had struck down neutral, generally
applicable laws when a case 'involved' both
the Free Exercise Clause and some other
constitutional protection.” We questioned
whether that dictum could be soundly applied
as a legal standard in other cases:

implicated, we will not use a stricter legal
standard than that used in Smith to evaluate
generally applicable, exception less state
regulations under the Free Exercise Clause."
Accordingly, we reject the Kleins' "hybridrights doctrine" argument.

"Why the addition of another constitutional
claim would affect the standard of review of
a free exercise claim is not immediately
obvious. Indeed, if the mere allegation of an
additional constitutional claim has the effect
of altering the standard articulated in Smith,
then the 'hybrid' exception likely would
swallow the Smith rule; free exercise claims
will frequently also pose at least a colorable
free speech claim. On the other hand, if the
Court meant that strict scrutiny pertains only
when an additional constitutional claim is
successfully asserted, then the rule
of Smith becomes mere surplusage, as the
church already would win under the alternate
constitutional theory."

As noted, the Kleins also invoke Article I,
sections 2 and 3, of the Oregon Constitution
(the free-exercise clauses). Under those
clauses, when a law is not neutral and
expressly targets religion, courts examine the
law with "exacting scrutiny"; when the law is
"neutral toward religion," the Oregon
Supreme Court has framed the proper inquiry
as whether there is "statutory authority to
make such a regulation" and whether an
individual claims "exemption on religious
grounds."
The Kleins' first argument is that the statute
and final order are not neutral toward religion
because they "target" the Kleins' religious
practice. In support of that contention, the
Kleins
essentially
incorporate
their
arguments under the federal Free Exercise
Clause; they do not contend that the analysis
meaningfully differs under the state
constitution, and we therefore reject that
argument for the same reasons discussed
above.

Other courts have similarly called the Smith
passage dictum and have declined to follow
it.
The intervening years have given us no
reason to reconsider our view that
the Smith passage was dictum. Despite the
considerable doubts about the "hybrid-rights
doctrine" that have been expressed in case
law and academic commentary, the United
States Supreme Court has taken no further
steps to embrace such a doctrine. We
therefore agree with the Sixth Circuit's
reasoning that, "at least until the Supreme
Court holds that legal standards under
the Free Exercise Clause vary depending on
whether other constitutional rights are

Second, the Kleins argue that, even in the
absence of impermissible targeting, they
should be granted a religious exemption from
compliance with ORS 659A.403. They rely
on two cases—Hickman and Cooper v.
Eugene Sch. Dist. As BOLI correctly points
out, however, neither of those cases actually
created a religious exemption to a neutral
law, or discussed the criteria, methodology,
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or standards that a court would use in
determining whether to grant one. Cooper
dealt with a law that was "not neutral toward
religion," which the Supreme Court
distinguished from a "general" and "neutral"
regulation that could present an issue of an
"individual claim to exemption on religious
grounds." Nearly two decades later, Hickman
simply cited Cooper, in a case that similarly
did not present the issue of whether to grant a
religious exemption.

but those with sincere religious objections to
marriage between people of different races,
ethnicities, or faiths could just as readily
demand the same exemption. The Kleins do
not offer a principled basis for limiting their
requested exemption in the manner that they
propose, except to argue that there are
"decent and honorable" reasons, grounded in
religious faith, for opposing same-sex
marriage, as recognized by the United States
Supreme Court in Obergefell. That is not in
dispute. But neither the sincerity, nor the
religious basis, nor the historical pedigree of
a particular belief has been held to give a
special license for discrimination.

In short, although the Kleins argue that the
Oregon Constitution requires that they be
granted an exemption on religious grounds to
an otherwise neutral law, the cases on which
they rely did not impose such a requirement,
but merely acknowledged an abstract
possibility that it could happen in a future
case. The Kleins have not offered a focused
argument for why the Oregon Constitution
requires an exemption in this case, under the
methodology
for
interpreting
our
constitution. They simply assert that a
religious exemption to ORS 659A.403's
requirement of nondiscrimination on account
of sexual orientation would impair the state's
nondiscrimination goals "minimally, if at
all," while furthering goals of "respect and
tolerance for people of different beliefs."
That argument does not amount to solid
constitutional ground in which to root an
individual exemption to a valid and neutral
statute.

For the foregoing reasons, we reject the
Kleins' arguments that BOLI's final order
violates
the
federal Free
Exercise
Clause or Article I, sections 2 and 3, of the
Oregon Constitution.
B. Second Assignment: Commissioner's
Failure to Recuse Himself
In their second assignment of error, the
Kleins assert that BOLI's commissioner,
Avakian, "the ultimate decision maker in this
case, violated the Kleins' [d]ue [p]rocess
rights by failing to recuse himself despite
numerous public comments revealing his
intent to rule against them." Specifically, they
argue that Avakian's comments about the
cake controversy in a Facebook post and in
an
article
that
appeared
in The
Oregonian show that he judged the Kleins'
case before giving them an opportunity to
present their version of the facts and the law.
We agree with BOLI that Avakian's
comments reflect, at most, his general views
about the law and public policy, and therefore

Moreover, it is far from clear that a religious
exemption as proposed by the Kleins would
have only a "minimal" effect on the state's
antidiscrimination objectives. The Kleins
seek an exemption based on their sincere
religious opposition to same-sex marriage;
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are not the kind of comments that require
disqualification.

Accordingly, public comments that convey
preconceptions about law or policy related to
a dispute do not automatically disqualify a
decision-maker
from
judging
that
controversy.
As
Judge Jerome
Frank succinctly observed in In re J.P.
Linahan, Inc., if "'bias' and 'partiality' be
defined to mean the total absence of
preconceptions in the mind of the judge, then
no one has ever had a fair trial and no one
ever will." The touchstone of bias, instead, is
whether the comments show that the decision
maker is not capable of judging the
controversy fairly on its own facts.

To establish a due-process violation, "[o]ne
claiming that a decision[ ]maker is biased has
the burden of showing actual bias." When
that claim of bias is based on prejudgment,
the relevant inquiry is whether "the decision
maker has so prejudged the particular matter
as to be incapable of determining its merits
on the basis of the evidence and arguments
presented.”
Importantly, in assessing bias, courts have
long distinguished between a decisionmaker's prejudgment of facts as opposed to
preconceptions about law or policy,
particularlyin the context of quasi-judicial
decisions. As we explained in Samuel v.
Board of Chiropractic Examiners, rev den,
"[a] preconceived point of view concerning
an issue of law * * * is not an independent
basis for disqualification." In Cement Inst.,
the United States Supreme Court articulated
that principle in the context of a challenge to
the impartiality of the Federal Trade
Commission:

In assessing a decision-maker's capability in
that regard, we presume that public officials
will perform their duties lawfully.
In this case, Avakian's comments on
Facebook and in the The Oregonian fall short
of the kinds of statements that reflect
prejudgment of the facts or an impermissibly
closed-minded view of law or policy so as to
indicate that he, as a decision maker, cannot
be impartial. On Facebook, before a BOLI
complaint had been filed, Avakian posted:

"[No previous] decision of this Court would
require us to hold that it would be a violation
of procedural due process for a judge to sit in
a case after he had expressed an opinion as to
whether certain types of conduct were
prohibited by law. In fact, judges frequently
try the same case more than once and decide
identical issues each time, although these
issues involved questions both of law and
fact. Certainly, the Federal Trade
Commission
cannot
possibly
be
under stronger constitutional compulsions in
this respect than a court."

"Everyone has a right to their religious
beliefs, but that doesn't mean they can
disobey laws that are already in place. Having
one set of rules for everybody ensures that
people are treated fairly as they goabout their
daily lives."
Below that paragraph, Avakian provided a
link to "'Ace of Cakes' offers free wedding
cake for Ore. Gay couple www.kgw.com.,"
followed by another paragraph:
"The Oregon Department of Justice is
looking into a complaint that a Gresham
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bakery refused to make a wedding cake for a
same sex marriage. * * * It started when a
mother and daughter showed up at Sweet
Cakes by Melissa looking for a wedding
cake."

Avakian as stating that "the Kleins * * *
needed to be 'rehabilitate[d].'"
The full quotations from that article, viewed
in context, present a different picture. The
article states, "'Everybody is entitled to their
own beliefs, but that doesn't mean that folks
have the right to discriminate,' Avakian
said, speaking generally." That sentence
follows a paragraph in which the author
describes the antidiscrimination law
generally. Given that context, and the
author's express qualification that Avakian
was "speaking generally," there is no basis on
which to conclude that Avakian was
commenting specifically on the merits of the
Kleins' case.

Viewed in context with the rest of the post,
Avakian's statements that "[e]veryone has a
right to their religious beliefs, but that doesn't
mean they can disobey laws that are already
in place," and that "[h]aving one set of rules
for everybody ensures that people are treated
fairly as they go about their daily lives," are
comments about the controversy between the
Kleins and the complainants. However, they
do not describe particular facts of the case,
suggest that
Avakian has already investigated or decided
those facts, or even suggest that he has fixed
views as to any defenses or interpretations of
the law that might be advanced in the context
of a contested proceeding. That is, they
reflect his general views of law and policy
regarding public accommodations laws, but
not the type of prejudgment that casts doubt
on whether he is capable of judging the
controversy fairly in an official proceeding.
Avakian's statements in The Oregonian
article likewise fail to demonstrate that he
was incapable of fairly judging this case. As
BOLI points out, the Kleins selectively quote
from that article to create an impression that
Avakian was commenting specifically on
their conduct. For instance, in quoting
excerpts, the Kleins argue that Avakian "said
that 'folks' in Oregon do not have a 'right to
discriminate' and stated that those who use
their 'beliefs' to justify discrimination need to
be 'rehabilitate[d].'" (Alterations by the
Kleins.) Later, the Kleins characterize

Similarly, and contrary to the Kleins'
suggestion, the article does not quote
Avakian as saying that the Kleins must be
"rehabilitated." Rather, the article quotes
Avakian concerning a more general
proposition: "'The goal is never to shut down
a business. The goal is to rehabilitate,'
Avakian said. 'For those who do violate the
law, we want them to learn from that
experience and have a good, successful
business in Oregon.'" Again, nothing in that
quote suggests that Avakian was responding
to a question about the Kleins in particular, as
opposed to BOLI investigations in general.
Indeed, the context again suggests the latter.
The next sentence in the article states, "The
bureau's civil rights division conducts about
2,200 investigations a year on all types of
discrimination, Avakian said."
There is, in fact, only one quote attributed to
Avakian in The Oregonian article that
appears to relate specifically to the Kleins'
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case—one that they do not mention. With
regard to BOLI's investigation of the
complaint against the Kleins, Avakian is
quoted as saying, "'We are committed to a fair
and thorough investigation to determine
whether there's substantial evidence of
unlawful discrimination.'"

unlawful practice that the respondent is found
to have engaged in, including but not limited
to paying an award of actual damages
suffered by the complainant and complying
with injunctive or other equitable relief[.]" In
this case, BOLI's formal charges alleged that,
pursuant to that statute, each complainant
claimed "[d]amages for emotional, mental,
and physical suffering in the amount of at
least $75,000."

In sum, the public comments on which the
Kleins rely do not demonstrate anything
more than Avakian's general views about law
and policy related to antidiscrimination
statutes. Because those types of public
comments do not establish a lack of
impartiality for purposes of due process, we
reject the Kleins' second assignment of error.

At the hearing on damages, BOLI offered
evidence of the emotional distress that the
complainants suffered as a result of the
Kleins' denial of service, including testimony
from Rachel and Laurel. The Kleins offered
evidence to rebut BOLI's evidence that the
refusal of service was the source of the
complainants' distress, including evidence
that, during the relevant time period, the
complainants were engaged in a custody
dispute for their two foster children. They
also elicited testimony from Rachel's brother
to support their theory that the complainants
were pursuing the case for political reasons
rather than to remedy emotional distress.

C. Third Assignment: Damages Award
In their third assignment of error, the Kleins
argue that BOLI's damages award of $75,000
and $60,000 to Rachel and Laurel,
respectively, is not supported by substantial
evidence or substantial reason. Within the
assignment of error, they make three distinct
contentions: (1) the damages award is
inconsistent with BOLI's findings and
ignores the Kleins' mitigating evidence and
evidence of the complainants' discovery
abuses; (2) the damages award is "internally
contradictory" with regard to recovery for
emotional distress resulting from publicity of
the case; and (3) the damages award is out of
line with BOLI's awards in other cases. As
discussed below, we reject each of those
challenges.

During
closing
arguments,
BOLI's
prosecutor explained that the agency was
seeking damages related to two different
causes:
"There are two distinct causes of emotional
distress damages in this case. The first is the
damage that's based on the refusal itself, and
for that the Agency is seeking $75,000 for
each Complainant. There is also the damages
that resulted from the media scrutiny of this
case, and for that amount we would defer to
the forum's discretion."

To better frame the arguments, we provide
additional context for the damages award.
Under ORS 659A.850(4)(a)(B), BOLI is
authorized to "[e]liminate the effects of the
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BOLI's prosecutor then proceeded to argue
the two causes separately, first recounting
testimony
about
the
feelings
of
embarrassment, depression, sadness, and
anger that Rachel and Laurel experienced
around the time of the refusal and thereafter,
including the strain that it put on their
relationship and their relationships with
others. The prosecutor then argued that "[t]he
second cause of emotional distress is this
media scrutiny." She contended that the
media coverage had made Rachel and Laurel
fearful for their lives, afraid for the safety of
their foster children, and anxious that it
would jeopardize their then-pending efforts
to adopt the children.

In rebuttal, BOLI's prosecutor emphasized
that whether Aaron called the complainants
"an abomination" or quoted a Bible verse
using that word was "beside the point":
"[H]ow it was couched doesn't really matter;
the word is what resonated with the
Complainants."
In his proposed final order, the ALJ set forth
extensive factual findings, including express
credibility determinations regarding the
witnesses at the hearing. The ALJ found that
Rachel, despite being an "extremely
emotional witness," had "answered questions
directly in a forthright manner" and "did not
try to minimize the effect of media exposure
on her emotional state as compared to
how the cake denial affected her." The ALJ
explained that it credited Rachel's testimony
"about her emotional suffering in its
entirety," but that he "only credited her
testimony about media exposure when she
testified about specific incidents."

Anticipating a challenge to the amount of the
damages sought, BOLI's prosecutor argued
that emotional distress damages are "very
fact specific," and that "$75,000 for the
refusal itself is very well within the
parameters of what's appropriate."
The Kleins responded that the complainants
had not told a consistent story throughout;
that there was no credible evidence that the
emotional distress suffered by the
complainants was actually caused by the
denial of service as opposed to other factors
in the complainants' lives, such as the custody
dispute; that neither Rachel nor Laurel was
present for Aaron's "abomination" statement
when Cheryl returned to the shop and that, in
any event, there was disagreement as to what
he actually said; and that the previous cases
referenced by BOLI's prosecutor involved
more severe instances of discriminatory
treatment.

The ALJ found Laurel less credible. That was
because Laurel "was a very bitter and angry
witness who had a strong tendency to
exaggerate and over-dramatize events,"
argued with the Kleins' attorney and "had to
be counseled by the ALJ to answer the
questions asked of her instead of
editorializing about the cake refusal and how
it affected her," and her "testimony was
inconsistent in several respects with more
credible evidence.” Thus, the ALJ "only
credited her testimony about media exposure
when she testified about specific incidents"
and otherwise credited her testimony only
"when it was either (a) undisputed, or (b)
disputed but corroborated by other credible
testimony."
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The ALJ then set forth his reasoning
regarding a damages award, describing
specific aspects of each complainant's
emotional suffering and distinguished
"suffering from the cake refusal" from
"suffering from publicity about the case."
With regard to the latter, the ALJ ultimately
concluded that, as a factual matter, the Kleins
were "responsible" for at least some of the
publicity that had followed the initial refusal,
but that "there is no basis in law for awarding
damages to Complainants for their emotional
suffering caused by media and social media
attention related to this case."

BOLI's final order also adopted the ALJ's
analysis of the amount of damages to each
complainant. The order states:
"In this case, the ALJ proposed that $75,000
and $60,000, are appropriate awards to
compensate
[Rachel
and
Laurel],
respectively, for the emotional suffering they
experienced from Respondents' denial of
service. The proposal for [Laurel] is less
because she was not present at the denial and
the ALJ found her testimony about the extent
and severity of her emotional suffering to be
exaggerated in some respects. In this
particular case, the demeanor of the witnesses
was critical in determining both the
sincerity and extent of the harm that was felt
by [Rachel and Laurel]. As such, the
Commissioner defers to the ALJ's perception
of the witnesses and evidence presented at
hearing and adopts the noneconomic award
as proposed, finding also that this
noneconomic award is consistent with the
forum's prior orders."

The ALJ's proposed final order then set forth
his conclusion on the amount of damages
related to the initial refusal:
"In this case, the forum concludes that
$75,000 and $60,000, are appropriate awards
to compensate Complainants [Rachel] and
[Laurel], respectively, for the emotional
suffering
they
experienced
from
Respondents' cake refusal. [Laurel] is
awarded the lesser amount because she was
not present at the cake refusal and the forum
found her testimony about the extent and
severity of her emotional suffering to be
exaggerated in some respects."

In a footnote to that paragraph, the order cites
specific BOLI cases in which damages were
awarded, in amounts ranging from $50,000 to
$350,000 per complainant.
With that background, we return to the issues
presented by the Kleins' third assignment of
error.

BOLI, in its final order, largely adopted the
reasoning and conclusions proposed by the
ALJ, including his credibility determinations.
BOLI, like the ALJ, separately discussed the
emotional suffering of each complainant with
regard to the denial of service and from
publicity. And, like the ALJ, BOLI
concluded that damages for emotional
suffering caused by media attention were not
recoverable.

1. Countervailing evidence
The Kleins assert that BOLI's order "is
inconsistent
with
its
credibility
determinations"—specifically,
BOLI's
findings regarding what Aaron actually said
to Cheryl when she returned to Sweetcakes
after the initial refusal of service. According
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to the Kleins, BOLI found as fact that Aaron
did not actually refer to Rachel as an
"abomination" but had only quoted a verse
from the Book of Leviticus, stating, "You
shall not lie with a male as one lies with a
female; it is an abomination." Yet, BOLI
awarded damages to both complainants "for
harm
attributable to being
called
'abomination[s].'"

orientation, and further found that the
complainants experienced emotional distress
based on the use of that term. It is that nexus
that underlies BOLI's damages award.
The Kleins also argue that the final order does
not account for certain evidence that
undermined the damages case, including
evidence that the complainants were pursuing
the case out of a desire for political change
and that they were experiencing stress from
their custody dispute at the time. The Kleins
also argue that the final order fails to account
for ways in which the complainants frustrated
the Kleins efforts to "discover the true extent
of their alleged emotional harm." According
to the Kleins, the final order therefore lacks
substantial reason.

We do not read BOLI's order to rest on a
finding that Aaron specifically called the
complainants "an abomination" as opposed to
quoting a biblical verse. As described above,
BOLI argued during the damages hearing
that exactly how the word was "couched" was
beside the point. BOLI's final order likewise
reflects a focus on the effect of the word
"abomination" on the complainants,
including their recognition of that biblical
reference and their associations with the
reference. For instance, the order states that
Rachel, who was brought up as a Southern
Baptist, "interpreted [Aaron's] use of the
word 'abomination' [to] mean that God made
a mistake when he made her, that she wasn't
supposed to exist, and that she had no right to
love or be loved[.]" Similarly, the order states
that Laurel recognized the statement as a
reference from Leviticus and, based on her
religious background, "understood the term
'abomination' to mean 'this is a creature not
created by God, not created with a soul. They
are unworthy of holy love. They are not
worthy of life.'"

The Kleins' argument in that regard
"misconceives the nature of the substantial
reason requirement." As the Supreme Court
explained in Jenkins, an order satisfies the
substantial reason requirement so long as it
"provide[s] an explanation connecting the
facts of the case and the result reached, and
[there is] no indication that, in making its
decision, the [agency] relied on evidence that
did not qualify as substantial evidence."
Beyond that, an agency generally is not
required to explain why it was not persuaded
by particular evidence.
In this case, BOLI's order includes extensive
factual findings regarding the emotional
suffering that the complainants experienced
and it connects the amount of damages to that
suffering. That is sufficient to satisfy the
substantial reason requirement, and we
decline to reweigh, under the guise of

Viewing the final order as a whole, we see no
inconsistency. BOLI found that Aaron used
the term "abomination" in the course of
explaining why he was denying service to the
complainants on account of their sexual
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substantial reason, the competing evidence as
to the extent of the complainants' damages.

suffering from media attention, particularly
when BOLI's order expressly says otherwise.

2. Damages from publicity and media
attention

The Kleins' alternative contention regarding
publicity damages is based on a statement
that BOLI made in the context of denying
recovery for those damages. In that part of the
order, BOLI concluded that "complainants'
emotional harm related to the denial of
service continued throughout the period of
media attention and that the facts related
solely to emotional harm resulting from
media attention do not adequately support an
award of damages." According to the Kleins,
that emphasized text reflects that BOLI
"awarded damages for harm lasting over
twenty-six months" related solely to the
initial denial of service, yet the proposed final
order and final order "note a near total lack of
any such evidence" regarding persistent harm
from the initial refusal.

Next, the Kleins argue that the damages
award is internally inconsistent in its
treatment of harm caused by media attention
from the case. According to the Kleins,
BOLI's formal charges "sought $150,000 in
total damages based on alleged emotional
suffering stemming from the denial of service
and subsequent media exposure." (Emphases
by the Kleins.) But then, despite concluding
that the complainants were not entitled to
recover for harm attributable to media
exposure, the final order awards an amount
close to the prayer.
The Kleins' argument proceeds from a
mistaken premise. BOLI's formal charges did
not seek "$150,000 in total damages based
on alleged emotional suffering stemming
from the denial of service and subsequent
media exposure." Rather, the formal charges
sought damages in "the amount of at least
$75,000" for each complainant. And, as
described above, BOLI's prosecutor clearly
expressed during the damages hearing—and
the ALJ plainly understood—that BOLI was
seeking $75,000 for each complainant for the
refusal itself and additional damages, at the
ALJ's discretion, for harm attributable to
media and social media attention. Both the
ALJ's preliminary order and BOLI's final
order reflect that understanding of the
damages request. Thus, there is no plausible
basis on which to infer that, by awarding
$75,000 to Rachel and $60,000 to Laurel,
BOLI relied to any extent on emotional

The Kleins' mischaracterize the relevant
orders. In his proposed final order, the ALJ
distinguished testimony about specific
incidents involving emotional suffering from
testimony about emotional suffering more
generally. The ALJ credited Laurel's
testimony that she "still feels emotional
effects from the denial of service because
[Rachel and their two children] 'were' still
suffering and that 'was' tearing me apart." The
ALJ also specifically found that Rachel had
not tried "to minimize the effect of media
exposure on her emotional state as compared
to how the cake denial affected her," and he
credited Rachel's testimony "about her
emotional suffering in its entirety." His order
further states:
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"Without giving any specific examples,
[Rachel] credibly testified that, in a general
sense, the cake refusal has caused her
continued emotional suffering up to the time
of hearing. Other than that, she did not testify
as to any specific suffering she experienced
after February 1 that was directly attributable
to the cake refusal."

discrete incident, whereas past BOLI cases
with such significant damages awards
involved ongoing harassment and typically
involved emotional suffering so severe that it
required medical treatment.
Fact-matching, when considering emotional
distress damages, is of limited value. As we
explained in Edwards, BOLI must consider
"the type of discriminatory conduct, and the
duration, frequency, and severity of the
conduct. It also considers the type and
duration of the mental distress and the
vulnerability of the [c]omplainant." The
actual amount of any award, therefore,
depends on the facts presented by each
complainant.

In adopting the ALJ's reasoning, BOLI's final
order similarly distinguished between
generalized testimony and testimony about
specific instances of suffering, and it repeated
the ALJ's findings in that regard.
Viewed in context, BOLI's findings and
conclusions demonstrate that it credited
Laurel's and Rachel's testimony that, at the
time of the hearing, they continued to
experience some degree of emotional
suffering from the initial refusal, but the final
order also reflects that BOLI understood that
evidence
to
be
generalized
and
limited. Nothing in the final order indicates
that BOLI gave that evidence more weight
than it could bear, or suggests that the agency
relied on evidence that was not substantial
when determining damages. Rather, the
complainants' generalized evidence of
continued suffering until the time of the
hearing is one among the many facts on
which the agency relied to support the
damages award in the final order.

As BOLI notes in its final order, the agency
has awarded far greater damages than
$75,000 and $60,000 to a complainant in
cases involving invidious discrimination.
Nonetheless, given BOLI's detailed factual
findings about the effect of the refusal of
service on these particular complainants—
including anger, depression, questioning
their own identity and self-worth,
embarrassment, shame, frustration, along
with anxiety and reduced excitement about
the wedding itself—we cannot say that the
order is so far out of line with previous cases
that it lacks substantial reason.
For the foregoing reasons, we reject the third
assignment of error and affirm the damages
award.

3. Consistency with other BOLI awards
Finally, the Kleins argue that BOLI's award
lacks substantial reason because it is "out of
line with comparable cases." The Kleins
contend, as they did below, that the
complainants' suffering relates to a single,

D. Fourth Assignment: Application of ORS
659A.409
In their fourth assignment of error, the Kleins
contend that BOLI erred in concluding that
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they violated ORS 659A.409. That statute
provides, as pertinent here, that

Perkins, Aaron described his brief
conversation with Rachel at Sweetcakes that
led to him telling her, "[W]e don't do samesex marriage, same-sex wedding cakes."
Second, at a different point in that same
interview, Aaron related an earlier
conversation that he had had with Melissa
regarding the prospect of legalized same-sex
marriage; in that conversation, according to
Aaron, he and Melissa agreed that they could
"see it is going to become an issue but we
have to stand firm." Third, BOLI relied on the
handwritten sign that was taped to the inside
of Sweetcakes' front window, which read, in
part, "Closed but still in business. * * * This
fight is not over. We will continue to stand
strong. Your religious freedom is becoming
not free anymore. This is ridiculous that we
cannot practice our faith. The LORD is good
and we will continue to serve HIM with all
our heart."

"it is an unlawful practice for any person
acting on behalf of any place of public
accommodation
as
defined
in ORS
659A.400 to publish, circulate, issue or
display, or cause to be published, circulated,
issue or displayed, any communication,
notice, advertisement or sign of any kind to
the effect that any of the accommodations,
advantages, facilities, services or privileges
of the place of public accommodation will be
refused, withheld from or denied to, or that
any discrimination will be made against, any
person on account of race, color, religion,
sex, sexual orientation, national origin,
marital status or age * * *."
In essence, the statute makes it unlawful to
threaten to commit unlawful discrimination.
In its final order, BOLI concluded that the
Kleins did so through several statements, as
discussed below, and enjoined them from
committing further violations.

In the final order, BOLI reasoned that the
above statements, considered in "text and
context," were properly construed as "the
recounting of past events," but also
"constitute notice that discrimination will be
made in the future by refusing such services."
As a result, BOLI's final order included
language ordering the Kleins "to cease and
desist" from making any communication "to
the effect that" they would discriminate in the
future "on account of sexual orientation." The
language in the order precisely tracks the
statutory language in ORS 659A.409, quoted
above.

The Kleins acknowledge that BOLI "may
enjoin people from threatening to
discriminate on the basis of sexual
orientation," without implicating the First
Amendment. However, the Kleins argue that
the statements that BOLI found objectionable
did not communicate any intention to
discriminate in the future, but merely
expressed the Kleins' views about the
ongoing controversy and their belief in the
validity of their legal and moral position.

On judicial review, the Kleins essentially
make two arguments. First, they argue that
BOLI erred in concluding that the three
statements, individually or collectively,

The final order describes three discrete
statements attributed to the Kleins. First, in
the February 2014 interview with Tony
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violated ORS 659A.409 by communicating
an intention to discriminate in the future. In
the Kleins' view, those statements simply
describe "the facts of this case, their view of
the law, and their intent to vindicate that
view." Second, the Kleins argue that BOLI's
injunction is overbroad to the extent that it
purports to restrict the Kleins from
expressing those views.

interviewer whether the controversy with the
complainants had caught him off guard, and
he responded, "[I]t was one of those
situations where we said 'well I can see it is
going to become an issue but we have to
stand firm.'" That statement plainly recounted
his past thinking and cannot reasonably be
construed as the kind of threat of prospective
discrimination that ORS 659A.409 prohibits.

We agree with the Kleins' first point. Aaron's
statements in the February 2014 interview
can be reasonably understood only one way:
as describing past events. BOLI's order states
that Aaron "did not say only that he would not
do complainants' specific marriage and cake
but, that respondents 'don't do' same-sex
marriage and cakes." But regardless of
whether his words can be understood to refer
generally to same-sex marriage and cakes,
BOLI ignores the context in which he made
that remark during the interview. Aaron was
asked by the interviewer, "Tell us how this
unfolded and your reaction to that." He
responded by describing what had
happened on the day of the refusal, including,
"I said, 'I'm very sorry, I feel like you may
have wasted your time. You know we don't
do same-sex marriage, same-sex wedding
cakes.' And she got upset, noticeably, and I
understand that." Viewed in that context,
Aaron's recounting of those historical events
cannot be understood as a statement that he
would deny service in the future.

That leaves the note taped to the Sweetcakes
window. Again, that note read:
"Closed but still in business. You can reach
me
by
email
or
facebook.
www.sweetcakesweb.com or Sweetcakes by
Melissa facebook page. New phone number
will be provided on my website and
facebook. This fight is not over. We will
continue to stand strong. Your religious
freedom is becoming not free anymore. This
is ridiculous that we cannot practice our faith.
The LORD is good and we will continue to
serve HIM with all our heart [heart symbol]."
BOLI concedes that the statement could refer
to their intention to stand strong in their legal
fight, but argues that it "also could refer to the
denial of services to same-sex couples."
We are not persuaded that, given the
ambiguity in the note, it can serve as an
independent basis for BOLI's determination
that the Kleins violated ORS 659A.409—
and, indeed, BOLI did not purport to rely on
the note alone. As explained above, in
overturning the ALJ's determination
regarding ORS 659A.409, BOLI relied
heavily on statements in the Perkins
interview—taken out of context—to
conclude that the Kleins had communicated

Likewise, Aaron's recounting, during the
interview, of past conversations that he and
Melissa had engaged in before the denial of
service cannot reasonably be understood as
an assertion of their plans to discriminate in
the future. Aaron was asked by the
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an intention to discriminate in the future.
When those statements and the note are
viewed in their proper context, the record
does not support BOLI's conclusion that the
Kleins violated ORS 659A.409. We therefore
reverse that part of BOLI's order.

Reversed as to BOLI's conclusion that the
Kleins violated ORS 659A.409 and the
related grant of injunctive relief; otherwise
affirmed.
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“Supreme Court passes, for now, on a new wedding cake dispute”
The Los Angeles Times
David Savage
June 17, 2019
The Supreme Court announced Monday it
would not decide, for now, whether a
Christian couple from Oregon had a
constitutional right to defy that state’s civil
rights law and refuse to make a wedding cake
for the marriage of two women.

orientation or transgender status. There is no
federal law that forbids discrimination based
on sexual orientation, but Oregon, like
California and 20 other states, prohibits such
discrimination by businesses and employers.
The justices had considered the appeal since
early February. The couple’s lawyers asked
the court to hear the case and issue a national
ruling. Oregon’s attorney general said the
appeal should be turned down.

Instead, the justices told an Oregon court to
take a second look at the case based on last
year’s high court ruling in favor of a Christian
cake maker from Colorado.
In doing so, the court kept alive the couple’s
appeal and left open the question of whether
businesses can discriminate against gays and
lesbians based on their religious beliefs.

The justices did neither. The court issued a
one-line order sending the case of Klein vs.
Oregon Bureau of Labor back to an Oregon
court “for further consideration in light of
Masterpiece Cakeshop vs. Colorado Civil
Rights Commission.” In that case, the
justices by a 7-2 vote said a Christian cake
maker had been treated unfairly by a state
civil rights commission.

The tentative decision shows again that Chief
Justice John G. Roberts Jr. and his colleagues
are inclined to put off rulings on culture war
controversies.
Melissa and Aaron Klein refused to make a
cake in 2013 for the marriage of two women.
Oregon authorities fined them $135,000 for
violating the state’s law that requires
businesses to provide full and equal service
for all customers, without regard to race,
religion or sexual orientation.

The Kleins were represented in the Supreme
Court by the Texas-based First Liberty
Institute,
and its president,
Kelly
Shackelford, called the outcome “a victory
for Aaron and Melissa Klein and for the
religious liberty of all Americans.”
Rachel and Laurel Bowman-Cryer, the two
women who sued after they were turned
away, were represented by Lambda Legal,

The case could have set a national precedent,
deciding whether conservative Christians
may receive a religious exemption from laws
that bar discrimination based on sexual
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rights for gays and lesbians, but said Jack
Phillips, the baker in that case, had been
subjected to religious “hostility” by a state
commission.

“It is a long-standing rule that the freedom of
religion is not a license for businesses to
discriminate,” said Jennifer Pizer, a senior
counsel for the legal defense fund.

“These disputes must be resolved with
tolerance, without undue disrespect to sincere
religious belief, and without subjecting gay
persons to indignities when they seek goods
and services in an open market,” he wrote.

In recent years, several Catholic social
services agencies have objected to arranging
adoptions for same-sex couples, and a small
number of business owners — including a
photographer in New Mexico and a florist in
Washington state — waged legal battles after
refusing to participate in same-sex marriage
ceremonies.

The Klein appeal asked the justices to decide
“whether Oregon violated the Free Speech
and Free Exercise Clauses of the 1st
Amendment by compelling the couple to
design and create a custom wedding cake to
celebrate a same-sex wedding ritual, in
violation of their sincerely held religious
beliefs” and whether “the court should
overrule” a disputed 1990 decision barring
most religious exemptions.

Until now, the Christian business owners
have lost in the courts. Judges have upheld
the state civil rights laws and the principle of
nondiscrimination.
Four conservative justices dissented in 2015
when the court upheld an equal right to marry
for same-sex couples. With Justice Brett M.
Kavanaugh having joined the court, there
may now be five justices ready to side with
religious conservatives on the question of
whether their beliefs can override civil rights
statutes.

The case began early in 2013 when the
Bowman-Cryers were preparing to marry.
The women had been together for nearly 10
years and were in the process of adopting two
children with special needs. Rachel and her
mother went to the Sweet Cakes shop in
Gresham, Ore., a small city just east of
Portland, where they had purchased
decorative cakes before. But when Aaron
Klein learned the marriage would have two
brides, he said the shop would not make a
cake for them.

Retired Justice Anthony M. Kennedy played
the key role in the court’s 2015 decision on
equal marriage rights. He was torn last year
over the case of a baker from Colorado who
cited his Christian beliefs as reason for
turning away two men who were planning a
wedding party.

In a later conversation with Rachel’s mother,
Klein quoted a passage from the biblical
Book of Leviticus and its reference to “an
abomination,” which many religious
conservatives read as a condemnation of
homosexual conduct.

Kennedy wrote an opinion in Masterpiece
Cakeshop that did not resolve how future
cases would be decided. He endorsed equal
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The two women filed a complaint with the
state
agency
that
enforces
its
antidiscrimination law. An administrative
law judge held a hearing and awarded the
couple $135,000 in compensation for their
emotional suffering. The state commission
and the state’s courts rejected appeals filed by
the Kleins.

Last year, the Oregon Supreme Court refused
to hear their case. And last fall, shortly after
Kavanaugh was confirmed, the Christian
couple asked the U.S. Supreme Court to hear
their appeal.
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“Justices Dodge New Case Defending Denial of Service to LGBT Couple”
Law.com
Marcia Coyle
June 17, 2019
The U.S. Supreme Court on Monday said it
will not take up and hear arguments over
whether a baker who refused on religious
grounds to make a wedding cake for a samesex couple violated a state’s antidiscrimination law.

who announced his retirement later that
month, said. Justice Brett Kavanaugh
succeeded Kennedy.
In the Oregon case, Melissa and Aaron Klein
owned a bakery doing business as
Sweetcakes by Melissa. Rachel BowmanCryer and her mother, Cheryl, visited the
bakery in 2013 for a cake-tasting
appointment. Rachel and her longtime
partner Laurel Bowman-Cryer were planning
to marry.

The justices vacated the lower court ruling
and sent the case Klein v. Oregon Bureau of
Labor & Industries back to the Oregon Court
of Appeals for further consideration in light
of the high court’s decision last term
in Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil
Rights Commission.

During the tasting, Aaron Klein told them
that Sweetcakes would not make wedding
cakes for same-sex ceremonies because of his
and Melissa’s religious convictions. The
couple who wanted a cake filed complaints
with the Oregon bureau, alleging the Kleins
refused to make them a wedding cake
because of their sexual orientation.

In Masterpiece, the justices avoided deciding
the First Amendment speech and religion
claims by a Colorado baker. The 7-2 majority
on June 4, 2018, reversed the commission
and the Colorado Court of Appeals because
the commission did not give a neutral hearing
to the baker. Some commission members,
Justice Anthony Kennedy said, showed
hostility towards the baker’s religious beliefs.

The bureau found that the Kleins had violated
the state’s public accommodations law by
denying “full and equal” service to a person
“on account of sexual orientation” and a
second public accommodations law by
communicating an intention to unlawfully
discriminate in the future.

“The outcome of cases like this in other
circumstances must await further elaboration
in the courts, all in the context of recognizing
that these disputes must be resolved with
tolerance, without undue disrespect to sincere
religious beliefs, and without subjecting gay
persons to indignities when they seek goods
and services in an open market,” Kennedy,

The Oregon Court of Appeals agreed that
their refusal to make the cakes was “on
account of” the couple’s sexual orientation. It
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also found that the bureau’s final order did
not impermissibly burden the Kleins’ First
Amendment right to free exercise of their
religion because, as the U.S. Supreme Court
held in 1990 in Employment Division v.
Smith, the order “simply requires their
compliance with a neutral law of general
applicability, and the Kleins have made no
showing that the state targeted them for
enforcement because of their religious
beliefs.”

to overrule the 1990 Smith decision. The
Smith majority opinion was written by
Justice Antonin Scalia.
Oregon
Solicitor
General
Benjamin
Gutman countered that the Kleins denied
service to the same-sex couple based on their
sexual orientation before discussing the
design of any cake. Under Supreme Court
cases, he wrote, “baking is conduct, not
speech, and Oregon may regulate that
conduct for purposes unrelated to the
suppression of free expression. Whether a
particular cake reflecting a specific message
could be protected by the First Amendment is
not presented on this record.”

In their Supreme Court petition, the Kleins,
represented by Adam Gustafson, partner at
Boyden Gray & Associates, pressed again
their First Amendment speech and free
exercise claims. They also asked the justices
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“The Supreme Court is Showing an Instinct for Self-Preservation, at Least Until
Next Year’s Election”
The New York Times
Linda Greenhouse
June 20, 2019
The justices of the Supreme Court know how
to keep out of trouble. That’s the takeaway
from the order the court issued on Monday,
sending back to the lower court a new case
about another baker who wouldn’t bake a
wedding cake.

upheld the order, and the Oregon Supreme
Court refused to hear the appeal.
On Monday, instead of adding the case to
their docket, the justices vacated the lowercourt decision and told the Oregon Court of
Appeals to reconsider the case “in light of”
last June’s Masterpiece Cakeshop decision.
Objectively, that disposition makes little
sense. The Supreme Court didn’t actually
decide the constitutional issues in
Masterpiece Cakeshop. Rather, Justice
Anthony Kennedy’s majority opinion found
that two Colorado officials who had a hand in
deciding the case against the baker had made
comments that indicated an impermissible
“hostility” to religion. As Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg observed in dissent, comments by
“one or two members of one of the four
decision-making entities” involved in
passing judgment in the case did not amount
to anything the Supreme Court had ever
deemed close to impinging on the free
exercise of religion. The decision was, in
other words, a punt. It has no “light” to shed
on the Oregon dispute.

The case, Klein v. Oregon Bureau of Labor
and Industries, was a near-exact replica of
last year’s Masterpiece Cakeshop case. Like
the owner of that Colorado bakery, the
husband and wife owners of Sweetcakes by
Melissa in Gresham, Ore., claimed that their
religion prohibited them from designing and
baking a cake to be used in celebrating a
same-sex marriage. To do so, the owners
explained in their petition to the Supreme
Court, would amount to “complicity in sin.”
In fact, they said, the very reason they baked
wedding cakes was to “celebrate weddings
between one man and one woman.”
Like Colorado, Oregon has a public
accommodations law that bars business from
discriminating on the basis of sexual
orientation. Acting on the complaint of a
lesbian couple, the official in charge of
enforcing that law imposed a $135,000 fine
to be paid to the couple as “compensatory
damages for emotional, mental and physical
suffering.” The Oregon Court of Appeals

To add a case to the Supreme Court’s docket
takes only four votes. The Oregon bakers’
appeal described their case as an “ideal
vehicle” that “squarely presents the
constitutional questions that the court did not
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answer in Masterpiece Cakeshop.” Wasn’t
that enough to interest four justices? Quite
likely, it was, at least initially. That’s where
serious strategizing must have come into
play. The appeal reached the court last
October. The justices took it up at their
private conference 10 times. While the
closed-door conference is the Supreme
Court’s ultimate black box, we know enough
about it to be certain that it’s not a place for
idle chatter. No doubt memos were
circulating, with arguments for and against
taking the case. Having ducked this particular
front in the culture wars a year ago, did the
justices really want to get back in now?

deeming Masterpiece Cakeshop irrelevant,
reissued its original opinion almost word for
word.
What I discern as the Supreme Court’s
instinct for self-preservation was also on
display last month in an abortion case from
Indiana. The state was appealing a ruling that
invalidated its law banning abortions for
reasons of the race, sex or disability of the
fetus, a law enacted in deliberate and flagrant
violation of existing abortion precedents. The
state’s appeal, Box v. Planned Parenthood of
Indiana and Kentucky, went to conference an
astonishing 15 times over five months.
Ultimately, the court denied the appeal,
noting in an unsigned opinion that because
the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit is the only court to have
considered such a law, “we follow our
ordinary practice of denying petitions insofar
as they raise legal issues that have not been
considered by additional Courts of Appeals.”

I think that what finally prevailed was an
institutional instinct for self-preservation.
Why re-enter this battle at this moment?
Cases granted this spring will be argued in the
fall, to be decided next spring with the
political season at its height and the court
itself under a bright election-year spotlight.
The court already has plenty to do next term,
with three cases granted on whether federal
law protects gay and transgender people
against discrimination on the job. The
conflict between private conscience and
public duty is age-old. The court has time to
resolve it in future cases. In fact, another such
case will soon be on the way to the Supreme
Court. This month, the Washington State
Supreme Court reinstated a ruling against a
flower shop owner who, because of her
“relationship with Jesus Christ,” told a gay
couple, longtime customers, that she could
not design a flower arrangement for their
wedding. The justices had vacated that ruling
and sent the case back to the state court last
summer for reconsideration in light of
Masterpiece Cakeshop. The state court,

On a court deeply divided on the subject of
abortion, that disposition was unanimous.
Ordinarily, when the court turns down an
appeal, it says nothing. That the justices
chose to explain themselves in this instance
has to be seen, it seems to me, as sending a
message. If I read that message correctly, we
can expect the same outcome when the states
that are now busy banning abortion appeal to
the Supreme Court from the lower-court
rulings that will inevitably strike down the
new laws. (But to be precise, my prediction
holds only until Election Day 2020, when the
justices will be free from whatever constraint
they now feel about taking a step likely to
incite a public backlash against the
Republican Party.)
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These reflections on the court’s instinct for
self-preservation lead me to a final question:
What to do about the census case? As the
world knows, the deeply contested question
of the validity of the Trump administration’s
plan to ask about citizenship has become
even more fraught with revelations from the
computer files of a recently deceased
Republican redistricting specialist, Thomas
Hofeller. The documents appear to validate
the conclusion reached by Federal District
Judge Jesse Furman, whose ruling against the
Trump administration is before the justices,
that the administration’s purported goodgovernment reason for adding the citizenship
question was a pretext. The real reason, the
documents indicate, was to provide a
statistical basis for entrenching Republican
power by disregarding noncitizens in the
population counts for future redistricting.

District Court without waiting for a decision
from the Court of Appeals.
But there is another option, suggested by the
plaintiffs in a final footnote to their latest
brief: Just dismiss the appeal. The procedure
is known as a DIG: “dismissed as
improvidently granted.” The justices use it
once or twice a term, usually when a case
turns out, on further reflection, not to be what
they thought it was when they granted it. In
fact, the court used a DIG on April 23 to
dismiss a securities case, Emulex Corp. v.
Varjabedian, that had been argued a week
earlier.
The court deployed a DIG on the last day of
the term in June 2012 to dismiss a case, First
American Financial Corp. v. Edwards, that
had been argued a full five months earlier.
That case presented a question with
important implications for the separation of
powers: whether Congress can enact a law
that confers standing — the right to sue — on
people who, while they can point to a legal
violation, did not suffer a concrete injury
traceable to the violation. Circumstantial
evidence strongly suggests that after the case
was argued on Nov. 28, 2011, the assignment
to write the majority opinion went to Justice
Clarence Thomas.

The court heard argument in the case in April,
a month before the new information surfaced
in an unrelated redistricting case. Judge
Furman, responding to a request by one set of
plaintiffs to reopen the census case for further
discovery, said that with the case now before
the Supreme Court, he lacked authority to do
so. Those plaintiffs, represented by the
American Civil Liberties Union, have now
asked the justices for a “limited remand” that
would send the case back to the District Court
“to allow exploration of where the truth lies.”

For reasons never revealed, Justice Thomas
apparently failed to keep the four colleagues
he needed on board with his analysis of the
case, and a decision was never published. Did
he overreach and scare the others away by
trying to make too big a statement about the
relationship between Congress and the
judiciary? Did the court, tormented that term
by the first Obamacare case, just throw up its

Even if the justices were so inclined, the
request
presents
obvious
logistical
difficulties, with the clock ticking toward the
date when the census forms have to be in final
shape for distribution. It was that deadline
that led the court to grant the administration’s
request to hear the appeal directly from the
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hands? The fate of First American Financial
is one of the little mysteries I’d like to see
solved one of these years.

even reached the court. A DIG here would
leave Judge Furman’s opinion in place and
would enable the professionals in the Census
Bureau, who strongly objected to adding the
citizenship question, free to go about their
business counting us — all of us. If I’m right
about these recent signals that the court
knows how to save itself, now is the time.

For the time being, it’s a reminder that the
court knows how to get itself out of a tight
spot when it needs to. A DIG requires no
explanation. Its effect is to wipe the Supreme
Court slate clean, as if the appeal had never
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“U.S. Supreme Court Orders New Look at Clash Over Gay-Wedding Cake”
Bloomberg
Greg Stohr
June 17, 2019
The U.S. Supreme Court ordered
reconsideration of a $135,000 award against
an Oregon bakery that refused to make a cake
for a same-sex wedding in a case that revived
a fractious debate over religious rights and
equal treatment.

The Kleins say the state violated their speech
and religious freedoms. They said the ruling
“will chill expression and enlarge the power
of bureaucrats to force unwilling speakers to
participate in rituals and to promote
ideologies of all kinds that violate their
creeds and their consciences.”

After more than three months of deliberation,
the justices Monday set aside the award and
told an Oregon state appeals court to revisit
the case in light of a 2018 Supreme Court
ruling in a similar fight from Colorado. The
Supreme Court resolved that case narrowly - and avoided the core constitutional
questions -- by saying Colorado officials had
shown animus toward the baker’s religious
views.

The Kleins, who paid the penalty plus interest
in 2015, say the dispute forced them to close
their business. The couple benefited from a
crowdfunding campaign that raised more
than $350,000, according to a report at the
time.
‘Months of Delay’
Oregon Attorney General Ellen Rosenblum
said the lower court applied “well-established
First Amendment principles to conclude that
a bakery open to the public did not have a
constitutional right to discriminate against
customers on the basis of the customers’
sexual orientation.”

The latest case involves “Sweetcakes by
Melissa,” a now-closed Portland-area bakery
owned by Melissa and Aaron Klein. The
Kleins, who are Christian, cited religious
grounds when they refused to provide a cake
for Rachel and Laurel Bowman-Cryer in
2013.

The Supreme Court took an unusually long
time to decide how to handle the case before
settling on what is often a routine step. The
appeal was scheduled for possible discussion
at the justices’ private conference 13 times.

The Bowman-Cryers filed a complaint with
the Oregon Bureau of Labor and Industries,
the state’s civil rights watchdog, which found
the bakers in violation of a state antidiscrimination law and awarded the two
women $135,000. An Oregon state appeals
court upheld the award.

The Supreme Court didn’t spell out precisely
what concerns it had about the award. But the
Oregon court’s reconsideration is likely to
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focus on the role of Brad Avakian, whose
position as commissioner of the Bureau of
Labor and Industries made him the key
decision maker in the case.

comment on the dispute between Sweetcakes
and the Bowman-Cryers.
In upholding the award, an Oregon state
appeals court said Avakian’s comments “fall
short of the kinds of statements that reflect
prejudgment of the facts or an impermissibly
closed-minded view of law or policy so as to
indicate that he, as a decision maker, cannot
be impartial.”

Shortly after the Bowman-Cryers filed their
complaint, Avakian posted a news article
about the dispute on Facebook, along with
the comment: “Everyone has a right to their
religious beliefs, but that doesn’t mean they
can disobey laws already in place. Having
one set of rules for everybody ensures that
people are treated fairly as they go about their
daily lives.” Avakian didn’t specifically

The case is Klein v. Oregon Bureau of Labor
and Industries, 18-547.
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“Appeals court upholds fine against Christian bakers who refused to make samesex wedding case”

Oregon Live
Gordan R. Friedman
December 28, 2017
The Oregon Court of Appeals on
Thursday upheld a decision by Oregon's
labor
commissioner
that
forced
two Gresham bakers to pay $135,000 to a
lesbian couple for whom the bakers refused
to make a wedding cake.

decided not to seek re-election when his
term expires next year.
The Kleins appealed Avakian's decision,
arguing for a religious exemption from the
Oregon
Equality
Act,
the
antidiscrimination law. They also argued
Avakian was biased against them, that his
actions violated their rights to free
expression as artists and their right to due
process, and that the fine was excessive.

Melissa and Aaron Klein made national
headlines in 2013 when they refused to bake
a cake for Rachel and Laurel BowmanCryer, citing their Christian beliefs. The
Bowman-Cryers complained to the Oregon
Bureau of Labor and Industries, saying they
had been refused service because of their
sexual orientation.

But in their ruling Thursday, a panel of state
appeals court judges sided with Avakian,
saying the Kleins did, in fact, deny the
Bowman-Cryers because they were
lesbians. The justices also rejected the
Kleins' argument that Avakian's ruling
violated state and federal free speech
protections.

An administrative law judge ruled that the
Kleins' bakery, Sweetcakes by Melissa,
violated a law that bans discrimination
based on sexual orientation in places that
serve the public. Brad Avakian, the state
labor
commissioner, affirmed heavy
damages against the Kleins for the
Bowman-Cryer's emotional and mental
distress.

In the ruling, Judge Chris Garrett wrote that
Avakian's order does not violate the Klein's
free speech rights because it simply
"requires their compliance with a neutral
law." Garrett also wrote that the Kleins
"have made no showing that the state
targeted them for enforcement because of
their religious beliefs."

The decision will likely be the most
controversial ruling, and the one with the
biggest impact, handed down by Avakian
during his nearly 10 years in the role. He has
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In a statement, Avakian said the Appeals
Court ruling "sends a strong signal that
Oregon remains open to all."

The First Liberty Institute, a religious
freedom law firm whose attorneys also
represented the Kleins, said it is
disappointed by Thursday's ruling. "The
Oregon Court of Appeals decided that
Aaron and Melissa Klein are not entitled to
the Constitution's promises of religious
liberty and free speech," said Kelly
Shackelford, the institute's president.

Through their attorney, the Bowman-Cryers
said Thursday's ruling affirms "the longstanding idea that discrimination has no
place in America."
"All of us are equal under the law and
should be treated equally," the couple said.
Any ruling to the contrary would "create a
sweeping license to discriminate," they said.

The Kleins paid the fine following
Avakian's order and closed their
baking business around the same time.
Donors gave the bakers more than
$500,000, money they say has been spent on
legal fees. The $135,000 damage award
belonging to the Bowman-Cryers has been
locked in an escrow account pending
appeals.

The appeals court ruling represents an
"important victory" for the BowmanCryers, who faced humiliation, harassment
and death threats after their wedding
preparations turned into an ordeal, said
Nancy Marcus, senior attorney at Lambda
Law, a national pro-LGBT rights group.
Marcus said the court's ruling is critical yet
"completely unsurprising" because it aligns
with courts in other states, which have not
allowed businesses to exempt themselves
from anti-discrimination laws.

The Kleins' case is one of several similar
cases that has attracted significant media
attention. Another, stemming from a
Colorado ruling, was argued before the U.S.
Supreme Court earlier this month. The court
justices are reportedly divided over whether
a baker was justified in turning away a gay
couple seeking a wedding cake because of
their religious beliefs. That baker, like the
Kleins, contends that creating and customdecorating a cake is an act of artistic
expression that deserves more free speech
protections than the sales of other goods and
services.

Adam Gustafson, lead attorney for the
Kleins and the former White House counsel
for President George H.W. Bush, was not
immediately available for comment.
Gustafson had argued the bakers' religious
beliefs should shield them from being
compelled to conduct speech -- in this case,
baking a cake. Such a requirement would
"offend
the
conscience
and
the
constitution," Gustafson argued.
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